The Discourse of Mass Incidents : Party-Press and Investigative Media Representations of the Weng’an Incident by Ness, Lars Flottorp
  
  
The Discourse of Mass Incidents 
 
Party-Press and Investigative Media 
Representations of the Weng’an Incident  
 




















M. A. Thesis (60 Credits) 
Chinese Society and Politics 
 
Supervisor: Halvor Eifring 
 
Department of Culture Studies and Oriental Languages 






























© Lars Flottorp Ness 
2013 









This study will examine two different media representations of the Weng’an incident, a social 
riot that took place in Weng’an county in Guizhou Province during the summer of 2008. The 
aim of my thesis is to scrutinize how the party-press and the critical press cover the sensitive 
topic of mass incidents. For this purpose, I have carried out a discourse analysis of the media 
coverage by the provincial party-paper Guizhou Daily and the investigative newspaper 
Southern Weekend. This dual focus on both the party-press and investigative media texts is 
undoubtedly one of the strong aspects of the thesis, because such a comparative view can help 
highlight the media diversity one actually can find within state-dominated media systems, 
such as the one in China. The analysis of the party-press coverage will contribute to not only 
getting a better understanding of how the orthodox party-papers handle very sensitive topics 
in the discursive domain, but also making it easier to grasp and assert the role of investigative 
journalism and its significance in contemporary Chinese media. One of the most interesting 
findings in this thesis is how investigative newspapers conduct critical journalism under 
conditions of domination. My analysis shows the subtle discursive strategies of resistance 
used by the critical press in order to camouflage critical comments and discussions of 
sensitive aspects, therefore to make them politically acceptable and publishable. This thesis 
shows that one major discursive strategy of resistance is polyphony – a multitude of official 
and non-official voices, which is also a particular feature of critical investigative media 
representations. In this polyphony, the strategic use of the official voice and discourse plays 
an instrumental role in making non-official critical voices and views seem more legitimate 
and therefore less transgressive. Other subtle strategies of resistance include conscious lexical 
and syntactical choices that help to downplay the discursive representation of social conflicts 
by implicitly pointing to the contradictions between an illegitimate corrupt local government 
and the masses. My study shows how Southern Weekend’s role and function are connected 
with the use of such strategies, which enable investigative newspapers to resist the traditional 
party-press style of journalism. I argue that Southern Weekend’s media representation of the 
Weng’an incident can be understood as an example of how investigative journalism in China 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
 
1.1 Thesis Statement 
 
The aim of this study is to examine how China’s traditional newspaper media cover mass 
incidents (quntixing shijian). I will use the Weng’an incident (Weng’an shijian) as my main 
case and do a discourse analysis of the coverage from two different Chinese newspapers. 
Even though coverage of such topics is considered a political minefield, such coverage is 
becoming commonplace in the Chinese media. However, the party-state’s introduction and 
renewed emphasis on the construction of a harmonious society (hexie shehui) in the preceding 
and succeeding years of the Beijing Olympics illustrates the sensitive nature of this topic. 
Official propaganda postulates that contemporary China is in a period of approaching 
shengshi, “a traditional term used in dynastic politics to describe the years combining peace 
(taiping) and prosperity”, but as Guoguang Wu points out: “only half of this term applies: 
China has achieved material prosperity, but without social peace”.1 Mass incidents as a social 
phenomenon encapsulates vividly most of the acute socio-political problems in contemporary 
China and its growing frequency underpins Wu’s point. I will specifically look at a critical 
investigative media representation of the Weng’an incident, but to better understand the role 
of investigative journalism in China, I will also include an analysis of a party-press 
representation of this mass incident. This will be done by analysing articles from Guizhou 
Daily, a provincial newspaper embedded in the immediate power structures in relation to 
where the actual event took place. I will analyse Southern Weekend and its coverage to 
examine how critical investigative newspapers cover the sensitive topic of mass incidents. I 
think this dual focus on critical investigative discourse and its role in tandem with an in-depth 
analysis of a party-press discourse is one of the strong sides of this thesis. This is because 
there has been little research and textual analysis done on party-press texts and articles, in 
comparison with the abundant research done on investigative journalism. Another interesting 
feature of this thesis is its emphasis on discourse with the detailed analysis of media texts, 
which tries to explain the interplay between politics, social structure and journalism and how 
this actually plays out in the actual texts and articles. The reason why this is particularly 
interesting is because there seems not much research on media texts and the practical 
                                                
1 Guoguang Wu (2010) “China 2009. Muddling though Crises” in Asian Survey, p 29-30 
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consequences of working under conditions of party-state domination. Another strong point of 
my study is that the analysis will include a dual focus on looking at the micro- and the macro-
levels of discourse. In other words, the analysis will range from detailed textual analysis of 
choices regarding words and syntactic structures to far above sentence-level, with the analysis 
of voices present and not present in the texts. 
 
On one side, the analysis of the news coverage by Guizhou Daily will show how the party-
press discourse organize meaning and knowledge and how it makes sense of mass incidents. 
On the other side, the thesis will examine resistance to such discourse, by looking at how 
critical investigative discourse provides an alternative media representation of the Weng’an 
incident. Analysing articles from the tour de force of investigative journalism in China, 
Southern Weekend will achieve this purpose. Such a comparative perspective will also help 
bring light to some of the diversity found within the Chinese state-dominated media system 
today. My thesis will thus examine some of the discursive strategies and means which critical 
investigative journalism can use to make critical comments on sensitive topics politically 
acceptable and thus publishable. One major finding in this study is the polyphony of critical 
investigative discourse, in which the strategic use of the dominant official discourse play a 
major role in camouflaging and neutralising critical comments in order to “bypass political 
minefields”2 found in the coverage of mass incidents. In relation to Guizhou Daily and the 
party-press discourse of mass incidents, I argue that Southern Weekend’s media representation 
of the Weng’an incident can be understood as an example of how investigative journalism in 
China has created new spaces of media representations.3 This is done through discursive 
strategies such as polyphony and infrapolitics by “inserting elements of the hidden transcript 







                                                
2 This phrase is borrowed from Jingrong Tong, a scholar who has done substantial research on investigative 
journalism in China. 
3 Elin Sæther (2008a) The Conditional Autonomy of the Critical Press in China, (2008b) “A New Political Role? 
Discursive Strategies of Critical Journalists in China” in China aktuell  
4 Sæther (2008a), p 9 
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With this in mind I propose the following research questions: 
 
How do critical investigative newspapers in China cover mass incidents? 
Which discursive strategies are employed to make critical comments safe and thus 
publishable? 
How do party-papers cover mass incidents? 
What are the role and function of party-papers and investigative newspapers respectively in 




Yew-Jin Fang has conducted research and discourse analysis of Chinese newspaper articles, 
but she focuses on representations of social protests and riots in Chinese foreign news. Her 
research shows how the ideological orientation of a given newspaper influences the reporting 
of a particular event in construing a media representation that is congruent with party-state 
ideology and national foreign policy.5 Jingrong Tong has done some very interesting research 
on the transformation of news articles by looking at how reports on social riots and unrest are 
altered in the process of editing through comparing the original article submitted by the 
journalist and the published article. She further examines how editors bypass political 
minefields with discursive strategies, solving the paradox of making news reports politically 
acceptable, as well as commercially profitable.6 Tong devoted a chapter in her book, 
Investigative Journalism in China, on how investigative journalists cover social riots and 
mass incidents, using discourse analysis to pinpoint journalists’ and editors’ discursive 
strategies.7 Qing Cao has done some similar research but on a different field, analysing how 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has utilized Confucian discourse on the international scene 
to develop the concept of “the peaceful rise of China” and later “the peaceful development of 
China” in order to battle and debunk Western cold-war framework underpinning the 
perception of China as “the China Threat”.8 The scholar Juan Li contrasted the official US 
and Chinese media coverage during the diplomatic crisis of 1999 and 2000 by looking at the 
discourse of national conflicts and the construction of national identities, using Fairclough’s 
                                                
5 Yew-Jin Fang (1994).“Riots” and Demonstrations in the Chinese Press” in Discourse and Society, (2001) 
“Reporting the Same Events? in Discourse and Society 
6 Jingrong Tong (2009a) “Press Self-censorship in China: A Case Study in the Transformation of Discourse” in 
Discourse and Society 
7 Tong (2009b) “Reporting on Social Riots: How Investigative Journalists Tell Stories” in Investigative 
Journalism in China: Journalism, Power and Society, p 154-191 
8 Qing Cao (2007) “Confucian Vision of a New World Order?: Culturalist Discourse, Foreign Policy and the 
Press in Contemporary China” in International Communication Gazette 
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version of CDA where intertexuality is a crucial part of the analysis.9 Peter Sandby-Thomas 
has recently done an analysis of discourse of stability through detailed case studies. Sandby-
Thomas asks the simple question how the CCP has managed to remain in power in post-
Tiananmen China. He goes beyond the normal explanatory scheme of economic development 
coupled with nationalism filling the ideological vacuum of Communist and Maoist ideology. 
According to his research, the use of the discourse of stability (wending) has functioned as an 
essential legitimization strategy, postulating that the party-state led by CCP is the sole 
provider of continued political and material stability.10 Elin Sæther has done extensive work 
on explaining the “conditional autonomy” of critical journalism in contemporary Chinese 
media.11 Her approach is twofold. On one hand, she explores the social strategies and 
journalistic practices of investigative journalists and editors through extensive fieldwork and 
in-depth interviews. On the other hand, she enriches her dissertation by looking at how this 
“conditional autonomy” plays out in empirical data in the articles from Southern Weekend on 
topics ranging from SARS to mining conditions. This is interpreted and analysed with tools 
from discourse analysis and discourse theory, specifically at the macro-levels of discourse.  
My research is perhaps particularly indebt to Sæther’s work, particularly on the notion of the 
polyphonic nature of critical investigative journalism. My emphasis is however exclusively on 
the discursive level trying to explain with discourse analysis of the media coverage of the 
Weng’an incident, what studies of media economics and ownership or research on the 
institutional and legal setup of the Chinese media system can only partially explain. This is 
particularly true when it comes to examining resistance to the party-press discourse, 
represented here with articles from Southern Weekend.   
 
I argue that despite choosing a topic of such nature, it will still enable me to examine some of 
the diversity that one can find within the Chinese media, and also expose the blurry 
boundaries and ideological framework set by the party-state. More interestingly, the actual 
difference in the coverage can be substantial and even contradictory. Critical investigative 
journalism seems to be dependent on a string of factors, such as locality of the given news 
event in relation to the newspaper itself and the administrative boundaries of the party-state. 
In other words, how the decentralization of political, economical, cultural power along down 
                                                
9 Juan Li (2009) “Intertextuality and National Identity- Discourse of National Conflicts in Daily Newspapers in 
the United States and China” in Discourse and Society 
10 Peter Sanby-Thomas (2011) Legitimating the Chinese Communist Party Since Tiananmen: A Critical Analysis 
of the Stability Discourse 
11 Sæther (2008a, 2008b)  
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the levels of government has lead to a situation where local power structures control its own 
media to be congruent with its own interests, even though these local interests often collide 
with the national ones from Beijing, marking what Tong has called “the crisis of the 
centralized media theory”.12 Tong argues that this clash between the local and national has 
lead to a situation in which “disparity in aims of control has left a gap in media control, which 
allows certain space of media freedom”.13 My thesis will try to examine this space of relative 
media freedom, which arguably is exploited to the fullest by Southern Weekend with the 
practice of cross-regional reporting. This is another reason why I have chosen my particular 
approach of looking both at the coverage of the provincial party-paper Guizhou Daily and the 
coverage by Southern Weekend. As noted, the former is a party-paper embedded in the local 
power structures, whereas the latter represents an investigative newspaper outside the 
constituency and jurisdiction of localized power. As such, this thesis will in more abstract 
terms examine the party-press discourse and the critical investigative discourse by doing a 




1.2  Definitions of Terms and Concepts 
 
Discourse and Discourses  
 
Since this is a thesis about The Discourse of Mass Incidents, it is important to understand 
what discourse(s) and discourse signify when I use them. For instance, when I talk about 
“party-press discourse” or “critical investigative discourse”14, I draw upon Fairclough’s 
conceptualization of discourse(s) as “”ways of signifying experience from a particular 
perspective”.15 In this way, discourses are the means to organize knowledge and meaning 
about a given topic from a particular point of view. Neoliberalist discourses would for 
example organize knowledge and ascribe meaning to the topic of globalization in a very 
different way than Marxist discourses would. My analysis will show how differently party-
                                                
12 Tong (2010) “The Crisis of the Centralized Media Control Theory: How Local Power Controls Media in 
China” in Media Culture Society 
13 Ibid, p 937 
14 I use “party-press discourse” (and very sporadically “mouthpiece discourse”) to refer to Guizhou Daily. 
Critical investigative discourse refers to Southern Weekend 
15 Norman Fairclough (2010) Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language, p 95 
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press and investigative discourse organize knowledge and meaning, resulting in two quite 
different media representations of the same news event. 
 
In the more abstract discussion of the discourse of mass incidents, discourse (as a singular 
noun) is “language use conceived as social practice”.16 This conceptualization of the term will 
only be used in discussion of the more general limits and the blurry ideological framework in 
the order of Chinese media discourse. When I talk about “order of discourse” it is “the sum of 
all the genres and discourses which are in use within a specific social domain”17, which in my 
case is the Chinese newspaper media. What is important to acknowledge in this respect is how 
the use of discourses and genres is controlled by this totality (order of discourse), because it is 
the order of discourse that “constitutes the recourses (discourse and genres) that are available” 
and thus “delimits what can be said”.18 In the Chinese media, the order of discourse is strictly 
constrained by the state, with old Maoist practices and concepts, such as “mouthpiece” 
(houshe). This practice is still a lingering and dominating one in the Chinese media, which 
consequently influences the repertoire of discourses and genres available for Chinese 
journalists to draw upon in order to make sense of and interpret social reality in an 
understandable way.  
 
Mass Incidents – Quntixing Shijian 
 
The specific social phenomena I am analysing the news coverage of is in Chinese official 
terminology called “mass incidents” (quntixing shijian). Technically speaking, mass incidents 
are any forms of social protests or unrest with a minimum of 100 participants. With such an 
unclear and ambiguous definition it is actually hard to make sense of Chinese official 
“newspeak” of what is meant by “mass incidents”. Mass incidents could in theory range from 
a relatively peaceful petition campaign to extreme violent outbursts of riots involving 
thousands of people.19 My chosen case study arguably belongs to the latter description. As 
Bjorn Alpermann, a scholar on rural governance pointed out: “official figures lump together 
all kinds of  “collective incidents” (qunti shijian) ranging form peaceful group petitioning 
                                                
16 Ibid, p 95-96 
17 Marianne Jørgensen and Lousie Philips (2002) Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method, p 72 
18 Ibid, p 72 
19 Bjorn Alpermann (2013) “Village Governance Reforms in China” in Towards a New Development Paradigm 
in Twenty-First Century China: Economy, Society and Politics, p 151 
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through sit-ins and traffic blockades to violent outbursts of public anger".20 During the Hu-
Wen administration the number of mass incidents has grown exponentially. Official data 
shows that there has been an increase from 8,700 mass incidents in 1993 to over 90,000 in 
2006. After 2006 no official figures have been released, but sources indicate that this problem 
is increasing, with an approximation of over 120,000 mass incidents in 2010.21  
 
The Weng’an incident was a serious mass incident with thousands of demonstrators and 
rioters. But the particularities of the Weng’an incident fit well with what the Chinese 
sociologist Yu Jianrong has called shuhui xiefen shijian or “anger-venting social incidents”.22 
According to his research on what is particular about this type of mass incidents is that they: 
 
reflect generalized anger that has built up over time and then is released when an incident, 
sometimes a relatively minor one, occurs. In a short period of time, large numbers of people—
most of whom have no relationship to those involved in the incident—mobilize quickly and 
engage in sometimes extremely violent behaviour.23  
 
The overall availability of new and improved tools of disseminating information “not only aid 
mobilization but quickly spread word of the incident far and wide, thwarting the efforts of 
local officials to suppress news”.24 I think the latter point interesting with regards to my own 
case. The relative media freedom when conducting cross-regional critical reporting (meiti yidi 
jiandu) represented here by Southern Weekend, did not just only address the inconsistencies 
of the official party-press discourse, but also pointed to the pitfalls of that style of journalism. 
As my analysis later will show, combined with slow government response and paternalistic 
party-press discourse, and categories such “the ignorant masses” (bu ming zhenxiang de 
qunzhong), the problem was exactly that the masses did not believe in the propagated truth 
(shishi de zhenxiang) from the government through the party-press. Yu Jianrong further 
points out two other factors in his research about mass incidents; the role of public security 
personnel and lack of belief in Chinese judicial system:  
  
The judiciary is the last resort for ordinary people who seek relief when their rights and 
interests have been violated. If the bottom line of judicial fairness is compromised, the public 
would lose the legitimate channel for voicing their views and demands, and it should not be 
                                                
20 Alpermann (2010) “Rural Governance in Times of Economic Stress” in China and the World Economy 
China's Economic Rise after Three Decades of Reform, p 94 
21 Ibid, p 95 
22 Joseph Fewsmith (2008) “An ‘Anger-Venting’ Mass Incident Catches the Attention of China’s  
 Leadership” in China Leadership Monitor, p 3 
23 Ibid, quoted in Fewsmith (2008), p 3 
24 Ibid, p 3 
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surprising if they turn to non-institutionalized social forces to achieve fairness and vent their 
anger. Where police and gangs work together and where the political system resorts too 
quickly to the use of force, residents cease to distinguish individual officials from local 
government and “considers the entire grassroots regime as an ‘enemy’.25 
 
This is actually a quite fitting summary of what Guizhou provincial party committee secretary 
Shi Zongyuan pointed out as the deeper causes (shenchengci yuanyin) of the Weng’an 
incident. I will come back to this point in my analysis of the media coverage. The point is the 
Weng’an incident as an “Anger-Venting” type of mass incident started out rather randomly. 
The Weng’an incident’s blasting fuse (daohuoxian) was the suspicious death of a young 
schoolgirl, originally only concerning the family of the deceased and the local police. This 
evolved later into massive protests and riots supposedly involving 10,000 – 30,000 people.26  
As the coverage of the incident intensified, the escalation of the initial protest into a mass riot 
was perceived to be the result of the more normal (accumulated) grievances of the rural 
population. For instance, disputes over land requisition, relocation and questions of 
compensation, environmental degeneration of land and fields. In all, reflecting a longstanding 
and widespread discontent of the masses towards the local government and its style of 
governance. 
 
Mouthpiece and supervision by public opinion 
 
On the nature of the Chinese press and its function in China, the concept of mouthpiece 
(houshe) is of particular importance to help with this understanding. According to this 
concept, newspapers’ essential task should be to disseminate party policy, ideology and 
political propaganda on behalf of the party. Just like the party-state apparatus and the political 
system in China still retain its initial structure from the Mao-period, the Maoist legacy of 
houshe remains a significant force in the Chinese media field. This is especially true when it 
comes to the discussion of political matters (zhengzhi) in China today.27 As Sæther points out 
“the political (…) is construed as a taboo and remains with the domain of propaganda 
journalism”.28 As for more concrete implications of the mouthpiece role, there is for instance 
an “80-20 percent rule”. This means that media should disseminate a minimum of 80 percent 
of “positive news” and a maximum of 20 percent of “negative news”. Both previous and 
                                                
25 Ibid, quoted in Fewsmith (2008), p 4 
26 Ibid, p 1 
27 Sæther (2008a), p 162-164 and p 214 
28 Ibid, p 214 
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recent research has showed that this practice is still well and alive in contemporary China.29 
Hu Yaobang, one among the progressive reformers and a favourite among 1989 student-
movement said in the conference “On the Party's Journalism Work” in 1985 that: 
 
media's role as "mouthpiece" (houshe) of the Party and government, warned against too much 
attention to societal ills or controversy (with the admonition that no more than 20% of news 
content should be negative while 80% should be positive, and decreed that those who gathered 
and wrote the news were not entitled to the same latitude granted to writers of literary works.30  
 
This statement holds a lot of truth regarding the level of control over the media, especially in 
comparison with the more relaxed rules and regulations when it comes to the field of 
literature. The mouthpiece concept entails that journalists are supposed to be party-
propagandists, working on behalf of the party by construing a positive image of the Party and 
the workings of the party-state. With regards to my research and case study, an understanding 
of the concept of mouthpiece is useful when discussing the role and function of the my two 
chosen newspapers. But it is also important to understand how the fragmentation of power 
and clashes of interest between different levels of government make the Western cold-war 
perception of the Chinese media as one unified mouthpiece seem very inaccurate. As such, 
Guizhou Daily is a mouthpiece for its own constituency, reflecting the needs and concerns of 
local power holders. As my analysis later will show, as a localized mouthpiece, Guizhou 
Daily’s primary role is to construe a positive representation of the provincial party-state. 
  
Two other central concepts in the Chinese media connected with houshe-role are supervision 
by public opinion or media supervision (yulun jiandu, meiti jiandu) and cross-regional media 
supervision (meiti yidi jiandu). The concept of supervision by public opinion was originally 
coined by the central party-state, reflecting the need to expose local government corruption 
and malpractice. One way to view this concept could be that it function as “a mechanism by 
which the government uses the press as a tool for social and political control that provides an 
official framework for the coverage of controversial topics”.31 My analysis will show that 
such an assessment fails to see forms of resistance and the potential of agency within the 
critical investigative discourse. Another problem, as tools for Beijing to supervise local 
governments, is that this practise is often hindered by local protectionism and media at lower 
                                                
29 Judy Polumbaum (1990) “The tribulations of China’s Journalists after decade of reform”, p 33-68 and Sæther 
(2008a), p 171 
30 Quoted in Polumbaum (1990), p 41 
31 Li-Fung Cho (2010) “The Origins of Investigative Journalism” in Investigative Journalism in China, p 165 
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levels is unable to serve their respective watchdog function.32 Jingrong Tong points to similar 
developments in her article “The crisis of the centralized media control theory”.33 This has 
lead to a situation in which media outlets look outside their own turf to conduct what has been 
called meiti yidi jiandu (cross-regional media supervision), often with the “perk” of no 
interference from their regional/provincial propaganda departments. According to Li-Fung 
Cho this practice is underpinned by three kinds of “gaps”:  
 
(1) The geographic gap, or da kongjian cha, by which an “out-of-town” reporter not subject to 
the direct administrative control of regional government officals enjoys much greater reporting 
freedom than does a local one”, (2) the self interest gap, or da liyi cha, by which local 
government official willingly tolerate or avert their eyes from reporting on problems in other 
provinces by media under their jurisdiction, as it makes them less likely to focus on local 
problems; and (3) the information gap, or da zixun cha, by which local officials have a harder 
time “tracking” the activities of out-of-town journalists, thus giving them more time to publish 
stories before political pressure to prevent publication occurs.34 
 
This practice of cross-regional reporting and how critical investigative discourse is dependent 
on geopolitical factors and relation to the administrative boundaries of the party-state is 
important to understand. I see Southern Weekend’s coverage of the Weng’an incident 
dependent upon to this relative media freedom, provided by the practice of cross-regional 
media supervision. In this way, mass incidents that happen within Southern Weekend’s own 
constituency, namely Guangdong province, would in theory be much harder for Southern 
Weekend to critically cover. This is because the respective propaganda departments would 
impose much stricter guidelines and try to constrain media coverage as much as possible. 
 
 
1.3 Domination and Arts of Resistance 
 
A theory that can explain possibilities of agency and strategies of resistance under conditions 
of domination, that is similar to party-state’s control over the mass media in China35, is 
Scott’s theory of domination and resistance, formulated in his book Domination and the Arts 
of Resistance.36 I think this theoretical framework can give fruitful insights and provide a 
framework to explain some aspects of both the party-press discourse of Guizhou Daily, as 
                                                
32 Ibid, p 169-170 
33 Tong (2010) 
34 Cho (2010), p 170-171 
35 For more on this, see chapter two “Media with Chinese Characteristics” 




well as the critical investigative discourse of Southern Weekend. This is particularly true in 
the discussion of discursive strategies, which for example, theories of media ownership and 
economics fails to explain and grasp. More importantly, in relation to my own research, it is 
precisely in the discursive dimension one can trace the actual resistance to the party-state’s 
formal, structural and discursive domination over the Chinese newspaper media. In my case, 
this is be done by examining the discursive strategies utilized by Southern Weekend for 
bypassing political minefields without going too far to risk negative repercussions. I think it is 
quite fruitful and useful to transfer some of Scott’s theoretical concepts to the analysis of 
Chinese media texts and discourse. However, this transfer is far from unproblematic. It should 
not be made without caution as Scott’s theory is developed and based upon a reading of 
historical sources of institutional racism and accounts of blacks and slave-owners from late 
19th century America. Scott also draws upon his own ethnographic fieldwork from 
agricultural communities in South-East Asia. More concretely, strategies of resistance by 
subordinate peasants against state-power and rich landowners in Indonesia. Despite obvious 
contextual differences, the similarities between my research and Scott’s are in the 
investigation of resistance to dominance and how this plays out in discourse under conditions 
of dominance. Despite the inherent problems of transferring a theory and implementing it on a 
totally different empirical material embedded in the particularities of Chinese media system 
and its practises, I still find Scott’s theory both applicable and useful. This elective move of 
using Scott’s theory can help to explain material that may seem very contradictory, 
paradoxical and ambiguous in my analysis. One example is how Scott’s concept of 
infrapolitics can help to explain Southern Weekend’s heavy reliance on official sources and 
prominent use of the official discourse and voice in their coverage.  
 
In his book, Scott differentiates four types of discourses; the public transcript is “the self-
portrait of the dominant elites and how they wish themselves to be perceived” and in which 
the goal is to “naturalize relations of domination”.37 In the Chinese setting, this is could be 
similar to the part-press discourse and the mouthpiece role, which produces and reproduces 
the official dominant discourse - a discourse that construes and organizes meaning and 
knowledge congruent with the interest of the ruling elite. As a localized mouthpiece, Guizhou 
Daily’s role is to serve the provincial government’s self-interests and image resulting in very 
orthodox party-press coverage.  
                                                




The second discourse is what Scott calls infrapolitics is of particular importance for 
understanding the critical discourse of Southern Weekend. Infrapolitics is the “the politics of 
disguise and anonymity that takes place in the public view but it is designed to have double 
meaning or to shield the identity of the actor”.38 For Scott this is the “weapons of the weak” 
and the subordinates’ tool “for jabbing at the masters”. Examples include “anonymous 
letter[s], arson, stealing, rumours, gossip, disguise, linguistic tricks, metaphors, euphemisms, 
folktales, ritual gestures”.39 I think his point how infrapolitics helps to create a double 
meaning is useful to the analysis of my empirical material. I have observed ambiguities and 
contradictions in the polyphony of voices and perspectives found in the articles from Southern 
Weekend. Scott shows in his book through extensive reading of historical sources on how 
afro-American slaves embedded in institutional slavery and under conditions of domination in 
the American-South, strategically utilized parts of the hegemonic discourse of dominant 
groups to pursue their own interests. This could be to make a good case for better living 
conditions, food, and treatment and so fourth.40 I think Scott’s concept of infrapolitics can 
help me to explain Southern Weekend’s prominent use of officially sanctioned sources and the 
high frequency of quotes from officials intertwined within a myriad of non-official voices, to 
make up their own critical discourse. The concept of infrapolitics explains how subtle 
strategies of resistance help to enable ways of voicing critical views and perspectives into the 
public transcript.  
 
I think Scott’s concept of infrapolitics could explain some aspects of my findings in the 
analysis of Southern Weekend’s coverage and show, despite being embedded in conditions of 
domination, how the agency of critical journalism can push the boundaries of expression in 
the order of Chinese media discourse. With this in mind, there is indeed a tacit play and 
tension between partially fulfilling an updated mouthpiece role and partially challenging it. In 
other words, inexplicitly refusing to be passive partners in subordination, while at least in the 
level of appearances to partially accept this subordination. I will come back to this discussion 
in the concluding chapter of my thesis. 
 
                                                
38 Ibid, 32 
39 Ibid, p 32 
40 Ibid, p 56 
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The third discourse in Scott’s theory is the hidden transcript, which is located “offstage” and 
hidden from the public transcript. It is in this space we find the counter- narratives and thus 
explicit subversive discourse. In Scott’s own words: 
   
Every subordinate group creates, out of its ordeal, a "hidden transcript represents a critique of 
power spoken behind the back of the dominant. The powerful, for their party, also develop a 
hidden transcript the practices and claims of their rule that cannot be openly avowed. A 
comparisons of the hidden transcript of the weak with that of the powerful and of both hidden 
transcripts to the public transcript of power relations offers a substantially new way of 
understanding resistance to domination.41 
 
According to Scott, both the dominant and subversive groups have their own respective 
hidden transcripts. One can for example view the system of internal channel (neibu) in which 
negative and sensitive news as the hidden transcript of the dominant – another practice and a 
legacy from Maoist time that still lives on in China today. One particular space where one 
could find such discourse easily is Chinese cyberspace, in which both the anonymity and the 
vastness of net make it a much harder place for the state to control and dominate. 
 
The last form of discourse is what Scott calls breaking the silence. This is when subordinate 
groups “speaks truth to power” effectively moving the hidden transcript into the public 
transcript”.42 However, under any conditions of dominance and systems of domination – such 
open confrontation and explicit display of insubordination are extremely dangerous and 
therefore very rare to be seen in the public transcript. It is much like choosing an “exit-
strategy” of which the consequences of transmitting explicit transgressive discourse openly 
out into the public transcript can be anything from losing your job to long prison sentences for 
Chinese journalists. The last two forms of discourse, namely the hidden transcript and 
breaking the silence are then off less importance and relevance to me because they are very 
hard to obtain and almost impossible to find in the Chinese newspaper media.  
 
To sum up, in the appropriation of Scott’s theory, the localized mouthpiece discourse 
represented by Guizhou Daily could be regarded as a force dominating the public transcript, 
but at disrupted, challenged, and resisted by the relatively marginalized critical investigative 
discourse of Southern Weekend. Under conditions of dominance, such resistance has to be 
masked and camouflaged through the use of infrapolitics. My analysis will show that this is 
one major discursive strategy by which the polyphonic and critical expressions of Southern 
                                                
41 Ibid, p xii 
42 Ibid, p 32 
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Weekend seem less transgressive and appear more politically acceptable and thus publishable. 
 
 
1.4 Chapter Outline 
 
This introductory chapter has outlined the basic terms and concepts, theoretical framework 
and the relevant background for the study, as well as the idea and rationale behind this thesis.  
 
Chapter two will go through the institutional particularities of the Chinese media system and 
the strategies securing structural and formal party-state domination over the Chinese media. 
In addition, I will also provide a short overview of the development of investigative 
journalism in China and briefly discuss how they operate under conditions of domination.  
 
Chapter three will give a brief summary on how I analyse my corpus of media texts, as well 
some thoughts on my chosen empirical data and why I chose to exclusively focus on the 
traditional newspaper media.  
 
Chapter four, which constitutes the main part of this thesis, will in its first subchapter provide 
a short description of the Weng’an-incident, and then an overview of the all the articles from 
Guizhou Daily and Southern Weekend, where I try to map out the main themes and topics in 
the coverage respectively. The following subchapters carry out main body of my analysis of 
the chosen articles from first Guizhou Daily and then Southern Weekend.  
 




Chapter II: Media With Chinese Characteristics 
 
The purpose of this section is to follow the general direction that the Chinese media has been 
going in the Post-Mao period and to provide the institutional setting of the Chinese media 
system. My reading of the literature shows that the party-state and Central Propaganda 
Department (CPD) have been quite successful in adopting methods of control and guidance of 
the media in a new commercialized environment and tackled new problems posed by such 
processes, as well as technological advances.43 However this has not been a straightforward 
plan that is carved out in stone following a ten-point list. Anne-Marie Brady quotes in her 
book a Chinese authority on propaganda work, which I think sums up the much more 
incremental approach state-planners have adopted; “the old ways are not effective, and the 
new methods are not yet clear” (Lao banfa bu ling, xin banfa bu ming).44 Brady’s book 
Marketing Dictatorship examines the overall propaganda system and the new high-tech 
propaganda strategies and techniques for controlling a much more diverse and information-
rich environment. Brady has also recently edited another book on propaganda in 
contemporary China, called China’s Thought Management. This book follows the same vein 
as its predecessor, but presents detailed case studies from a wide range of contributors. 
Nonetheless, the conclusion of both seems to be that the party-state has been quite successful 
in adapting itself with updated tools, making up a tech-savvy and modernized propaganda 
system. According to Brady’s research, propaganda and thought work are not on the decline, 
rather even on the rise in China, just in new forms and changed content. In other words, 
propagated through new techniques and measures that seem to be more in tune with the 
sociocultural and political reality of contemporary China.45 To some extent, the Chinese state 
has managed to stay along side the curves of social change facilitated by market reforms and 
rapid progress in the era of computer- and information technology. This is partially achieved 
with pro-active measures, such as institutional innovations, new rules and regulations, 
updated methods of censorship and control, as well as with media reforms and strategies 
designed to keep media profitable and politically acceptable. In short, this section will look at 
                                                
43 One notable exception is Daniel C, Lynch and his research. He argues on the contrary that the party-state has 
lost most of its control over the mass media largely due to processes of commercialization and technological 
advancements. For more in this see; Lynch (1999) After the Propaganda State: Media, Politics, and Thought 
Work in Reformed China 
44 Anne-Marie Brady (2008) Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China, p 
65 
45 Brady (2008) and (2011) China’s Thought Management edited by Brady 
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the diverse strategies for maintaining structural and formal domination over the Chinese 
media by the party state. In the last section, I will elaborate on the other side of the coin from 
the focus on structure, with a short account of the trajectory critical journalism and how it is 
situated and operates under conditions of domination. 
 
 
2.1 Party-state strategies of media control and domination  
 
In Maoist-China the mass media was fully integrated into the party-state apparatus, both in 
terms of ownership and state-subsides as the only source of income. With the economic 
realities of the 1980s, state planners started to allow media outlets to experiment with other 
forms of funding, such as advertising, subscription sales and so fourth. The embracement of 
market reforms, in which the media’s financial independence from the state was the aim, 
reflects the utilitarian motive behind such reforms. That is the state’s need to cut down on 
government spending, leading to a much-needed commercialization and marketization of the 
mass media. Although the media has become financially independent from the state, 
newspapers were expected to serve both the party and the logic of the market, which means 
that China’s media was caught in a tension between the party line and the bottom line.46 
 
The most significant changes within Chinese media were connected to the large social 
transformation with the attempt to create “socialism with Chinese characteristics” in Post-
Mao China. This was done with importing elements and mechanisms from a market economy, 
but still lingering with practises from the old political system. But there is no doubt that the 
social change facilitated by the shift from Maoist China to Dengist reforms brought about 
immense changes in the field of media and its practices. In this new environment, media 
outlets had to strive for financial autonomy from the state. This meant that the logic of the 
market forced media in China to think about its audience and readers, not solely the party and 
the party line, which by now had lost its monopoly over media output and content. This 
process of commercialization and marketization was further accelerated with Deng’s Southern 
Tour in 1992, which ended the debates regarding the exact nature and pace of the reforms. As 
a consequence, in terms of media-development, by the end of the millennium most media 
                                                
46 Yuezhi Zhao (1998) Media, Market, and Democracy in China: Between the Party Line and the Bottom Line 
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organizations were not only financially independent, but also extremely profitable.47 However, 
in the backdrop of the internal and external crisis of Communism, respectively the crisis of 
1989 and the downfall of Communism in Soviet and Eastern Europe, the incumbent elites in 
China connected such failures to the lack of control over the media. In post-Tiananmen China, 
the party-state found new strategies to keep the mass media under control, by both being 
economically profitable and politically answerable.48 On strategy securing formal control over 
the mass media, also a distinctive feature of media with Chinese characteristics, is to prevent 
private ownership of the media. All media outlets and organisations “must be registered under 
a recognized institutional publisher or sponsor, which includes party committees, government 
bureaucracies, mass organizations, and other institutions of official standing above the county 
level”.49 Technically speaking, all media outlets are regarded as shiye (public institutions), a 
type of organization that does not exclusively follow the logic of the market. News 
organisations are thus not regarded as qiye - or business enterprises, producing goods only for 
profits.50 Consequently, all media outlets fall under the direct supervision of both their party-
state sponsor and their respective propaganda department, with the Central Propaganda 
Department in Beijing at the top of the hierarchy.51 This selective lingering of old Leninist 
management principals, while at the same time opening up for commercialization exemplifies 
the state architects’ very pragmatic and non-dogmatic approach, epitomized with the grand 
scheme of building a “socialist market economy”. The media scholar Zhao Yuezhi has in her 
research tried to follow the intrinsic contradictions within this euphemism. She calls this 
“neoliberalism as exception” and “exceptions to neoliberalism”.52 The practical consequences 
entail an elective importation of fitting elements from capitalism and the consequent lingering 
of practices from Maoist-period, which helps to secure state-control and dominance over the 
Chinese media. The aim of this non-dogmatic pragmatic two-fold strategy is to prevent the 
media to function as independent businesses enterprises, which follow solely the logic and 
rationale of the market. A new institutional innovation marking media with Chinese 
characteristics, is this the media licensing system, which was designed to manage the rise of 
the messy commercial media outlets in post-Tiananmen China.53 GAPP (General 
                                                
47 Chin-Chuan Lee et al (2007a) “The Case of the Shenzhen Press Group” in Political Regimes and the Media in 
Asia, p 13 
48 Zhao (2008) Communication in China: Political Economy, Power and Conflict, 
49 Zhao (2008), p 80 
50 Zhao (2004) “The State, The Market, and Media Control in China” in Who Owns the Media, p 196 
51 For an extensive introduction to the workings of the CPD and the Chinese Propaganda system as a whole see 
Brady (2008) 
52 Zhao (2008), p 6 
53 For more on such innovations and strategies see Zhao (2008, 2004) 
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Administration of Press and Publishing) with the power of issuing and withdrawing media 
licenses “thus, through its licensing power, the GAPP has managed to contain the commercial 
revolution in the Chinese press within the orbit of the party-state”.54 Other older and newer 
institutions embedded in China’s domestic propaganda system, with CPD on the top, include 
the SARFT (State Administration of Radio, Film and Television) OFP/SCIO (Office for 
Foreign Propaganda/State Council Information Office), Spiritual Civilization Offices and 
Ministry of Culture.55 OFP/SCIO was created in 1991 as a “recognition of the need to 
dramatically improve the CCP government’s international image in the wake of the events of 
1989”. Its principal tasks are to control and supervise “the activities of foreign journalists in 
China, [and] monitoring foreign social science research on China, and controlling the 
Internet”.56 This formation of these two offices might be examples of the Chinese propaganda 
system adjusting itself to a new environment. The offices of SCIO along side propaganda 
departments at different levels take the immense task of controlling and censoring the many 
forums and microblogs in Chinese cyberspace. In China, such digital propaganda workers are 
employed to battle anti-government and dissident views on the net by posting and 
disseminating official party-state views. These are called the 50-cent party members 
(wumaodang). To the millions of Chinese netziens this is, not surprisingly, quite a derogatory 
term. 
 
Another strategy made to ensure political adherence to the party-state, in spite of pushing for 
further commercialization, was to look at management and modes of media ownership in the 
West. In post-Tiananmen China, state planers started to encourage the making of state-media 
conglomerates as the main part of media reform (meiti gaige).57 As Chinese media scholar 
Ashley Esarey points out: 
 
Under Jiang Zemin's leadership in the mid- to late-1990s, media management strategies 
became even more sophisticated, with the formation of media conglomerates intended to 
strengthen the media industry financially, and place it under more politically reliable 
leadership. After initial experimentation with media conglomerates, the Propaganda 
                                                
54 Zhao (2008), p 81 
55 Brady (2008), p 11 
56 Ibid, p 23 
57 Cao Peng (2004) “xinwen gaige de tupo: cong baoshe dao baoye jituan” (曹鹏 “新闻改革的突破：从报社到
报业集团 <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/14677/22100/41491/41503/3035719.html> (15 April 2013). In this 
regard, it is interesting to note that concentration of media ownership in form of media conglomerates is one of 
the mechanisms in the Propaganda Model formulated by Herman and Chomsky in (1989) Manufacturing 
Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media 
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Department and SPPA decided to reorganize print media at the city, provincial, and central 
level into media conglomerates or media “groups” as they are called in China.58 
 
In retrospect, the main reason for the formation of state conglomerates was to strengthen the 
state’s political control over the media. This new strategy is also connected with the initial 
effects of Deng’s 1992 Tour, facilitating a faster pace in the pursuit of commercialisation and 
marketisation, resulting in an exponential growth in the number of newspapers. Such intense 
competition, leading to a massive, chaotic and thus uncontrollable commercial media 
environment became a serious concern for Beijing. But with the new media reform, which 
initiated the making of state conglomerates, media organizations and newspapers that were 
politically unreliable could now be closed down or merged with politically reliable ones. As 
Yuezhi Zhao points out, the central state started campaigns “aiming at media recentralization, 
and the creation of conglomerates to achieve the optimal integration of political control and 
market efficiency”.59 In short, such state-owned media conglomerates, manifested in the so-
called “socialist press groups”60 in China were a part of a strategy which aims to strengthen 
the political control over the now profitable and highly commercialized mass media. 
 
The formation of socialist press groups since the mid-90s in tandem with propaganda 
departments at different levels acting as the “guiding hand”61 of the party, has strengthened 
the state’s grip on the Chinese news media. Propaganda offices posses the power to sack and 
appoint editorial personnel at will, give informal and formal guidelines on what to write 
about, how to write about it (or what not to write about).62 Editors’-in-chiefs are especially 
vulnerable because they are accountable for decisions made by subordinate editors and 
journalists, which makes censorship and self-censorship an integral part of media 
organizations.63 These indirect and direct, formal and informal mechanisms help to ensure 
party-state domination and control over the media at all levels. Political and ideological 
control was strengthened with the formation profitable state-conglomerates, which helps to 
sustain a strange marriage between market forces and state power. Most news organizations 
thus adopt a strategy for securing profit by providing “infotainment” for the urban middle and 
                                                
58 Ashley Esarey (2005) “Cornering the Market: State Strategies for Controlling China’s Commercial Media” in 
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59 Zhao (2008), p 96 
60 Zhao (2000b) “From Commercialization to Conglomeration: The Transformation of the Chinese Press Within 
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upper classes, and at the same time, avoiding political minefields that could anger the 
incumbent elites. Through fieldwork and interviews by Lee, He and Huang, such an approach 
is epitomized in the words of a mid-level media worker:  
 
Some newspapers play the ‘edge ball'. They want to please a handful of readers and encourage 
individualistic heroism among some journalists. They misguide public opinion, offend the 
leaders, and suffer from punishment they deserve. We don't. We adhere to the political line and 
maximize our economic returns.64 
 
It is interesting to note that misguiding public opinion in this context could mean prioritizing 
exposure of corruption and illegitimate practices at cost of concerns regarding social and 
political stability. Journalists and editors from Guizhou Daily, as we later will see, share such 
a similar mindset. These words also illustrate the importance of media organization as profit-
driven business enterprises (“Incs, “maximize our economic returns”). Most importantly for 
the state power is that such priorities are coupled with loyalty and partial subordination to the 
party-state (“adhere to the political line”). This marriage between political power and the 
market forces marks a change from earlier clear-cut ideological and propaganda type of 
journalism to a modernized version of the mouthpiece. The media scholar He Zhou coined the 
concept of “Party Publicity Incs” to describe the new role of a modernized mouthpiece, in 
which positive publicity of the workings of the party-state is central, along side 
sensationalised infotainment.65 As Lee, He and Huang point out: “the media have abandoned 
the Maoist role as ideological brainwashers”.66 These “Party Publicity Incs” have on one hand 
managed to function as very profitable business enterprises following market logic and 
rationales. On the other hand, the organisational structure of socialist press groups makes it 
easier to conduct ideological and political control over potential newspapers that could stray 
away from the “party-line”. That is why most newspapers in China stay away from political 
minefields, prioritizing infotainment, marking the new modernized mouthpiece role of being 
Party Publicity Incs. 
 
All in all, there has been a state-led development from the commercialization to 
conglomeration of the Chinese media in order to cope with new problems posed by the initial 
transformation and change brought by the once much-needed commercialization of the media. 
In order to secure party-state control and domination over the Chinese media, the formation of 
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Special Zone Daily” in Power, Money and the Media, p 112-151 
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state-conglomerates has been placed as a top priority of media reform. The aim is to provide 
an overall framework that ensures the “Party Publicity Inc” function of the mass media. That 
is adhering to the political line on one side, and functioning as independent profitable 
economic enterprises on the other. The success of the Inc is due to the fact that big state-
owned conglomerates secure profits due to conditions of monopoly, rather than through 
market competition. In conclusion, Chinese state architects have been relatively successful in 
controlling the “uncontrollable” commercial media by keeping it “within the orbit of the party 
state”.67  
 
Much of the aforementioned research shows that with “media with Chinese characteristics” 
that party-state has been relatively successful in allying itself market forces and controlling its 
own media. Increased political control was a favourable consequence of the construction of 
socialist press groups that was given top priority in state-led media reforms. The overarching 
goal is to make media outlets financially profitable and loyal adherents to the political line .68 
However, as this thesis later will show, despite such conditions of structural and formal 
domination secured by the strange marriage between political power and market forces, one 
can still find resistance to the being a modernised party-mouthpiece (even within this system 
and its many constraints and limitations). My thesis and analysis will show exactly such 
resistance to state domination through the use of discursive strategies and how critical 
investigative journalism, through the use of such strategies can, provide alternative media 
representations to the ones produced by the dominant party-press discourse. 
 
 
2.2 Investigative Journalism in China 
 
Despite party-state domination and control over the Chinese newspaper media, investigative 
journalism has since the early 90s developed and thrived. The development of investigative 
journalism made it a force that disrupted and contested the once top-down relationship 
between the state and the media. However, in the discussion of critical investigative 
journalism it is important to go back to the roots. As noted in Maoist China, the mass media 
was supposed to be sole throat and tongue of the party, but it is also important to recognize 
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the inherent contradictions within the mouthpiece concept from the beginning. In theory, 
journalists in Maoist China were supposed to serve the party by disseminating party line, 
official ideology, moral education and positive propaganda. Moreover, they were also 
supposed to serve the people by giving them a voice and reflect the concerns of the people 
(qunzhong fanying). However in practice, the latter became secondary to the former to the 
extent that “the mass media are the loyal servants of the state, the party (…) but not of the 
people".69 The forefather of Chinese investigative journalism, Liu Binyan, was caught in this 
tension between serving the people and serving the party. Liu Binyan became forerunner and 
creator of a new genre, a proto-type of investigative journalism within the order of Chinese 
media discourse. Based on in-depth interviews and observation baogao wenxue was 
“presented as literature” and characterized by “ a hybrid style of writing that, at its best, 
involved detailed reporting and various levels of compilation of facts”.  More importantly, 
within this genre, primacy was given to content and not style and delivery.70 As a 
consequence of his proto-type of investigative journalism, Liu Binyan was expelled and 
labelled a rightist in 1957. He started writing again after the Cultural Revolution and became 
famous for his uncompromising articles on corruption and social injustice, epitomised by his 
most famous work “people or monsters” (renyao zhijian), published in 1978. He was expelled 
once again during the crackdown of bourgeois liberalism in 1987. But things were changing 
during the liberal times of the 1980s, with the introduction of the concept public supervision 
(yulun jiandu), which marked an official endorsement of investigative journalism. Yulun 
jiandu has been instrumental in creating a space in which the so-called watchdog journalism 
in China could develop and thrive. However, the period marking the pinnacle of critical 
journalism in China reached its end with the crushing of student demonstrations in June 1989. 
Oppressive measures in the aftermath of the demonstrations included purges of journalists and 
editorial staff of every major party papers. After the lost years between 1989 and 1992, 
critical journalism enjoyed a rapid development during the latter part of 1990s. Despite 
critical comments on the limits of this kind of journalism, Zhao Yuezhi identified this trend as 
one of the most prominent and significant ones in post-Tiananmen China.71 Even the central 
public broadcaster, CCTV started their own TV-program designed to accomplish the task of 
public supervision with the immensely popular programme, Focus (Jiaodian Fangtan) on 
prime-time television. Critical investigations of corrupt officials, crime, infringement of 
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people’s rights and interests were among the topics discussed. However, some research has 
argued that this type of public supervision to more or less extent also fulfils an updated 
mouthpiece role. This manifests itself by only taking up problems that are solvable, as well as 
strictly restricting the scale and scope of the investigations to the local level and individual 
instances. This helps to construe a good image of responsive and responsible central party-
state, who fixes and addresses local and individual malfunctions and malpractices.72 Such a 
particular understanding of the rules of the game also seems to have been internalized by 
journalists in the written press. But one of the ways critical journalism used to expand their 
work and push the boundaries of accepted topics, content and reporting was the “depoliticise” 
critical journalism. This was achieved by channelling their reports under the category of 
“social news”, which Elin Sæther, among others, argues as essential in normalizing critical 
journalism within the order of Chinese media discourse.73 This was one way that critical 
investigative journalism could explicitly avoid “the political”; a particular space within the 
order of Chinese media discourse in which the mouthpiece role and orthodox party-journalism 
enjoy a much stronger position, entailing much more constraints and limitations in coverage 
and style. In connection to my own empirical data, it is interesting to note that none of the 
articles in Southern Weekend are under the banner of “social news” which seem to indicate 
that the category has played out its former role. The articles I analysed are either under the 
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Chapter III: Discourse Analysis  
 
In this section I will first provide a short overview of my method of discourse analysis, before 
discussing my corpus of Chinese newspaper articles and why I choose to exclusively look at 
the traditional newspaper media.  
 
 
3.1 Method of Discourse Analysis 
 
My method of approaching media texts and articles is based upon some central concerns 
stemming from the tradition of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and perhaps in particular a 
reading of Norman Fairclough and his method of CDA. My method of discourse analysis is 
influenced by insights from his books, Media Discourse and Analysing Discourse: Textual 
Analysis for Social Research74, in which he provides specific examples of actual analysis, 
ranging from concrete text-analysis to the more abstract analysis of discourse as social 
practice. I have also picked up more practical inspiration for analytical categories in media 
text from Richardson’s Analysing Newspapers: An Approach from Critical Discourse 
Analysis.75 This can been seen in my focus upon lexical and syntactical choices, types of 
narratives, sources and voices. These aforementioned are actually the main analytical 
categories in my analysis of media texts. However, I chose to call my method discourse 
analysis because some of the theoretical foundations of CDA are problematic to accept, due to 
being formative and politically biased. I am much more interested and inspired by the 
methodical aspect of CDA. But as a starting point, I will first include a very good definition 
of CDA, which is actually one of the theoretical aspects from the CDA-tradition I find useful 
and fruitful in relation to my own research: 
 
CDA sees discourse – language use in speech and writing – as a form of social practice. 
Describing discourse as social practice implies a dialectical relationship between a particular 
discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s), and social structure(s), which frame it: The 
discursive event is shaped by them, but also shapes them. That is, discourse is socially 
constitutive as well as socially conditioned – it constitutes situations, objects of knowledge, 
and the social identities of and relationship between people and groups of people. It is 
constitutive both in the sense that it helps to sustain and reproduce the social status quo, and in 
the sense that it contributes to transforming it. Since discourse is so socially consequential, it 
                                                
74 Fairclough (1995) Media Discourse and Fairclough (2003) Analyzing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social 
Research 
75 John E. Richardson (2007) Analysing Newspapers: An Approach from Critical Discourse Analysis, p 46-71 
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gives rise to important issues of power. Discursive practices may have major ideological 
effects – that is, they can help produce and reproduce unequal power relations between (for 
instance) social classes, women and men, and ethnic/cultural majorities and minorities through 
the ways in which they represent thing and position people.76 
 
This view on discourse is an elaboration on the definition of discourse as a singular abstract 
noun which I discussed in the introductory chapter. I think the notion of how discourse is both 
constitutive of the social (shapes the social) and constituted by the social (shaped socially) is 
of particular importance. Such view on discourse reflects a dual focus on how discourse is 
constrained by the context that it occurs in, while at the same time acknowledging the 
potential of agency and social change within discourse. In short, it is a perspective that pays 
attention to both structure and agency (which can explain social change regardless of context, 
be it authoritarian or liberal democracy). However, how social structure can shape discourse is 
perhaps particularly significant in the discussion of Chinese media discourse, which is 
situated and embedded in a particular form of media system, with its propaganda practices, 
rules and regulations. The social structure and political system in China, with its ambiguous 
boundaries (or lack of boundaries) between state and society are also factors that regulate and 
socially shape Chinese media discourse. However, this thesis shows that the party-state in 
China has only partial control over media content and order of media discourse. As noted, this 
double view on discourse as shaping the social, but also at the same time being socially 
shaped, opens up and acknowledges a space for change and agency within discourse. My 
analysis of Southern Weekend’s investigative discourse and its alternative media 
representation of the Weng’an incident will show the potential of agency within discourse, 
even under conditions of domination. I will discuss this in in-depth on the role and function of 
Southern Weekend in the concluding chapter. Nonetheless, the party-state in China posses a 
range of informal and formal tools and means to shape and constrain media discourse.77 The 
Chinese party-state has, comparatively speaking, much more leverage and control over its 
own domestic media, compared to the Western media and media systems. In the West, it is 
not the state, but rather the influences of a market and profit-driven environment that has 
gotten much attention from CDA-scholarship and in other fields.78 In this respect, it is strange 
why many Western scholars have interpreted the embracement of commercialisation and 
                                                
76 Fairclough and Wodak (1997) “Critical Discourse Analysis” in Discourse Studies: A Multidisciplinary 
Introduction edited by T. Van Dijk, p 258 
77 For more on context and media system, see chapter two, “Media with Chinese Characteristics. 
78 One example is Jurgen Habermas who, among other things, was critical against the rise of commercialized 
mass media and the subsequent deterioration of the public sphere in his pioneering work originally published in 
1962 (1989) The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere 
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market reforms in China and of the Chinese media system through an almost Aristotelian 
teleological framework, which views democratization and liberal democracy as the final and 
natural end of the aforementioned processes. As we have seen, on the contrary, the CCP has 
been quite successful in securing its monopoly over political power, as well at the same time 
pushing forward the construction of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” and a “socialist 
market economy”. 
 
My method of analysis will range from the micro level, with detailed textual analysis, to the 
macro-level of discourse, with sources and voices. The analysis on the micro-level of 
discourse, including focuses upon both lexical- and syntactical choices, will show how such 
choices can help to underpin particular representations of social actors and social conflicts in 
the texts. One example is Guizhou Daily’s consistent choice of qunzhong with the modifier 
buming zhenxiang de, which I simply translate into “the ignorant masses”. Such lexical choice 
and collocation helps to construe the masses as irrational and mob-like. Syntactical choices, 
which I analyse under the category of agency, can also have a tremendous effect on particular 
representations of different social actors. In my analysis, I use the analysis of agency to 
comment upon blame and victimization in the texts. The following example epitomizes how 
the irrationality of the masses is reflected through syntactical choices and how the blame for 
the mass incident is pinpointed to the few lawless people through syntactical choices. This 
sample is taken from Guizhou Daily’s party-press discourse: “some people incited the 
ignorant masses to assault the county public security department”.79 We can see that the 
primary agency of the few (inciting) pinpoints blame for the actions of the many (masses 
assaulting). This causative sentence construction with primary and secondary agency also 
helps to enhance the picture of “the ignorant masses” as a passive mob without their own 
ideas and thoughts. In this way, syntactical choices can influence how the different social 
actors are represented and perceived in the texts. However, it is important to not to overlook 
the overall context when analysing syntactical choices. For example, if the police is present as 
an agent in a paragraph and later in the same paragraph an agentless-passive construction is 
used, careful consideration should be given in such case. In other words, agentless-passive 
constructions are not interesting in themselves and should not simply be “read off” as a 
product of ideology. Moreover, some CDA research has been criticized for uncritically and 
too eagerly digging up agentless passive constructions without paying enough attention to the 




context such constructions occur in. Another concern for me as an analyst is that bei-sentence 
(a typical Chinese passive sentence construction) is used differently compared to English 
passives. Agentless-passives are comparatively speaking more common in English than 
Chinese, and this can explain why I did not find that many agentless passive constructions.80 
As a final note, these lexical and syntactical choices are not interesting in themselves, but 
rather interesting in how they can help to underpin particular representations in media texts. 
These choices are often interrelated and interconnected in creating and influencing the 
newspapers’ overall media representation of a given news event. That is why, in my analysis, 
I often discuss different choices under some central themes in the two papers’ respective 
coverage, such as rationality and irrationality, blame and victimization, suddenness and 
passiveness. 
 
Another central concern and focus in my analysis is the analytical category of sources. 
Sources is a focal point in any analysis of media texts, but in addition to particular patterns of 
quotation techniques like reported speech versus direct quotations and the potential for 
misrepresentation by such choices, I will also look for voices and perspectives present in the 
texts (hereafter just voices). Which voices are dominant, and which are to some extent 
backgrounded or even excluded? In this sense, what is not said might be as important as what 
actually is said. My analysis will show that Guizhou Daily’s coverage is more monophonic 
compared to the polyphony in Southern Weekend, and illuminate how differently these two 
newspaper use and contextualise the same quotes.  
 
3.2 Corpus and Newspapers  
 
 
I will analyse six articles in total, three from Guizhou Daily and three from Southern 
Weekend, which are from a total corpus of 36 articles found on the topic. 28 articles are found 
in Guizhou Daily on the Weng’an incident in the time frame between 30th of June and 14th of 
July. Of the 28 articles from Guizhou Daily, three are used as corpus for the in-depth analysis 
on what I call the party-press discourse of mass incidents. All of these articles were found at 
                                                
80 For more on Chinese syntax see Edward Gunn (1991) Rewriting Chinese: Style and Innovation in Twentieth-
century Chinese Prose 
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Guizhou provincial news service www.gog.com.cn81 by searching with the key word 
“Weng’an incident”.82  
 
Eight articles are found from Southern Weekend in the period from 2nd of July to 17th of 
July. Among the eight, two of these are more or less reprints from Xinhua and mistakenly 
similar to some of Guizhou Daily’s articles. Three articles are selected and analysed, making 
up the corpus for analysing the investigative critical discourse of the Weng’an incident. These 
articles are found on Southern Weekend’s webpage, www.infzm.com83 by the same keyword 
as earlier. A total of six articles then make up my corpus of empirical data. To compensate for 
such narrowness in terms of scope, I have listed up an overview of all the headlines of 36 
articles and tried to identify some major themes and topics in the chapter “4.2 Overview of 
the media coverage of the Weng’an incident”. I have in my analysis of media texts translated 
the Chinese texts into English and put the original text in footnotes. All translations are my 
own. 
 
The reason for my choice of the three articles from Guizhou Daily lies in my initial inquiry on 
what the party-press’ immediate reaction is to a mass incident and how they handle this 
discursively. The two first articles from Southern Weekend were chosen because they are 
interrelated in terms of themes and topics. The last article “Weng’an – the Unstable Town” is 
chosen because it is the first genuine, in-depth investigative report published on the Weng’an 
incident. It is considerably longer than the other articles, but perhaps the most interesting 
among all of them.  
  
The reason for my sole focus upon traditional newspaper media is three-fold. First, by only 
looking the traditional newspaper media helps to narrow down the scope of my thesis. 
Second, the newspapers in China have a bigger impact in terms of scale and seriousness than 
other types of media, which is also why the Chinese state controls its own traditional media 
much stricter than other kinds of media output.  Even though blogs and microblogs such as 
Weibo are fascinating in terms of new ways to disseminate dissident views at unprecedented 
speed, it is nonetheless a phenomenon for the urban, middle-class, and highly-educated. 
Besides, just as in any other countries, the majority of the blogs in China is not politically 






oriented, but rather about normal daily life, popular culture and so forth. Finally, newspaper 
reports are also not based solely on individual opinions, but more connected to the publisher’s 
status and name, therefore having much more influence and impact on the Chinese society as 




Chapter IV: Analysis of the Media Representations 
of the Weng’an Incident 
 
 
I will start this main chapter with a short introduction and background information of the 
Weng’an incident. The next sub-chapter provides a short overview of the media coverage by 
my two chosen newspapers. Then what follows is the analysis of Guizhou Daily and its party-
press discourse. I will then analyse articles from Southern Weekend before giving a summary 
and some last thoughts about the two media representations and forms of discourse. 
 
 
4.1 The Weng’an Incident 
 
This mass incident took place in Weng’an county in Guizhou province 28th of June 2008. The 
Weng’an incident or the “28.06”-incident as it was also labelled, started out from the 
suspicious death of a 16 year old school girl named Li Shufen. One the 22nd of June she 
allegedly went out to the bridge by Ximen river with three other persons and was found dead 
floating in the river later the same day. These three persons, according to later rumours, were 
connected to local officials through family relations and so fourth. Weng’an public security 
bureau concluded quickly through an official statement that Li had committed suicide by 
jumping into the river. Li Shufen’s father, Li Xiuhua started to have doubts regarding the 
cause of death when he found out that the three suspects already had been released from 
police custody. As soon as they were released they also showed up in grave rumours 
spreading around in Weng’an. Rumours included that Li Shufen was raped and murdered and 
that the police’s handling of the case was a cover up for the culprits which had ties to local 
officials. Li Shufen’s dad made an appeal for a full autopsy. Two days later Li Shufen’s 
uncle, Li Xiuzhong went down to a local police station and came to clashes with a policeman 
for unknown reasons. Later the same day, Li Xiuzhong was reported to have been severely 
beaten up by a gang of unidentified people. Li Xiuhua wrote another urgent appeal to the 
police for resolving the case and bringing the culprits to justice. The case was never solved 
and it was believed through rumours that these unidentified people in reality were criminals in 
collaboration with the public security bureau, perhaps as officially hired thugs (in Chinese 
often referred to as chengguan). In order to preserve the remains of Li Shufen, her family 
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rented an ice coffin. People from all of Weng’an donated money to support the family. 
Citizen journalist Zola also made it possible for people to donate money through his blog. On 
the 28th of June, the police sent a notification stating that since Li Shufen’s cause of death 
already had been asserted, following the regulations her remains should be buried and failure 
to comply would entail that the police would have to forcefully make sure it happened. This 
caused public indignation and anger. As the provincial party secretary, Shi Zongyuan later 
pointed out, Li Shufen’s death was only the “blasting fuse” for the Weng’an incident. 
According to reports by Southern Weekend, later the same day, a couple of middle-school 
students started demonstrating under the banner of “seeking amendment for the injustice done 
to the masses” (wei renminqunzhong shenyuan). As the demonstrations moved along more 
and more people joined the protests, especially relocated peasants from the newly erected 
Seven Star Village, which had a long-withstanding conflict with the local government 
regarding lack of compensation and forced relocation. When the demonstrators reached the 
county government buildings, more than 10.000 people had allegedly joined in. Later the 
same day, these demonstrations escalated into full-blown riots and clashes between the police 
and the masses. As media attention evolved from purely a local or provincial matter into a 
national news event, questions and investigation of possible local government malpractice 
started snowballing. Investigative papers such as Southern Weekend, as we will see, played a 
crucial role in questioning local officials and the official media representation of the Weng’an 
incident initially produced by Guizhou Daily.    
 
 
4.2 Overview of the Coverage of Weng’an incident 
 
I have chosen to look at the media coverage of Weng’an incident from two newspapers; 
Guizhou Daily a provincial party-paper embedded in the administrative boundaries and power 
relations in which the actual news-event took place. On the other hand, we have Southern 
Weekend, a newspaper from the outside, affiliated with the Southern News Group and under 
the control of Guangzhou and Guangdong propaganda departments. As noted, different 
propaganda aims between the central- and the local-levels have opened a space of relative 
media freedom that is connected with the practice of cross-regional reporting. This is a 
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practice that, Southern Weekend’ as newspaper coming from outside the formal administrative 
boundaries and reach of the Guizhou province exploits to the fullest.84  
 
I will first give an overview of the main topics and themes in the coverage of Weng’an 
incident. Since Guizhou Daily is a daily newspaper, there are far more articles from them 
compared to Southern Weekend, which is a weekly newspaper. I have listed up all articles in 
the section under and tried to indentify main themes and topics, some more dominant than 
others. I have found eight articles from Southern Weekend between 2nd of July to 17th of July.  
However, the first two articles published are respectively a transcript from press conference 
hold in Guizhou and a reprint from Xinhua. The remaining six articles are then the full-
fledged articles which make up Southern Weekend’ coverage of the Weng’an incident. 
 
I have identified the following themes and topics in Guizhou Daily’s coverage of the Weng’an 
incident: 
 
(1) Destruction and havoc of the victimized local government by the lawless people. The masses 
was incited by the lawless few, one of the reasons why the situation escalated into a violent 
mass incident.) 
(2) Government’s successful cooperation between different levels of party-state (national, 
provincial, local) key factor for bringing down the situation, restoring normality and 
safeguarding social stability and harmony.  
(3) Unification through collective moral condemnation by the masses and against the few lawless 
people. 
(4) Propagating the truth of the matter (zhenxiang), and the consequent attempt to debunk rumours, 
e.g., autopsy-controversy, the suspects’ alleged connection with local officials through family 
ties and so forth.  
(5)  Battle against organized crime, “crack down on crime, eliminate evil”-campaign. 
(6)  Strengthen the masses’ and teenagers’ moral education (character-building) and their 
awareness of the law. 
(7) The united appreciation of the masses towards the armed police. 
(8) Investigation of leading cadres and the deeper causes of Weng’an incident. 
(9) Heroic actions of cadres and masses.  
(10) Information and propaganda management in the era of the Internet and news media. 
 
The themes and topics that get the most attention are (1), (2), (4), and (5), whereas the topic 
that gets least attention is (8) investigation of leading cadres and deeper causes. Guizhou 
Daily published an article just stating the fact that some officials were sacked, but in their 
very limited coverage the reasons why they were sacked were not elaborated upon. Indeed, 
this topic of corrupt local officials and their alleged malfeasance of duty drown in the sea of 
other dominant topics. Furthermore, my analysis will show that there are some discursive 
nodal points or macro themes in the party-press representation, such as social stability 
                                                
84 For more on this, see “1.2 Definitions of Terms and Concepts” 
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(wending), social harmony (hexie), economic and social development (shehui jingji fazhan). 
These are powerful discourses in the Chinese context, marking the guiding principals for 
governance as well as main sources of legitimization for continued CCP rule. I argue in my 
analysis of the Guizhou Daily’s party press that these discourses provided a dominant 
framework for how the mass incident was understood and made sense of. All of these themes 
and topics can be observed with a quick look at the headlines in Table I. 
 
I will discuss in detail some of the themes and topics in Southern Weekend in my analysis, but 
I have underneath schematically tried to list up some of the major themes and topics found in 
the critical investigative discourse:  
 
(1) General comments on state-society relations – problem of too much government power 
and the need for a functioning civil society, system of checking and balancing government 
power. 
(2) Elaboration of the deeper causes (shenchengci yuanyin) 
(3) Investigation of leading cadres and their malfeasance of their duties.  
(4) Problem with state propaganda and management of information. 
(5) Unsafe living conditions of Weng’an 




Southern Weekend’s media representation of the Weng’an incident differs quite a lot from 
Guizhou Daily. Southern Weekend’s coverage is much more problem-oriented and critical of 
the local governance of Weng’an. Another striking feature, which my analysis will discuss in 
detail, is the polyphony of Southern Weekend’s coverage – in other words, how this 
alternative media representation gives voice to a wide spectre of the different social groups. 
This is particularly true in the investigative article “Weng’an, the unstable town”. I will come 
back to this in more detail in the analysis of that article. It is also interesting to note how 
Southern Weekend also used the discourse of stability (wending), but differs immensely in 
their usage of it and the understanding of this discourse in connection with the Weng’an 
incident and how social stability can be maintained and secured. I will discuss this in more 
detail in “4.5 Analysis of Social Stability and Government Power”. 
 
I have listed up all the headlines from the two different newspapers in Table 1 (Guizhou 






Guizhou Daily’s headlines 
1. (我省依法妥善处置瓮安县“６·２８”打砸烧突发事件) Guizhou province handles the Weng’an “6.28” hit, 
smash, burn sudden incident properly and according to the law  
2.(瓮安群众愤怒谴责“６．２８”事件打、砸、抢、烧不法分子) Masses of Weng’an indignantly condemns 
the “6.28” incident lawless persons’ hitting, smashing, looting and burning 
3.(做好“６．２８”突发事件的善后工作处理好维护稳定和经济发展的关系) Do a good job in settling the 
aftermath of the “6.28” sudden incident, [and] handle properly the relation between safeguarding stability and 
economic development 
4..(“我哪里死啦，希望不要乱传谣言了”) “I didn’t die, please do not spread rumours anymore” 
5.(我省有关部門召开新闻发布会通报“６．２８”严重打砸抢烧突发事件有关情况), Relevant provincial 
departments of hold a press conference and gives a report on significant circumstances of the grave “6.28” hit, 
smash, loot, burn sudden incident 
6..(瓮安“６．２８”事件目击人的讲述), Narrations by Weng'an "6.28” incident witnesses 
7..(有关方面人士就“６．２８”事件相关问题答记者问 7.(瓮安干部群众希望珍惜平安美好生活环境), 
Cadres and masses of Weng'an wish to treasure peaceful happy living environment 
8.(专访李树芬死亡案件直接办案人), Interview with the head of the investigation of Li Shufen's death 
9.(黔南州严厉打击黑恶势力团伙), Qiannanzhou cracks down on criminal-networks 
10.(省法医专家组第三次对李树芬遗体检验), Provincial medical expert's third examination of Li Shufen's 
remains 
11.(初步分析“６·２８”事件发生的深层次原因), The全省“打黑除恶”严打全省“打黑除恶”严打 initial 
analysis of the deeper causes of the "6.28" incident 
12.(瓮安县群众代表发言摘登), Extracts from statements by Weng'an county People’s representatives 
13.(加强中小学生健康人格教育刻不容缓), Urgent needs in strengthening elementary and middle-school 
students' moral quality through education  
14.(李树芬死因的三次法医鉴定), Li Shufen's third autopsy regarding cause of death 
15.(李树芬父亲不赞成以野蛮方式解决问题), Li Shufen's father does not approve solving problems with 
barbarous means. 
16.(“社会安定才能安心生活”), A stable society is prerequisite for a good life 
17.(“我们是被迫参与打砸的”), We were forced to participate in hitting and smashing  
18.(瓮安县公安局政委局长被免职), Head of the Politics committee Bureau of the Weng’an police station was  
removed from office 
19.(全省“打黑除恶”严打整治行动电视电话会召开), Provincial "crack down on crime, eliminate evil" 
campaign television conference 
20.(省委召开瓮安“６·２８”事件阶段性处置情况汇报会), Provincial Party committee holds conference on 
the current report of the Weng'an "6.28" incident 
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 21.(瓮安群众感激维稳武警官兵), The Masses of Weng’an appreciates the efforts of the armed police 
safeguarding social stability 
22.(临危不惧 血写忠诚－－瓮安干部群众“6·28”抢险救援记事), Face danger without fear, dedication with 
blood shedding - Accounts of Cadres and Masses of Weng'an rushing to help and rescue  
23.(瓮安县党政主要负责人调整), Adjustements in the Weng'an party-government administration  
24.(瓮安“６·２８”事件已查获涉案人员１１６名), Weng'an "6.28" incident has already arrested 116 persons 
involved in the case 
25.(省委召开在职在编和离退休省级党员领导干部会议), Provincial party committee holds a conference with 
working and retired provincial party members and leading cadres 
26.(真相 是消弭谣言的“良药”), The truth is "good medicine" to put an end to rumours 
27.(李树芬第三次遗体检验结果公布), The result of Li Shufen's third autopsy made public 
28.(“６．２８”事件专案组通报工作进展情况), "6.28" incident special investigation team progress report 
 
Table 2 
Southern Weekend’s headlines 
1.(贵州省公安厅公布李树芬溺水死亡事件细节) Guizhou public security office publish the details regarding 
the drowning case of Li Shufen 
2.(贵州省瓮安县发生一起打砸烧事件) A sudden hit, smash, burn incident in Weng'an, Guizhou province  
3.(瓮安事件揭示稳定之道), The Weng'an incident shows the way to stability 
4.(瓮安县公安局政委、局长被免职), Head of politics committee and the head of the police station of Weng'an 
removed from office 
5.(瓮安新生请自公权谦卑始), New Weng'an hopefully marks the start of humble government power 
6.(瓮安，“不安”的县城), Weng'an, the "unstable" town 
7.(.记者见地：“不明真相的民众”为何还不相信), Insights of a journalist: Why the "masses who are unaware 
of the truth" do not believe/trust 
8.(6月28日7月14日：贵州官员瓮安“大考”，还原“6·28事件”中真实的政府反应和政府作为), 6.28-7.14: 










4.3 Analysis of the Initial Party-Press Response of the Weng’an Mass 
Incident (Guizhou Daily) 
 
 
I will begin my analysis with the coverage of Guizhou Daily and analyse the initial party-
press response to the Weng’an incident by looking at the news articles “Guizhou province 
handles the “Weng’an “6.28” hit, smash, burn sudden incident properly and according to 
law”85 and “The masses of Weng’an indignantly condemns the “6.28” incident lawless 
people’s hitting, smashing, looting and burning”.86 The former was published 1st of July 2008 
while the latter was published two days later. Since this analysis is based upon these two news 
articles, I will refer to them as article I and article II respectively. Being the first articles 
published, this sub-chapter will show the party-paper’s immediate reaction to the mass 
incident that broke out 28th of June.  
 
Rationality and the notion of suddenness 
 
A high frequency word in these two articles is “the masses” (qunzhong). This word often gets 
translated into English as “the masses, the masses of people, rank and file, crowd”.87 
According to Hanyu da cidian the word is quite archaic, appearing in the writings of Xunzi 
and Sima Qian. However, qunzhong in the modern sense refers to “people who are not party 
members or members of the communist youth league” and “people who are not exercising the 
duty of leadership”.88 In this way it bears as a connotation of status implying reference to non-
party members or officials in government. Media scholar Jingrong Tong points out that the 
use of this particular noun “in the Chinese context has the implication that (…) people are of 
lower status and are 'masses' and 'mobs' without their own ideas and rationality”.89 As such, 
this particular lexical reflects (implicitly) a paternalistic view on people as mindless, 
                                                
85  我省依法妥善处置瓮安县“６·２８”打砸烧突发事件 
86 瓮安群众愤怒谴责“６．２８”事件打、砸、抢、烧不法分子 
87 Dennis J Doolin et al (1973) A Chinese-English of Chinese Communist Terminology, p 123 
88 指不但任领导服务的人， 指没有加入共产党，共青团组织的人 
89 Tong (2009a), p 599 
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irrational, easily affected and uncontrolled. The lexical choice of qunzhong may then have an 
effect on how the people (as non-party non-government) is being perceived and represented in 
these two texts. However, Hanyu da cidian also cites Mao praising the masses “as actually the 
ones who have/posses an amazing effect/function”.90 There is an ambivalence in the party-
press discourse when it comes to the perception of the masses as either a positive force that 
needs to be listened to or as a potentially dangerous and helpless one in urgent need of control 
and guidance for their own good. In these two articles the representation of the masses seems 
to be closer to the latter conception. This is evident considering that qunzhong is a part of a 
very frequently used collocation in Guizhou Daily’s coverage altogether. That is the 
collocation with the modification of the noun qunzhong, in the fixed expression buming 
zhenxiang de qunzhong meaning “the masses who are unable to grasp the truth” or “the 
masses who don’t know the facts”. I translate this into more natural English with “the 
ignorant masses”. In the initial party-press response the consistent use of buming zhenxiang 
de qunzhong could function to underpin one of the major understandings of this mass event 
presented in this party-press discourse. As we will see later, the sudden outburst of violent 
riots is understood as a result of the acts done by a minority of lawless people. I will later 
refer to them simply as “the few”. Indeed, such a representation of the masses as irrational, 
ignorant and mob-like is arguably needed to enable the mechanism of pointing to and blaming 
the few (“some people”, “few lawless persons”) for the actions of the many (“the masses”). 
At least it makes such an understanding more plausible. This is well illustrated in the 
following paragraph: 
 
A few people incited the ignorant masses to assault the county public security bureau, county 
government and party-committee buildings. Afterwards, a few lawless persons seized the 
chance to smash offices and even set fire to many offices and cars.91 
 
Even though the masses is the agent of assaulting party-state apparatus, they are not guilty-as-
charged due to being used and led astray by an evil minority of lawless people. By 
representing the masses as a generic irrational entity helps to put emphasis on the role of the 
few lawless people as the main culprits in this incident. This emphasis on the few and the role 
of the few and the passivity of the masses will be discussed in more detail under the section of 
agency and blame.  







Even though the social actors responsible for inciting and provoking the masses, “some 
people” (yixie ren) or ‘”few lawless people” (shaoshu bufa fenzi) are perceived as cold cynics 
and schemers by taking advantage of the helpless masses, their actions are also depicted as an 
irrational outburst of extreme violence, seemingly without any rational cause: “but a few 
lawless persons nonetheless frenziedly beat up government personnel and police, broke into 
and smashed some offices and stole some office equipment, before finally going as far as to 
set on fire and burn the office building and cars”.92 The idiom sangxinbingkuang coupled with 
lexical choice of ouda, does not only imply a high degree of crazed cruelty and violence of 
their actions, but also bring connotation of insanity, loss of reason and rationality. The lexical 
choice of ouda (instead of, for instance da) also helps to intensify the degree of violence. 
Indeed, much of the emphasis in the first articles is put on the extreme degree of destruction 
and havoc. This emphasis on acts of violence and destruction is reflected in lexical choices 
describing the incident itself. In Guizhou Daily’s coverage in general, but in particular the 
paper’s immediate response to the event, it is often referred to as a “sudden hit-smash-burn 
incident” (dazashao tufa shijian). This exact phrasing comes from the headline but is also 
repeated in the main paragraph right below. As such, acts of destruction and violence without 
any apparent cause are foregrounded and given prominence just by their central position in 
these news reports by Guizhou Daily. The frequent use of “sudden occurrence” (tufa) 
embedded in the phrase “hit-smash-burn sudden-incident” (dazashao tufa shijian) stresses the 
perceived suddenness of this mass incident (in contrast with Southern Weekend’s coverage). 
This notion of suddenness helps to underpin that the incited masses and the lawless few 
suddenly and without any apparent cause decided to riot, loot and burn. This degree of 
suddenness combined with the role of the few and the incited masses helps to strengthen the 
party-press script of this mass incident as just a sudden expression of an irrational outburst of 
violence. Other explanations, such as the later deeper causes (shenchengci yuanyin) are 
excluded on a narrow focus on the acts of violent rioting. And to put even more emphasis on 
the seriousness of this sudden mass incident it is described as a siege and attack on party-state 
apparatus: “On the 28th of June in the afternoon a serious besiegement of government 
buildings and hit, smash, burn sudden incident broke out in Weng’an”.93 Another key word 
                                                
92 但少数不法分子却丧心病狂地殴打政府工作人员和公安干警，并冲进一些办公室打砸一通，
并抢劫了一些办公用品，最后竟放火焚烧办公楼和车辆  
93 瓮安县城发生一起严重的围攻政府部门和打砸烧突发事件  
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here is weigong meaning to besiegement or attack from all sides. This lexical choice puts even 
more emphasis on the degree of destruction and gives connotations of war and battle.  
 
It is interesting how the family of the deceased is represented as emotionally unstable (sizhe 
jiashu qingxu fanfu) and thus unwilling to accept the official autopsy which stated that Li 
Shufen committed suicide by drowning. What is more disturbing is the fact that the family’s 
hesitation and lingering are being portrayed as an indirect cause of the escalation of the 
situation. As they were unable and unwilling to accept the official autopsy confirming the 
cause of death as drowning, some few lawless persons used this stir-up and incite the situation 
(cishi hou bei shaoshu bufa fenzi shandong). 
 
As we have seen in this section, rationality or the lack of rationality helps to construe a 
particular representation of the masses, epitomized as the “ignorant masses”. The irrationality 
of the masses in combination with the manipulative few who stirred up the situation, resulting 
in an irrational sudden outburst of extreme violence all constitute a prominent focus in these 
two texts. Such a focus also helps to delegitimize the whole demonstration/riot by 
foregrounding the actual acts of destruction, and writing them off as totally irrational and 
without (seemingly) any rational cause, except as a part in the scheme by the few. However, 
as we will see in the next section, where I will focus upon the analysis of agency, the role of 
the few are consistently being foregrounded through particular syntactical choices. We will 
also see how the representation of the masses and their role in the incident is quite ambivalent 
because explicit reference to violent acts is strictly limited to the lawless few. 
 
Agency, lexical choices and voices 
 
In this section we are going to take a look at agency and how social actors are represented in 
the text through agency or lack of agency, and what consequences this might have in the 
representation of particular social groups. We will see the power of discursive strategies that 
have to do with agency and how the action of an agent can be foregrounded, backgrounded or 
even omitted. Consequently, these choices can have a tremendous affect on how the social 
actor and their actions in text are being represented. As a preliminary assumption one can 
assume that negative actions of an antagonist will be emphasized and their positive actions 
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backgrounded or omitted (and vice versa for the protagonist).94 We will take a look at ways 
one can mitigate the agency of an agent, which are usually done by creating agentless passive 
constructions95 or through nominalization (making a verb into a verb-like noun/process). We 
will also look at if the sentence in question is an active-or passive one and the ways such 
constructions could help to foreground or background an agent and their actions. As we will 
see later, such syntactical choices could help to pinpoint degrees of blame and victimization 
in the text. 
  
The masses (qunzhong), as I have already pointed out, is construed as an irrational and mob-
like entity without their own ideas or independent thought. Such a conceptualization of the 
masses could be reflected in the way that they are represented syntactically. In this text, the 
masses is very often placed in the position of the affected. In other words, the masses is very 
seldom the active agent of an action or a process, but rather the object of another agent’s 
action. In the first paragraph, we can observe that the masses is positioned as the affected or 
the object of “some people’s action”: “some people stirred up/incited the ignorant masses to 
assault the county public security department”.96 The action of the masses attacking the 
government is actually the result of few people inciting them (the object of shandong). In this 
way, as a form of secondary agency and through a causative sentence construction the actions 
of the many (qunzhong) are ascribed to the workings of “the few”. It is also interesting to note 
that “some people” and “the masses” and their respective actions are represented through 
active sentence constructions. This arguably helps to emphasize and foreground the evil acts 
of these antagonists. To sum up, the actions of the many are attributed to the few and the mass 
incident itself is perceived to be a consequence of the manipulative acts done by a minority of 
lawless people inciting the masses. In these text the main culprit is the few lawless people.  
 
I think the following passage is illustrative with regards to the perceived degree of agency of 
cadres (ganbu) vis-à-vis the masses:  
 
Provincial party committee and government demand each department and all leading cadres 
utilize their political superiority [skill], go down to the basic units to bring forth understanding 
of the situation, report the facts/truth about the incident, and engage in thorough and detailed 
                                                
94 In the way that positive actions are foregrounded and their negative are backgrounded or omitted. 
95 In Chinese this form is in most cases realized with the use of the passive marker ‘bei’ (被), but this is just one 
among many ways to create subjectless sentences. I focus upon the bei-constructions because they are easy to 




ideological work, guide the masses to be self-conscious in upholding stability and material 
stability and unity, adopt proactive measurements, put into practice tasks and duties to all 
villages and towns, departments, communities, and work hard to restore the social order as 
soon as possible.97 
 
In this passage, we can observe a lack of agency with regards to the masses. It is government 
officials and party members that have to work and guide the masses to be self-aware and self-
conscious about maintaining social order and stability. This is apparently not something they 
can do by themselves. This passage is worth to quote at length because it also shows the 
perceived need for a responsible paternalistic party-state to guide and lead the masses. The 
passage also illustrates the party-state’s high degree of perceived agency, in other words how 
they are imagined to fulfil their duties, report the facts, engage in deep ideological and 
political thought work and so forth. Such hard work is a prerequisite in order to restore the 
normal social order. It is also significant how the actions of party-state officials are always 
construed as fast and quick. For example, among a long list of other officials, “head of public 
security, Cui Yadong [all] quickly arrived at scene/site”.98 While the masses, or bystanders in 
this case, on the other hand are being construed as slow and docile, e.g.; “bystanders slowly 
dispersed”.99 Not only do representatives from the local government have much more active 
role and attributed a higher degree of agency, they are also depicted as fast and responsive. 
This contributes to an overall positive representation of the local government as a resolute and 
responsive government body by restoring social order and stability in times of crisis. The 
masses is not only depicted as irrational, ignorant and passive, but also when they actually get 
attributed some form of agency, their actions are slow and docile. In essence, they seem 
almost as in a desperate need of a paternalistic figure, or a strong government to guide them 
and protect them both from themselves and from the few lawless people.  
 
Direct blame of the mass incident and the destruction that followed is largely attributed to 
“the few”, as in a few lawless people (shaoshu bufa fenzi) or some people (yixie ren). In 
paragraph three, direct blame for the escalation of the situation is put on the few lawless 
people: “Afterwards, this was stirred up by some lawless people, leading to the escalation of 





99 围观人员缓慢散去. 围观群众 (…) 缓慢散去 
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the situation”.100 This is an interesting sentence worthy of further analysis.101 Even though 
this is a case of passive sentence construction, the agency of the agent remains explicit 
because the agent is present in the clause/sentence. Indeed, the role of the agent is even 
emphasized and foregrounded by being placed right after the passive marker bei. However, it 
is important to stress that this is very often the case with Chinese passive bei-constructions, 
although one could also omit the agent completely in clause. This is not done here for 
arguably more or less obvious reasons. With the preliminary assumption, i.e., a conscious 
strategy of positive self-representation and negative representation of an antagonist’s actions, 
this is one way that their “bad” actions can be explicitly referred to through syntactically 
choosing to do so. The point is that there is a consistency in the representation of the few and 
how their “bad” actions are explicitly linked to them as a visible agent. Indeed, the role of the 
few lawless people gets more prominent later in this article and in article II as well. The 
masses is in these texts not an agent of violence, except in the sentence I already analysed in 
which they were only secondary agents. The primary agent of violence and rioting is the few, 
and in later descriptions of destruction and havoc it is repeatedly emphasised that this is the 
work of the few, not the masses. For example: “afterwards, few lawless people seized the 
chance to smash up offices, and set fire to some offices and cars”.102 Exclusive reference to 
the few continues in article II, but with new names and terms. For instance, blame is 
attributed explicitly to “unlawful people”, “hit-burn-loot people” and “troublemakers” (feifa 
fenzi, da-shao-qiang fenzi, naoshizhe).103 I will come back to this in the analysis of the 
dichotomy of order and chaos in “4.4 Analysis of Social Stability and Economic 
Development”. 
 
The next passage illustrates the explicit blame on the few and the victimization of the local 
government: 
 
In interviews with county government officials, they explained that during the entire course of 
events, government personnel and public security police repeatedly tried to explain and 
persuade the masses at the scene, showing extreme self-control/restraint and patience in their 
work. But on the contrary, a few lawless people regardless frenziedly beat up government 
                                                
100 此事后被少数不法分子煽动，导致事态扩大  
101 There are to other instances of passive constructions in the journalist’s narrative about the experience coming 
to Weng’an (paragraph four). I argue that it is quite natural to use the agentless passive in her description of the 
aftermath as a passed event or fulfilled action. Analysis is then futile. For example: 县政府大楼不同程度被烧
，数十辆被烧过的车辆 
102 随后，少数不法分子趁机打砸办公室，并点火焚烧多间办公室和一些车辆  
103 非法分子，  打砸抢分子，  闹事者  
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staff and police, broke into and smashed some offices and office equipment, before finally 
went as far as to set on fire and burn office buildings and cars.104 
 
This passage sums up both the explicit role of the few as main culprits, the victimization of 
government and the ambivalent role of the masses, as well as the restrained, controlled and 
orderly role of government officials. What I mean with ambivalence is that the masses in the 
text earlier actually are “innocent” participants in violent riots due to manipulation. But later 
in the texts they are totally absent as agents of destruction and violence. In this sense, the 
masses is positioned and squeezed in the middle between the lawless few and the lawful local 
government. On one side, we have the representation of the masses as a generic irrational 
mob-like entity as “innocent” and an involuntarily participant of unlawful acts. On the other 
side, through a paternalistic party-press discourse, the masses is not perceived as the main 
culprits; they can for instance “be guided to become more self-aware and conscious on 
safeguarding stability and upholding unity”.105 The masses as a social actor gradually 
disappears in the text as the role of the few become more prominent. In this passage, the 
masses is at the scene when officials and police try to sort out the situation, but they are not 
present when it comes to the subsequent description of acts of violence and destruction. Did 
the masses simply stand by and observe or did they also join the lawless few in violent acts?  
 
It is interesting to see how the actions of the few in this aforementioned passage are being 
contrasted with the conjunction dan and the adverb que (both marked in bold) to further 
contrast the actions of the few against the good actions of representatives from the 
government. Despite impeccable behaviour and forbearance from the police and government 
personnel, the lawless still attacked them and continued loot and burn. Textual coherence with 
the conjunction dan also helps to construe the government and their representative as helpless 
victims of the extremely violent act’s done by the few (I have already analysed the lexical 
choices describing the few in this passage under the section of rationality). This representation 
of the helpless victimized government is further elaborated upon in the interview with the two 
police officers in article II: 
 





105 引导群众自觉维护稳定，维护安定团结的局面  
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The two police officers told the journalist, during “6.28” incident, when they and another 30 or 
so police officers started to defend the entrance of the public security bureau, thay did not have 
any protection equipment, while the unlawful people used iron clubs and sticks to beat them 
and flower pots and stones to pound them, almost all of the policemen got injured.106 
 
The adverb jihu and meaning almost, nearly or practically, and suoyou meaning all, helps to 
further strengthen the picture of the police as the victims of the actions done by the few. It is 
striking that any mentioning of casualties beyond that of representatives from the party-state 
is excluded in the coverage by Guizhou Daily. This is questioned in Southern Weekend’s 
coverage, where we do not only get to know that there were violent clashes and casualties on 
both sides, but also that county government had a long record of using police force to solve 
problems and disputes between local government and discontented citizens. Such information 
seems to constitute what is left unsaid in Guizhou Daily’s coverage. It should be noted that 
Guizhou Daily also reports on possible deeper causes (shenchengci yuanyin) and the sacking 
of local officials. But this sort of information is however very briefly touched upon and 
backgrounded in sea of other topics, such as the later provincial campaign against crime 
(yanda) and the need for more political and ideological education of school students.107  
 
If we look at imagined political reactions or demands in the text, we can observe that it is 
strictly limited to punitive measurements against the few. The headline and the preceding 
opening paragraph in article II states that:  
 
The masses of Weng’an indignantly condemn “6.28” incident hit-smash-pillage-burn lawless 
people:  
 
The Weng’an “6.28” hit, smash, pillage, burn incident has raised intense reactions from the 
masses of Weng’an, the great masses detest the actions of a small handful of lawless people 
who wilfully trampled on the law, assaulted government offices, burned and damaged public 
property, influencing [in a bad way] the social order, [the masses] believe 30 years of social 
and economic development since reform and opening up, the excellent situation of stability and 
unity were hard-earned, all demand that the government complete dredge work, and severely 
punish leading lawless people in order to give back to the common people a harmonious, safe 
and sound, good environment.108 














This passage is worth to quote at length because it demonstrates some of the discursive 
strategies at play in party-press discourse. Not only does it further demonstrate the separation 
of masses and the few in terms of blame, but also how the perceived demand from the masses 
reflect a paternalistic party-press discourse. The text construes the great masses (guangda 
qunzhong) as a uniform collective, speaking in one voice. The members of the masses one 
after another (fenfen) demand that the government should complete their work restoring 
normality and the social order by severely punishing leading figures among the group of 
lawless people. Any political demands or investigation of other possible causes are excluded 
on a narrow focus upon punitive action against the minority of lawless people. Lexical 
choices help to intensify the perceived degree of anger amongst the masses against the few 
and their actions, such as indignant (fennu), condemn (qianze) and detest (shenwutongjue). 
This anger towards the few is intensified even further when such lexical choices are coupled 
with the rhetorical trope on how the few “wilfully trampled on the law”109. The few lawless 
people’s actions assaulting (chongji) the party-state apparatus are then contrasted and 
compared through a from of retrospective technique, with a historical perspective on the hard-
earned social and economical progress and the period of relative stability and unity. In a way, 
their illegitimate actions are put up against what has been the main source of legitimacy for 
the CCP the last 30 years, namely stability (wending) and economic and social development 
(shehui jingji fazhan). The discourse of stability (wending) is perhaps one of the most 
powerful ones in contemporary China, especially in the post-Tiananmen-period. Peter 
Sandby-Thomas pointed to how the discourse of stability and the use of it have been 
instrumental for the CCP in strengthening their legitimacy, and in which the central notion is 
that it is CCP who is the sole guarantor of continued political and material stability.110  
Guizhou Daily utilizes this discourse to provide a powerful discursive tool in their coverage of 
this localized mass incident. The discourse of stability, the role of party-state and demands for 
punitive measurements are further played upon later in the article, for instance in interviews 
with locals from Weng’an. Wang Guilin says after a long narrative of destructive acts done by 
the few that he “hopes that the government will strike a severe blow [severely punish] against 
those lawless people, otherwise we will not have good days [in the future]”.111 The 
conjunction fouze connects the role of the government in punishing the few and the necessity 
                                                
109 肆意践踏法律  
110 Sandby-Thomas (2011)  
111 希望政府要严厉打击那些不法分子，否则我们将不会有好日子  
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of doing so in order to secure good days in the future. Taxi driver Ceng Bin concludes after 
explaining how the mass incident has affected his business that “ the beating, smashing, 
looting people should be handled as quick as possible, so that I can go back to my business 
without worries”.112 Independent merchant You Hu blames rumourmongers (zaoyaozhe) for 
harmful influence done by propagating rumours to the masses. He hopes that everything goes 
back to normal so that he can ‘live and work in peace and contentment’ (anjuleye). These 
statements reflect a perceived trust in the government as paternalistic protectors and punishers, 
but also the importance of stability as a prerequisite for economic development. As such, the 
blame for the mass incident is put on the few, in which vivid descriptions of their violent acts 
are pitted against the discourse of stability (wending) and economic and social development 
(shehui jingji fazhan). The few are then not only to blame for violence and destruction, but 
also as disrupters of social stability, which again causes great harm to economic development.  
 
In article II there is also an interesting interview with two police officers. Despite being 
unarmed and as almost helpless victims of the few’s extreme violence, they manage to stop 
the unlawful people due to perceived exceptional bravery: “the unlawful people once again 
rushed onto the second floor, and still wanting to go up to the third floor. But the policemen 
risked their lives to defend to the death the entrance to the third floor, the unlawful people 
charged four times without success”.113 This is a good example of a clear-cut positive self-
representation and negative “other” representation often found Guizhou Daily’s coverage. 
Later in the interview, it is very interesting to note that one among the masses gets injured 
when trying to help a wounded police officer: “Police officer Cai Lei’s head was severely 
wounded by a troublemaker, a very serious injury, one among the masses carried him on the 
back and went out from the back door for the rescue, but as soon as they got once outside the 
troublemakers just started to attack and chase to beat [him] up”.114 That one among the 
masses is attributed agency through a positive act further strengthens my assessment of the 
ambivalent representation of the masses in these two texts. We can see that in both of these 
two passages, the agency of the few remains explicit and even foregrounded with active 
sentence constructions (feifa fenzi you chongshang, chong le si ci). In the last example two 
passive bei-sentences are used, but both with clear reference to the agent (bei naoshizhe 
                                                







dashang, weigong zhuida). The bad actions of the few are even more intensified with the 
sentence construction yi…jiu, meaning as soon as something happens, something else happens. 
In this case as soon as the person carrying the wounded policemen out, he was immediately 
attacked and chased by the few. 
 
With regards to blame, it is interesting to note that the two police officers give additional 
information on who the few lawless people actually could be. According to the two officers 
“these hit, smash, pillage, burn people (…), and among them many are known criminals and 
drug users who this public security bureau have tried to arrest on earlier occasions”.115 It is 
interesting that drug users, perhaps one of the weakest social groups in China are used 
alongside criminals to pinpoint blame. By pointing to marginalized groups, such as criminals 
and drug users, not only helps to distance the masses from the few and their perceived role in 
this mass incident, but as well as to delegitimize the demonstrations/riots as a whole. It is also 
interesting to note in article II, resident Wang Guilin mentions that “ there were all sorts of 
people at the scene, there were student-looking people and youngsters and also some migrant 
workers”. He goes on saying; “their acts looked like it was arranged, like it was organized”.116 
Claims that this mass incident was partly organized by the few, adds another dimension of 
fear, with an organized opposition against the party and the government. However it is little 
information about who the few actually could be. In this respect one cannot help to ask: Who 
or which groups of people actually constitutes this minority of lawless people? Is it drug-users 
and criminals? To what extent do students and migrant workers count as belonging to the few? 
What about workers, peasants and the average Joe of Weng’an; to what extent did they 
participate in violent riots? It was after all a mass incident, involving thousands of people. In 
essence, they few as a social actor is represented through impersonal and derogatory generic 
entities, such as “some people” or “few lawless people”. Such a vague generic referential 
strategy helps to obfuscate them and their role117 as well as to impersonalize them. I think this 
vagueness, as a referential strategy is of particular importance when it comes to blame and in 
construing the few as a distinct “other”, with a complete lack of reason, moral and respect for 
the law.  
 
                                                
115 这些打、砸抢、烧分子 , (…)其中不少人是曾经本公安机关打击过的违法犯罪分子和吸毒人员  
116 他说，事发现场人员很杂，有学生模样的，也有一些社会青年，还有一些外来打工人员，他
们的行动看上去很有程序，感觉是有组织的  
117 To further elaborate on this: who are the “yixie ren”? Are they the same as the lawless people? 
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This referential vagueness of the few and the ambivalence of masses with regard to their role 
as participants in the mass incident also helps to minimize the representation of social 
conflicts (shehui maodun) between local party-state and the people of Weng’an. In Guizhou 
Daily’s discourse the perceived social conflict seems to solely be between a minority of 
lawless people as a distinct “other” and the lawful local government. By comparison, in 
Southern Weekend the representation of social conflicts is perceived to be a general and deep-
rooted conflict between the party-state and the people of Weng’an. I will come back to this 
later in the analysis of articles from Southern Weekend. 
 
To sum it up, there seems to be a macro strategy and a generic structure of, on one side vivid 
descriptions of violence and destruction with explicit reference to the few and the subsequent 
victimization of the local government. Despite this and being perceived as an almost helpless 
victim of the few, it is precisely a strong party-state and the successful cooperation between 
the three levels of government (local, provincial and central) that can bring the situation back 
to normal: 
 
After the event took place; important leaders from the provincial party committee and 
government demand a proper handling of the situation as soon as possible, Guizhou province 
standing committee member, commissionary secretary of politics and law, and head of public 
security office Cui Yadong all quickly arrived at the scene, guiding local party and government 
officials in handling and quieting down the situation. 29 of June, bystanders slowly went away, 
the situation did not escalate any further, and the normal order in Weng’an had almost returned 
to normal.118  
 
The successful response of the party-state as a functioning whole in handling the incident and 
bringing back normality and stability is attributed to all levels of government. This gives 
legitimacy to the party-state apparatus as a coherent and organic whole. In this passage, much 
of the legitimacy is attributed to the guidance from the provincial level, but later in the article 
there is a whole paragraph describing how this matter received the closest attention from the 
central level and how the centre gave instructions to the provincial level (zuochu zhongyao 
pishi) on how to handle this event. These nodal points can be found in the overview of article 
I, which I schematically have listed up as topics in brackets: 
 
Headline (properly and lawfully handling of the mass incident by Guizhou Province) 
First paragraph (background information, few lawless people inciting the masses, subsequent 
assault and destruction of government buildings.) 
                                                
118 29日，围观人员缓慢散去，事态没有进一步扩大，瓮安县城秩序基本恢复正常  
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Paragraph two (success of party-state’s response to the mass incident bringing back the normal 
social order.) 
Paragraph three (elaboration on the causes and how the situation got out of control by blaming 
the few) 
Paragraph four (the journalist’s first-hand account of and elaboration on the destruction and 
chaos) 
Paragraph five (further elaboration on violence and destruction done by the few despite 
extreme forbearance and patience from government staff and cadres) 
Paragraph six (elaboration on the cooperation between the national, provincial, and the local 
government, successful response; setting up of different work groups) 
Paragraph seven (elaboration on instructions from the central/provincial-level to local levels, 
concrete solutions, such as ideological work and adoption of pro-active measures etc.) 
Wrap up (successful handling of the mass incident; everything back to normal and continuation 
of the hard work.)  
 
Through a quick look at main topics and sub-topics, we can see that it is a focus on (1) the 
role of the few in inciting the masses and attacking party-state organs; (2) a victimization of 
the party-state and (3) the successful governmental response due to excellent cooperation 
between the levels of government, restoring order and stability. This generic structure is 
arguably quite representative of a party-press discourse on mass incidents  
 
 As discussed, other reasons or causes besides that of the few inciting (shandong) the many 
(qunzhong), which escalated the situation into a sudden mass riot, are excluded. In this sense, 
what is not being said can be more important than what is being said. To further elaborate on 
this, on the topic of blame and victimization, the roles of the victim and the victimized seems 
to be switched around in the coverage by Southern Weekend. As we later will see by 
analysing Southern Weekend’s coverage, it is the people of Weng’an that are actually 
construed as the victims of the local government’s infringement of their lawful rights and 
interests. Illegitimate local governance is pointed out as one the deeper causes of the Weng’an 
incident. Blame is thus put on poor local governance and its illegitimate practices, resulting in 
a deep-rooted discontent towards the local government over a long period of time. As this 
short summary above shows, by having a basis for comparison between the two types of 
discourse, I think it enables me to see what said and what is left unsaid in both the party-
press- and the investigative discourse of the Weng’an incident.  
 
I think that Guizhou Daily’s headlines say a great deal about which voices or perspectives that 
are dominant in the articles. In article I the headline is as follows: “Guizhou province 
appropriately handles the ‘6.28 Weng'an hit-smash-burn sudden incident according to law”.119 
Translation is always hard, but I have tried to translate it in a way that shows the original 




connotations in the Chinese version. Parts of the connotation in the first word may actually be 
lost in translation. The lexical choice of wosheng has patriotic feel, in this case referring to 
Guizhou province as “our province”, just in the same way many Chinese say “our country” 
(woguo). This also epitomizes the de facto position of the newspaper; representing the official 
voice at the provincial level. This is why the headline also reflects the party-state’s perceived 
ability (governmental bodies as well as political bodies) and the success in their handling of 
this mass incident. Guizhou Daily has also an immense focus on the government’s lawfulness, 
i.e., on how the provincial party-state apparatus handled the mass incident according to law 
(yifa). This yifa does not only come up in this headline, but also comes up consistently in later 
articles. The voice represented and propagated by Guizhou Daily is not only clearly an official 
one, but also a lawful and righteous one. I will come back to the notion of the government’s 
lawfulness and the few’s lawlessness in the next sub-chapter in the discussion of the 
dichotomy of order and chaos.  
 
We have now moved above the mere textual level to the macro-level of discourse by looking 
at the analytical category of voices. In these two texts we can see that there is an 
overrepresentation of official actors representing the party-state government. This is 
particularly true if one looks at paragraph six in article I. The whole paragraph (which is quite 
long) is dedicated to listing up all the officials involved from the central- down to the local 
level in the handling of this mass incident. If we take a look at sources in the texts it is 
predominantly official ones. In article I, much of the text is based upon insights from leading 
county government officials, or statements from local officials who is in charge on the 
matter.120 The combination of official government sources and predominance of official news 
actors makes these texts very monophonic, authoritarian account of the “28.6” incident. The 
articles also feature a predominant use of indirect reported speech, i.e. summary of what was 
supposedly said. I say “supposedly”, because by using this form of reported speech, the 
journalist has much more room to distort and misrepresent what was actually was said. With 
regards to this, it is interesting to note that the family of the deceased is represented through 
an official government source in the form of indirect reported speech. In this way, non-official 
voices, in this case, the genuine voice of the family can be excluded and misrepresented. 
 
                                                
120 记者从县政府有关领导处获悉，采访中，县政府负责人介绍说   
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As indicated, non-official sources and voices are underrepresented in these two articles. In 
article I we have what we can call a semi-official voice, namely the journalist’s voice. 
However, this paragraph is nothing more than a first-hand account in retrospect of the 
destruction and havoc already done: “entering the county government yard, I saw the county 
public security bureau, party committee buildings and county government buildings were 
burned to different degrees, and about ten burned-out cars were laying in a rubble inside the 
yard”.121 The journalist sums up the present situation (qingkuang) with the fixed expression 
canburendu, meaning “too horrible to look at”. As we can see, the journalist’s voice in the 
text does not give us much new information, besides what has already been emphasized 
before, namely violence and destruction.  
 
In article II, there are actually interviews with three non-official representatives from the 
masses, along side an interview with two police officers. However, these testimonies are quite 
similar in content and style. Entrepreneur and shopkeeper You Hu and Taxi driver Ceng Bing 
both point to the grave economic consequences in the aftermath of the ‘6.28’ mass incident. 
Resident Wang Guilin gives a yet another similar account of the few’s destruction and 
violence. These non-official voices do not provide much new information. On the contrary, 
they arguably just help to reproduce the dominant official script of the violence and 
destruction done by the few. As such, I think these two articles are very monophonic – or one-
voiced, which arguably is a characteristic of Guizhou Daily’s coverage as a whole. The 
prominent voice is the dominant official one, representing and reflecting the provincial 
government and their concerns with what to be said and what to be left unsaid. 
 
We have in these two articles seen a general positive self-representation of local- and 
provincial- government officials and cadres, representing order, stability, law, and legitimacy. 
While on the other side, we have an overall negative representation of the antagonistic “other”, 
with the almost animalistic violent lawless few and the mindless ignorant masses. The few 
represents the minority that is the responsible agent of chaos. In sum, there is an over-
simplistic dichotomy of order and chaos in these two texts. Order is represented by a lawful 
and legitimate party-state, resembling a paternalistic figure as the provider and protector of 
stability and unity. Chaos and unlawfulness are solely represented by the few as the agents of 
destruction and havoc.  






The predominance of the official voice in these two articles, underpinning a particular party-
press representation of the Weng’an incident was later challenged and questioned by other 
accounts. Actually, such a discrepancy between official and alternative accounts might have 
contributed to making this initial local matter into a national matter. As we later will see, this 
somewhat simplistic paper-press representation of the Weng’an incident was later contested 
and questioned by the investigative reports of papers such as Southern Weekend.   
 
 
4.4 Analysis of Social Stability and Economic Development (Guizhou 
Daily)  
 
I will start the analysis of Guizhou Daily’s “Do a good job in settling the aftermath of the 
“6.28” sudden incident, [and] handle properly the relation between safeguarding stability and 
economic development”122 with focus on agency, lexical choices and themes of blame, 
ignorance and rationality. This is also connected to a discussion of the different social actors’ 
degree of agency. I will then discuss an overall dichotomy of order and chaos in Guizhou 
Daily’s discourse and coverage. I will then take a quick look at the issue of suddenness, both 
in the positive and negative sense, before I turn the analytical category of voices.  
 
Lexical choices and Agency 
 
In this article we can find a string of new lexical alternatives describing the few, including 
“few people with ulterior motives”,  “evil criminals”, “saboteurs”, and “hit, smash, loot, burn-
criminals”.123 Other new ways to refer to the few, as vague as the aforementioned are 
“organizers”, “schemers” and “the violent”124. As I pointed out in the first analysis, there is a 
tendency to be very vague in the reference to the few as a social group, except through the use 
of such negative epithets. Even though more lexical alternatives or terms describing the few 
are introduced, I argue that this vagueness still prevails and that such new derogatory terms 
are part a strategy of alienating the few as a particular social group from the masses. The few 
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as a social group is in this text still perceived as the main culprit, for example in this 
collective condemnation by county party- and government representatives: 
 
(…) feel deeply distressed and bitter about the “6.28” incident, believe that the actions of the 
hit, smash, pillage, burn-criminals, severely damaged not only Weng’an, but also the whole 
province’s image, wrecked the excellent social and economic development of Weng’an county, 
destroyed conditions of stability and unity in Weng’an, as well as in the entire province. 
Everybody demands the party committee and government to severely punish and saboteurs, 
and safeguard social stability and harmony.125 
 
The acts of violence and riots done by the few are, as in previous article, put up and measured 
against macro discourses, such as “social stability and harmony” (shehui wending hexie) and 
stability and unity (andingtuanjie). I will come back the discussion of these in detail in the 
discussion of the dichotomy order and chaos.   
 
Later in the text, lexical choices are employed to intensify and pinpoint the perceived conflict 
between the few and the local government. The few, in this case, ”people with ulterior 
motive” and “criminals” are depicted with the choice of the derogatory adverb as “brazenly” 
(gongran) going against the party and government. We can also see that there are some 
examples of foregrounding their bad actions through syntactical choices: 
 
The cause of “6.28” incident was simple, but was stirred up and exploited by a few people with 
ulterior motives, even criminals meddled and got directly involved, this was a mass incident in 
which [they] brazenly and intentionally provoked the Guizhou party committee and 
government.126  
 
We can see here that the agency of the social actor is explicit through the use of a passive 
sentence construction with a present agent. The fact that it was the “few people with ulterior 
motives” that incited and took advantage of the situation is emphasised with this particular 
syntactical choice. Furthermore, salience and emphasis is also put on the actions of “evil 
criminals”127 (hei’eshili renyuan) with an active sentence structure. In any case, the agency of 
their bad actions is explicit as they are both present as agents in their respective clauses. It is 
interesting to note that in addition to “stir up” (shandong), the verb “to take advantage of” 










(liyong) has been included as acts done by the few. But it is quite vague what is meant by “the 
cause of the 6.28-incident was simple”?  What is simple? Is it a reference back to 
circumstances around the death of Li Shufen? Anyway, the article continues with an 
elaboration on consequences of the acts done by the few: “The plot/circumstances were vile 
and abominable, serious destruction was done, which caused enormous material and 
economic damage, affecting the stability of the whole province and the image of Guizhou”.128 
These two examples are similar to the pattern of blaming the few and the victimization of the 
local government found in the analysis of the initial party-press response. However, further 
blame and demand for harsh punishment is channelled against leading figures among the few:  
 
(…) must rigorously differentiate two problems of [completely] different nature, for the 
bystanders and participants self-criticism and education will be the main means to rely on, 
organizers, schemers and the violent [on the other side], will be ruthlessly dealt with 
[punished], [we] cannot show any leniency, [and will] make great effort to build a quiet and 
stable Weng’an, Qiannanzhou and Guizhou Province.129 
 
The blame for the incident is reflected in the punitive measurements against the few vis-à-vis 
what ought to be done with the many (bystanders and participants). The few is to and must be 
dealt with strict punitive measures in order to safeguard social order and stability of not only 
Weng’an, but the whole the province. However, the bystanders and participants (pangguan 
xietongzhe) should rather than being punished, undergo education and criticism. As I have 
earlier pointed out in the first analysis of the party-press discourse, the masses is not 
perceived as a main culprit, albeit a potentially dangerous force that has to be controlled and 
moulded. One solution imagined in this text on how to get the ignorant masses over to the 
lawful and right side, is to conduct ideological and educational thought work:  
 
Even though the situation at the present is more or less under control, there is nevertheless a lot 
of work to be done. Among them, which is the upmost important task, is to conduct thorough 
and detailed work with propaganda and education towards the great masses of whole 
county, and to explain the facts, and reassure the people, in order for the situation to 
subside, as well as to uphold the overall situation of stability, and for pushing forward [social 
and economic] development.130 
 
                                                








This passage illustrates a general tendency in Guizhou Daily’s discourse to construe the local 
and provincial government as social actors with a very high degree of agency. On the other 
side, non-governmental actors, such as the masses is quite passive and absent, except for the 
agency of the few as the ones who incite, manipulate, loot and burn. The lack of agency with 
regards to the masses is reflected in that it is the government that has to educate, explain and 
reassure the masses. As a social actor in the text the masses is positioned mostly as the 
affected of an action. I argue that by often being placed in such a position and not that of an 
active agent, the masses is conceptualized in these media texts as an entity with very low 
degree of agency. However, the lexical choice with the collocation “the great masses” 
(quangda qunzhong) reflects on the other side, the Maoist conception of the masses as a 
potential positive force, if guided and educated correctly. A good example of this is one of 
most crucial tasks left to do according to the text, namely the work to conduct a thorough and 
detailed propaganda and education-campaign directed to the masses. In short, it is a 
responsible, paternalistic government that has to enlighten the ignorant, passive masses, who 
seems to be in need to be told the truth and reassured that everything is under control. Another 
similar example is how the government has to “tell and take the truth of the matter (in order) 
to talk sense to the masses, and educate the masses to prioritize stability above all”.131 All of 
these examples underpin the pervious perception of the masses as “the ignorant masses” 
(buming zhenxiang de qunhzong); a passive, ignorant, irrational and mob-like entity without 
independent ideas and thoughts. 
 
The Dichotomy of Order and Chaos 
 
As the previous section has shown, one among the major themes in this text and in Guizhou 
Daily’s coverage in general, is how the few is perceived as a very dangerous, disruptive and 
splittist force. On the other side, we have the government and its role as a preserver and 
protector of “ a stable and harmonious society”132. These discursive nodal points have been 
connected with the few and their sudden acts of violence and rioting, which is perceived as a 
direct attack on the local government and on social order in general, resulting in social 
instability and disunity. As such, one can find in Guizhou Daily’s discourse an overarching 
dichotomy of order and chaos, which I will discuss in the following pages.  
 





In the party-press discourse, local and provincial governments are perceived as defenders and 
upholders of social order, and by logical extension, of social stability and harmony in society. 
We have also observed a similar division between the lawfulness of the local government as 
opposed to the lawlessness of the few. Such distinct dichotomies between the state and the 
few are not found in Southern Weekend’s coverage. Another interesting difference between 
the two papers is the different ways they employ the macro discourse of stability (wending). 
In Southern Weekend’s discourse this discourse is connected and collocated with the people’s 
sentiments (renxin) and linked with the theme of rights and interests (quanyi). As such, it is 
the protection and safeguarding of people’s rights and interest that can ensure stability, both 
on an individual- and a societal-level. It is striking that in Southern Weekends’s coverage 
there are no instances of drawing upon the official discourse of harmony (hexie). However, 
social stability, harmonious society (shehui wending hexie) and social and economic 
development (shehui jingji fazhan) are among the most frequent collocations in Guizhou 
Daily’s coverage. To illustrate this, we can take look at the headline and the following ingress: 
 
Do a good job in settling the aftermath of the “6.28” sudden incident, [and] handle properly the 
relation between safeguarding stability and economic development  
 
Shi Zongyuan arrives at Weng’an [to give] on-site command in the work dealing with the 
“6.28” incident, [and] stresses the importance of the aftermath work of “6.28” sudden incident 
[and] to handle properly the relation between safeguarding stability and economic 
development.133 
 
Salience is given to the government’s successful response to an immediate crisis and its role 
in being able to preserve stability and economic development. The headline is quite 
illustrative of some of the key principles and rationale for CCP and the party-state’s 
legitimacy in post-Mao China. The government is the guarantor and protector of (1) stability 
(wending), laying the foundation for (2) social and economic development (shehui jingji 
fazhan). Social harmony (hexie) although not present in this extract is also frequently used in 
Guizhou Daily’s discourse. The latter is a relatively new discursive tool and concept, and in 
fact has been one of the discursive trademarks of the previous Hu-Wen administration in pre-
and post-Olympic China. Contrasting and linking this mass incident with concepts of stability, 
social harmony and economic development are arguably very efficient and powerful ways to 






point to potential dangers of chaos, with political and social instability.134 Instead of focusing 
on specific social problems and deeper underlying causes of the incident as Southern 
Weekend’s discourse does, much of the attention in the party-press discourse is put on the 
potential dangers of the disintegration of the social order. It is precisely the government and 
its efforts that are seen as crucial in providing conditions of continued stability. Guizhou 
Daily’s media representation of the Weng’an incident is very much positioned around and 
understood within the powerful discursive frameworks, such as social stability and harmony 
(shehui wending hexie), and social and economic development (shehui jingji fazhan).  
 
In the following passage we can identify the whole spectre of the government hierarchy and 
how the successful cooperation and top-down integration of the levels of government are 
perceived to be crucial in order to reinstate normality and social stability: 
 
After the incident, the central party committee and state council have paid the upmost attention, 
and have been very concerned about [it], general secretary Hu Jintao issued important 
instructions: standing committee member of the Politburo, secretary of the central political and 
legal commission, Zhou Yongkang has issued important instructions twice; member of the 
state council, minister of public security, Meng Jianzhu made repeated telephone calls to the 
frontlines to give direct guidance; Commanding officer of the People’s armed police Wu 
Shuangzhan issued instructions, and dispatched personnel to get to Weng’an as fast as 
possible to give guidance and direct the work. Provincial party-committee and the 
provincial government followed and implemented the important directives and 
instructions of the central leadership to the letter, the situation subsided and safeguarding 
stability was given top priority, members of the provincial party committee, secretary of law 
and politics, and head of public security office, Cui Yadong has made up font-line commando 
post all through the night.135 
 
The fixed expression buzhebukou, functioning as an adverb with de-marker, meaning one 
hundred percent (ly) or doing something to the letter is of particular importance (in bold). 
This lexical choice illustrates best the perceived success in the cooperation between the 
central and local governments, and the party-state apparatus functioning as coherent whole. 
Another interesting word is pishi which I translate into “instructions”.  This lexical has also 
connotations of hierarchy, often being instructions or order given from a superior to an 
inferior. As such, it seems that this hierarchy is perceived to be fully functional without 
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clashes of interests or conflicts. The next example also show how provincial and local 
governments were perceived to be successful in reinstating social order and normality due to 
hard work and impeccable behaviour, contributing to the role of the government as an orderly 
force, in the dichotomy of the order and chaos: 
 
On the 29th of June, Provincial party deputy secretary Wang Fuyu [was] dispatched to 
Weng’an as the chief of the provincial work team to guide, supervise and give support to other 
relevant work with the case. In the process of handling [the situation], the People’s armed 
police and the People’s police showed and exercised the greatest degree of patience and self-
control, adopting many kinds of safe, reliable, but vigorous measures, especially the People’s 
armed police[’s presence] has worked like a cornerstone, quickly taking control over the 
situation, during the entire process there were no direct clashes with the masses, not even one 
person died, the situation is already, on the whole, under control. The overall situation has 
already gone back to normal, the handling [of the situation] has been both controlled/restrained 
and efficient.136 
 
Beside the successful cooperation between the different levels of government, there is also a 
connection with how the government punishing the few is seen as essential in order to 
safeguard stability: “everyone demands the party committee and government to severely 
punish and saboteurs, [to] safeguard social stability and harmony”.137 In this example, we can 
see that the local and provincial government is construed as the protector of social stability 
and harmony by punishing the few. As we see from this translation, this is actually not only a 
wish, but rather a collective demand (fenfen yaoqiu).  
 
With regards to chaos, blame for the incident is attributed to the few, both as the main 
participant in the actual riots but also the one responsible for the situation escalating into a 
mass incident. As such, the few is not only construed as criminals and rioters which 
committed acts of material destruction and violence, but also as a potential subversive force 
that could endanger the stability and unity of Guizhou province as a whole. Their actions are 
perceived to have:  
 
Severely damaged not only Weng’an, but also the whole province image, wrecked the 
excellent social and economic development of Weng’an county, destroyed excellent conditions 
of stability and unity in Weng’an, as well as in the entire province.138 
                                                










The few are not only criminals violating the law, burning and looting and destroying material 
things, but also guilty of severely damaging the more immaterial and abstract conditions of 
stability and unity, as well disrupters of social and economic development. As such, they are 
agents of chaos both on the level of the material destruction of property and physical violence, 
as well as disrupters of the more immaterial state of stability and unity. In this text and also in 
Guizhou Daily’s coverage in general, the political phrase “andingtuanjie”139 is frequently 
used. I translate this into “stability and unity”. We can see in this text that the few is 
responsible for “destroying the excellent condition of stability and unity”.140 As such, the few 
is perceived to be a splittist-force whose acts are seen as breaking up the unity and stability in 
Weng’an county and Guizhou province. This political phrase “stability and unity” was 
actually a part of a secret document and slogan coined by Mao Zedong in the backdrop of the 
Cultural Revolution: “Stability should be good at the present. The whole party and the whole 
army must unite together”.141 Later it was referred to as “Mao Tse-tung’s directive on stability 
and unity”.142 At that point in time, apart from that the fact that it did not mean stability and 
unity in the sense that “the proletarian class and the bourgeois can coexist peacefully”, the 
obstacles and dangers for disrupting stability and harmony were perceived to be: 
 
1) the bourgeois factionalism which disregards the situation of the country and is detrimental to 
consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat; 2) the erroneous tendency to commit acts of 
autonomism which harm the centralized leadership of the Party; 3) the class enemies at home 
and abroad who intend to disrupt the proletarian government and the social order, to confuse 
people’s ideology and to carry out reactionary sabotaging activities.143 
 
First, it is interesting to note that the problem with “deviant” localities is not a new 
phenomenon as they had “the erroneous tendency to commit acts of autonomism” and thus 
going against the interests of the centre. Second, on can also see from this passage that much 
of the former essential Maoist discourse has lost some of its former relevance in 
contemporary China (the bourgeois, dictatorship of the proletariat, class enemies, reactionary 
and so fourth). Third, as a final digression one can perhaps assert that what the leadership in 
today’s China actually want (but does not say out load) is exactly what the old Maoist once 
categorically dismissed and fought against; namely stability and unity as means to ensure a 
peaceful coexistence between the proletarian class and the bourgeoisie, or more precisely the 
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142 Ibid, p 3 
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coexistence between the disenfranchised groups144 in contemporary China with the affluent 
urban elite. The Weng’an incident and the media representations of it can in be seen in this 
sense as different ways to deal with grievances of laobaixing regarding poverty, corruption, 
infringement of basic civil rights and interests and so fourth. This example with the use of 
“stability and unity” is worth mentioning in detail because it illustrates how political phrases, 
concepts and discourses often are recontextualised and decontextualised by being taken out of 
its original context and put into a new one to serve present purposes. As we have seen in with 
the example of “stability and unity”, the original meaning often gets altered in the course of 
this process.   
 
We have in this passage discussed an overarching dichotomy between the lawful government 
and the lawless few as one of order and chaos. Similar dichotomies such as lawfulness and 
lawlessness and unity-split are for analytical purposes put together and seen as a part of the 
overarching one of order and chaos.  
 
The Notion of Suddenness 
 
In this article as in earlier articles in the party-press corpus, government and party officials are 
construed as fast, reactive and responsive. To distinguish this form of positive suddenness 
from the negative,  I will rather call it “immediacy”.  Shi Zongyuan and his actions are, for 
instance, represented through the following group of lexical choices: 
 
Once [Shi Zongyuan] arrived in Weng’an [he] promptly hurried to the site of “6.28” 
incident to inspect, and immediately immersed himself among the masses to understand the 
situation, visited people’s police and officers from the armed police. Around twelve o’clock 
secretary Shi Zongyuan left the site and immediately organized a meeting in Qiannanzhou 
(…).145   
   
In this example we can also see how the distinctively Chinese sentence structure (yi-jiu) helps 
to express a higher degree of immediacy in a positive way. In this context, how the second 
verb “hurried to” (gandao) comes straight after the completion of the first verb “arrived” 
(dao). This sentence construction along side the choice of adverbs liji and zhijie meaning 
“immediately” and “directly”, helps to construe Shi Zongyuan in a particularly positive way; 
as responsive, fast, quick and so forth. Another example of a similar representation of the 
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immediacy of officials is how ”county and government representatives at the conference 
enthusiastically took the floor [made statements]”.146 This couple of examples show how 
choices regarding words, verbs and adverbs and sentence constructions can assist and 
underpin a particular representation of a particular social group, in this case party- and 
government officials at different levels. In here, positive representation is connected with 
degrees of immediacy, quickness and responsiveness. These examples illustrate how the 
dominant wishes himself to be perceived: as reacting quickly and immediately, as responsible 
leaders should. 
 
The other side of suddenness, which represents danger and loss of control, is connected to 
Guizhou Daily’s constant use of sudden (tufa). Even though Guizhou Daily has changed from 
the very graphic reference with “hit-smash-burn sudden incident” to refer to the mass incident 
as the “6.28” sudden incident, the term “sudden” (tufa) is still very often used. Such a 
consistency in usage helps to underpin a dominant focus on the incident as a sudden eruption 
of violence and riots. As such, in this media representation of the Weng’an incident it seems 
that it is not rooted in any deeper causes or social conflicts, but rather exclusively connected 
to the sudden destructive impulses of the few. On some level it insinuates that this was only a 
sudden mass incident, without deeper and underlying causes. At least, the deeper and 
underlying causes of the mass incident do not receive much attention, because the immense 
focus on suddenness comes at the expense of elaborating on the deeper causes and looking at 
alternative understandings of this mass incident. According to Southern Weekend, this 
incident initially started out as a popular protest in form of demonstrations due to long 
withstanding and growing conflicts between the people of Weng’an and the local government. 
In the party-press discourse, the Weng’an incident is solely construed as a sudden irrational 
outburst of violent riots instigated by the few. By comparison, the discourse of Southern 
Weekend seems to understand this mass incident as result of a long withstanding conflict 
between the local government and the people of Weng’an. There is thus a very different 











In this text, Shi Zongyuan is present both as an important social actor and source. Most of the 
paragraphs start with either Shi Zongyuan “points out” (zhichu) or “underlines” (qiangdiao). 
As all of these paragraphs are written in reported speech, it is therefore hard to assess what it 
is Shi Zongyuan’s own words, and what it is the journalist’s own view. Nonetheless, this 
article, as the previous two is very monophonic. The official voice of the provincial 
government voice is particularly prominent and dominant in this article. Other non-official 
voices, such as those from different sections of the masses, or the family of the deceased are 
excluded and not represented. But it is very interesting to see how the two different 
newspapers are using the same quotes differently for their own respective purposes. In the last 
paragraph before the wrap-up, we find a passage attributed to Shi Zongyuan where he touches 
upon some of the underlying factors or causes (shenchengci de yuansu) of the incident. The 
same quote or passage comes up in the articles from Southern Weekend, but plays a much 
more central role, almost functioning as the starting point of a critical discussion of these 
deeper causes. I argue this is a discursive strategy in Southern Weekend’s investigative 
discourse, namely infrapolitics, in which the strategic use of official discourse is used to make 
critical viewpoints seem safer and more legitimate to express. However, in this article, it is 
not only that this relatively critical passage is backgrounded by its position coming last in the 
article, but also how this passage is discussed and what conclusions and solutions are deduced 
from it. In other words, there is a substantial difference in how these two newspapers use and 
contextualise official quotes. In this article, this quote is actually preceded by a passage 
praising the work of local government under the guidance of the provincial government:   
 
Shi Zongyuan stresses, [that] for a long time, party members at every level and the government 
of Weng’an, under the proper leadership of the provincial party committee and government 
and county party committee and government, have taken seriously the task of implementing a 
scientific development perspective, and quickened the county’s social and economic 
development, the results are obvious, and most cadres are good.147 
 
This extract illustrates that Guizhou Daily as the highest-ranking newspaper in its own 
constituency, which in theory is in the position to criticise lower level officials, is more 
interested in trying to put less focus on the potential malfeasance by local officials and rather 






emphasise the achievements of economic growth under provincial guidance. The discussion 
of potential problems of local governance is almost non-existent.  As Shi Zongyuan says: 
“most cadres are good”. Another reason for such a strategy could be that as the provincial 
party-press paper it would delegitimize the provincial government if malpractice by local 
officials under their leadership were to be exposed and elaborated upon. The critical passage 
following this praise is as follows: 
 
But from this incident [we] can see there must have been deeper causes/factors, [how could it 
else] it start out as a simple civil case [and later] develop into a serious hit-smash, loot and 
burn-mass incident. Social conflicts were accumulated over a long period time, many types of 
disputes intertwined, some did not receive the attention that they should have, and some 
[disputes] were not resolved in a timely and efficient manner, the ones that stick out are mining 
disputes, migrant disputes, and relocation disputes, [resulting in] tension in cadres-mass 
relationship, the public order and security is not good enough. In some places and departments 
there still exists different problems with way of thinking [mentality] and with cadres’ working 
style, manners and methods, that is why the masses is not content with our work yet.148 
 
In this passage, the three types of disputes are mentioned but not elaborated upon. It is quite 
vague what the problems are beside a very general comment on working style (zuofeng, 
gongzuo fangshi) and way of thinking or mentality (sixiang yishi). This vagueness is perhaps 
best exemplified with how there still exists “some problems of one kind or another”.149 Rather 
than elaborating on the exact nature of these problems, this passage is followed up by and 
connected to a discussion regarding how the basic levels of the party has to be strengthened, 
how cadres’ working style has to be reformed and how on the more abstract level, they will 
“build party for the people” and “put people first”. In Southern Weekend the solution as well 
as the indirect cause of the mass incident, are perceived to be the peoples’ lack of rights and 
interests, functioning legal mechanisms that could ensure the interests of the people, and the 
need for a stronger civil society, which could help to absorb and mitigate social conflicts. 
These themes are virtually non-existent in the party-press discourse. I have translated some of 
the proposed solutions and visions in this passage attributed to Shi Zongyuan. It is also 
interesting to note the extensive use of political formulations and slogans (tifa): 
 









The problems revealed by this ought to make us think over, [we] should use this incident as a 
mirror, use it to push forward and adopt feasible and efficient measures, and to even more 
strongly and vigorously develop the basic structure of the party, strengthen the basic structure 
of the party, realistically improve the way of thinking and the work style of party members and 
cadres, and in the course of the good and fast economic development, bring into play the 
fortress function of the grass-rot levels of the party and the vanguard model of the CCP 
member. Be loyal practitioner of the slogans to “build a party serving the interests of the 
people”, “govern for the interests of the people”, “to build a party serving the interests of 
the people” and “to govern for the interests of people, and [show that these are] not empty 
slogans, [we] will put words into action, [we] will put people first and persist in [fulfilling] 
the motto/aim of serving the people, [we] will put the masses and their struggles on the 
agenda. [We] will properly handle and resolve the relation between upholding social stability 
and accelerating the economic development, [and to] continue to improve the level of 
leadership and their ability to deal with sudden incidents, both do a good job with present work 
with upholding stability, as well as the aftermath work of “6.28” incident.150  
 
This quote or parts of it, is also found in Southern Weekend, but used to elaborate on the 
specific problems and concrete solutions. This passage tells a lot about how Guizhou Daily 
and the provincial government, at least on the discursive level, want to be perceived and how 
they want to resolve the issues at hand revealed by this mass incident. Beside working to 
strengthen party structure in rural China and punishing the culprits, there are not many 
concrete suggestions. Indeed, the whole discussion is of a much more abstract and idealistic 
character. Examples are “putting people first”, “building a party serving the interests of the 
people” and “governing for the interests of the people”. Indeed, the government wants to 
“show that these are not empty slogans”. However, how this is supposed to be done by 
concrete suggestions is not brought up and discussed. The stress and the perceived need to 
strengthen the grass-root party organization and put into effect “the fortress function of the 
grass-root levels of the party” reflects a common fear of social disintegration in rural China 
due to weak state presence. If the state and the party are not present in rural China, it is often 
assumed that this space will be filled by dubious organizations and “evil forces” (hei’eshili), 
such as criminal networks and organizations. The article concludes with another passage 
attributed to Shi Zongyuan: 
 
Shizong Yuan stresses, the fact that the “6.28” incident took place, [should] makes us even 
more clearly realize the extreme importance of safeguarding stability. Especially under the 










situation of Guizhou’s “two shortcomings”151, there are many detrimental factors, stability has 
come hard earned, and stability is now even more valuable [important]. We should maintain a 
extreme consistency to comrade Hu Jintao’s Central Committee, firmly placing safeguarding a 
stable and harmonious society at top priority before all other work. Take seriously [the task] of 
implementing the concept of scientific development, defend the people’s livelihood, and ensure 
the people’s livelihood, improve the people’s livelihood, unite as one, stimulate vitality, and 
accelerate the good and fast economic development of Guizhou province.152  
   
All in all, we can see that the official voice of the local-, and in particular the provincial 
government is extremely dominant in this text. As noted, Guizhou Daily’s party-press 
discourse is much more monophonic compared to the polyphony found in the discourse of 
Southern Weekend. We have also discussed and pointed to a general dichotomy of order and 
chaos and found a continuation of the few as main culprit, as well as the perception of the 
ignorant and passive masses on one side, and the reactive, responsive and thus responsible 
local government on the other. We have also looked at how official quotes are used and 
contextualized differently, and how solutions and suggestions in this text are expressed 
through extensive use of political formulations and slogans. As this last passage illustrates, 
concepts also include scientific development and defending the people’s livelihood and so 
fourth. How and with which concrete measures this will be done is unclear. Uniting around 
Hu Jintao’s directives and the importance of stability and unity are also repeated. As such, 
these general measures and lofty promises are perceived to be sufficient in addressing the 
problems revealed by the Weng’an incident. However, the exact nature of these problems is 
not elaborated upon. But Southern Weekend’s investigative discourse provides another 
framework for understanding and making sense of this mass incident. The deeper causes are 
elaborated upon and possible solutions are discussed in a much more concrete, 
straightforward way, without extensive use of political formulations and slogans (tifa).  
 
 
4.5 Analysis of Social Stability and Government Power (Southern 
Weekend) 
  
                                                
151 The “two shortcomings” refer to the shortcoming of not being an economically developed place. The other 
shortcoming refers to a general lack of development of natural resources, infrastructure and so forth. In Chinese 







The first published report in Southern Weekend on Weng’an incident was a reprint of a 
Xinhua news report, which was like a short summary of Guizhou Daily’s initial news 
report.153 The first independent news article on the subject from Southern Weekend is 
“Fangzhou commentary: The Weng’an incident reveals the way to stability”154. I will in this 
section also analyse “New Weng’an hopefully marks the start of humble government 
power”.155 I put these two articles together because they are connected with similar themes 
and the latter is more or less the natural continuation of the former. After a short introduction, 
the analysis will because of spatial concerns and limitations, only focus upon the analytical 
category of voices and Southern Weekend’s strategic use of official sources and quotes.  
 
First of all, these two articles show that there is less emphasis upon the initial acts of violence, 
destruction and chaos and much more focus upon discussing the deeper and underlying causes 
of the Weng’an incident. These two texts are more reflections of both what seem to be the 
deeper structural causes of the incident, and constructive suggestions of what the government 
should do to prevent similar incidents happening again. These are for instance adopting 
measures to ensure basic civil rights and to create a channel where interests of the people can 
be properly negotiated through the means of “rightful resistance”156, i.e., through the channels 
of a functioning legal system and so fourth. The text perceives the protection of these rights 
and interests of the people as a prerequisite to re-establish social stability. This is exactly the 
main theme and topic of these two articles; First, how the government has failed in their task 
to ensure the basic civil rights and interests of the people.  Secondly, it is exactly that the lack 
of a system in which these rights and interests can be safeguarded that is argued to be one 
among the more underlying structural causes of the incident itself. This long withstanding 
situation is perceived to have lead to growing discontent and anger against local government 
in Weng’an and made the situation unstable and latent. These themes are further elaborated 
upon in the second article, “New Weng’an hopefully marks the start of humble government 
power”. One major theme is how this mass incident shows the limits of the traditional model 
of governance, using the abuse of police force in Weng’an as an example pretext for further 
discussion. Like the preceding article, it oscillates between the discussion of the concrete 
conditions in Weng’an and reference to the local government, to the more abstract and 
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principal discussions of problems with the excessive concentration of government power and 
the lack of an efficient system of checks and balances. As this analysis will show, both of 
these two articles use official quotes as a backdrop to camouflage and make critical comments 
seem more valid and thus safer to express. This is a part of a discursive strategy of resistance I 
connect to Scott’s concept of infrapolitics. I also argue that specific problems revealed by the 
exposure of the Weng’an incident are used to make implicit general and critical comments on 




We can see that both articles heavily drawn upon official sources and voices. Shi Zongyuan 
and other officials play an important role as sources in Southern Weekend as they also do in 
Guizhou Daily. In fact, these two articles exclusively draw upon official sources from high-
ranking party-government members. In this first article “Weng’an shows the way to stability” 
there is actually one source: Shi Zongyuan, the party secretary of Guizhou. But it is 
interesting to note how implicit critical comments and opinions of the journalist157 are centred 
on and around the official voice of Shi Zongyuan. I argue such strategic use of official 
statements and quotes is a part of an overall strategy to make critical comments safer by 
mixing them with official dominant discourse. This can arguably be linked and explained 
infrapolitics, and is indentified as one of the major strategies of resistance in Southern 
Weekend’s investigative discourse.  
 
Themes and topics taken up in the discussion of Weng’an incident in these two texts differ 
immensely from how Guizhou Daily perceived the event and its origins (see the preceding 
analysis for comparison). First of all, the article poses the question of how a simple “civil case” 
between police and the deceased’s family could evolve into a mass riot involving thousands 
of rioters and demonstrators. This discussion begins with a quote from Shi Zongyuan (in bold) 
saying there must have been deeper causes and lists three types of disputes; disputes regarding 
development of local mine, settlement of migrant workers and resettlements and 
compensation in connection with property development: 
 
Just like what Shi Zongyuan said, there must have been deeper conflicts for this simple 
“civil case” to evolve into a hit, smash, pillage, burn mass incident. What specific disputes 
                                                
157 I regard this as a type of voice for analytical purposes. 
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are we talking about? Shi Zongyuan listed roughly three types, first, mining disputes, second, 
migration disputes, and third, disputes in connection with construction work and relocation, the 
accumulation and intertwinement of these social conflicts, have not received attention it should, 
nor have it been resolved in a timely and efficient way, “the masses are not content with our 
work yet”.158   
 
Note how this quote is both used to make a critical comment upon the situation in Weng’an 
and at the same time connect it with the general situation in China in the following paragraph, 
with generalising these three specific disputes into disputes about interests (clashes of 
interests). According to the text, clashes of interest in transitional China are regarded as quite 
normal. However the ways the masses react and show their resistance in such conflicts are 
very different: 
  
The fact that accumulated long-term conflicts exploded over the night is not unique for the case 
in Weng’an. During the transformation of a society, and under an unbalanced distribution 
system of interests/profits, this could happen everywhere. It is only that in the case of Weng’an 
it was expressed in the forms of disputes over mining, migration and resettlement, but in other 
places, it could be expressions over other kinds of disputes. But no matter how immensely the 
forms of expressions differ from each other, the rights and interests of the masses are 
nonetheless impaired. Therefore in an unfair system of unbalanced distribution of 
interests/profits, [the masses are] unable to fully enjoy the profits of social development, then 
very few are capable of being an exception (to extreme forms of expressions).159 
 
First, the lexical choice of “in the period of transformation of a society (zai shuihui zhuanxing 
qi) is intriguing. One can argue the choice of this vague term is one way to make general 
comments on problems in contemporary Chinese society safer. With regards to this, it would 
be much more sensitive to use the official term during the “reforms and opening up” (gaige 
kaifang) and connect this to problematic consequences and drawbacks of this policy. In any 
case, it is interesting how the text takes the specific discussion of Weng’an and connects it 
with the wider mechanisms of contemporary Chinese society. On one hand, it could actually 
be read as a very implicit critique of the status quo. On the other hand, it could be a strategy 
of carefully oscillating between the specific discussion of Weng’an and the more abstract 
discussion of principal problems and thus helps make the commentary more politically safe. 
In this way, the text avoids too extensive explicit criticism of the local party-state apparatus in 











Weng’an. Such caution could be needed because repercussions from angry local government 
can transcend administrative boundaries and actually penalize practitioners of critical cross-
regional reporting.160  
 
The text continues with a principal discussion on the role of the government and how its most 
important task is to provide a balanced and fair system allocating interests and wealth. The 
more abstract theme of rights and interests is discussed by how the former is a prerequisite of 
the latter: “Rights and “interests” are interconnected, “rights” is the foundation of “interests”, 
without “rights”, there is no support [for safeguarding] “the interests”.161 In the next section, 
the journalist suggests that government power should yield and make a space for a civil 
society, which in turn will bring mechanisms and dynamics in society that will help society to 
adjust itself, absorb and mitigate social conflicts. As a comparative note, this “solution” is 
very different from the one in the party-press, which focuses upon punishment, unity and 
harmony, and a stronger party organization and presence in rural China. In the next paragraph, 
the discussion is moved down from the abstract level to the concrete level of Weng’an and a 
focus upon the public’s right to participate in process of negotiation over disputes over 
interests. The author connects this to the specific event in Weng’an by “proving” that the 
people of Weng’an had no say by rhetorically asking why the locals (people) should suffer 
environmental degeneration, which is a price paid by the development of the mine without 
getting any share of the wealth accumulated by the development of the local mine: 
 
If the people could participate on equal terms in the negotiations, how could it then be that they 
have to suffer with the deterioration of environment as a result of mine development and not 
receive any of the profits from the development of the local mine?162   
 
In the wrap-up, there is yet another quote by Shi Zongyuan, which is also used in Guizhou 
Daily’s coverage, but the way it is contextualized is very different in this article. In this text, it 
is linked to and understood within the framework of rights and interests (in particular the 
peoples’ right to participate in negotiations) and how this right is the prerequisite for a 
“stability based on the foundation of peoples sentiments”:   
  
Shi Zongyuan said it well, the problems revealed by the Weng’an incident should make 
us reflect and rethink, and [we]  should use this incident as a mirror and to push forward. 
                                                






There is a fundamental agreement [common knowledge] on the importance of social stability, 
but social stability must lay its foundation on the stability of the people’s sentiments, only then 
[we will have] a genuine and sustainable stability. And to fully guarantee basic rights of 
citizens, especially to fully ensure the peoples right to participate in the process of negotiations 
[regarding conflicts of interests], this is exactly the prerequisite of a stability founded on the 
people’s sentiments. This I’m afraid is the most important lesson we can obtain from our 
reflection of the Weng’an incident.163   
 
This is but another example of how investigative papers use the official discourse and voice 
as a backdrop to make comments on politically sensitive topics seem more legitimate and 
safe. We can also see from this passage how the use the discourse stability is used and 
understood differently vis-à-vis Guizhou’s party press discourse. For instance, how stability 
(wending) is collocated with people’s sentiments (renxin) as in “the urgent necessity to 
build/establish a stability on the foundation of people’s sentiments”.164 There are no examples 
of a collocation with e.g., social stability and harmony (shehui wending hexie), which were 
among the most common collocations in the articles from Guizhou Daily. The focus in this 
text is that stability must start at the bottom level, with the common people’s concerns and 
interests. Stability is in this way perceived to be dependent on the protection of the rights and 
interests of the people, and it is exactly the failure of such protection that leads to an unstable 
society.  
 
The strategic use of the official voice is also very prominent in “New Weng’an hopefully 
marks a start for humble government power”. This article starts with a summary of the major 
themes taken up in the text. These are limits of traditional model of governance and the 
problem with excessive concentration of state power. Then it oscillates back to the more 
concrete level, with the specific example of the arbitrary use and abuse of police force/power 
in Weng’an, which is used as a springboard for further discussion:  
 
The exposure of the Weng’an incident shows the limits of the traditional model of governance. 
Under such a model, one aspect is the excessive concentration of government power, the other 
aspect is the lack of efficient checks and balances; its enviable outcome is the improper use of 
government power. 
The use of police force in Weng'an can be regarded as a classical example.165 











We can observe a similar pattern in this text as in the former one of how the official voice and 
discourse are intertwined with the journalist’s own voice and perspective. In the concrete 
discussion of the alleged practice of arbitrary use of police force, the former chief of the 
public security, Shen Guirong, is quoted through both reported speech and by direct quotes (in 
bold). These quotes are then intertwined with the voice of the journalist:  
 
If the main force [resources] of the Weng'an police is not used to maintain the normal social 
order, what on earth is it used for then? Just like what the former chief of the public security 
bureau Shen Guirong, recently frankly admitted during media interviews, the police force has 
been to a great extent, used on non-police affairs and activities. "For instance, whenever 
there is a mass incident, [we will]  just dispatch policemen, this matter of violating and 
offending the common people, we had to do it all the time". Police force was used to handle 
disputes over mining rights, relocating migrant workers and relocation in connection with 
construction work. According to Shen Guirong’s statistics, merely in the last few years there 
here have been "five large scale operations involving over 100 policemen directed against 
[dealing with]  collective incidents".166 
 
Later in the text the consequences of such abuse of state power is perceived to be a complete 
lack of trust and respect towards the local government. As such, it became quite 
commonplace with attacks on government bodies. In the next passage, we can again see the 
pattern of how the prominent official voice and discourse are mixed with the journalist’s own 
critical perspective: 
 
The improper use of government power harms fundamental civil rights, as well as endangers 
the government itself at the same time. The result of abuse of police force by the local 
government of Weng'an is just like what Shen Guirong honestly admitted, "we offended 
almost everyone". This certainly wrecked the local masses' trust and respect towards the 
government through and through, and yet the cruel reality, which made Shen Guirong feel even 
more shameful/humiliated: "Our authority was lost a long time ago. Our offices often got 
attacked."167 
 
Southern Weekend’s understanding of social conflicts and contradictions is connected with 
the government and their role as a protector of basic civil rights. As such, it is actually the 
government’s failure in fulfilling their role, which is the source of social conflicts. Therefore, 
the representation of social conflict in Southern Weekend is perceived to be a long 
withstanding conflict between a corrupt and illegitimate local government and the people of 










Weng’an. This is arguably a discursive nodal point in Southern Weekend’s coverage.  
 
In the next paragraph, we can see that the official discourse and voice through quotes by party 
secretary Shi Zongyuan are used to further comment upon the practice of the improper use of 
government power and how this leads to a widespread fear among the people of Weng’an: 
 
Is it not a monstrosity to threat the people with the means of a dictatorship! But such 
monstrosity ended up as a common phenomenon in Weng’an. Pretending to be fair, but being 
unfair during conflicts of interests, and then using state force to treat the people at the slightest 
provocation is bound to bring about widespread fear among the people. Guizhou Party 
secretary, Shi Zongyuan said with a sigh: “We are responsible for the fact that the people 
does not dare to speak the truth". This sigh of sorrow does not come without reason. The 
local masses has no way to rid themselves of the fear, and the lack of basic rights and local 
government's improper use of its power, all of these are obviously interconnected.”168 
 
The article concludes with yet another reference to Shi Zongyuan, which later becomes the 
headline of Southern Weekend’s next article, an extensive investigative report which I will 
analyse in the following sub-chapter. Shi Zongyuan’s quote is followed by the journalist’s 
own concluding thoughts and comments on the matter. It is pointed out that a reliable and 
sustainable stability must take the people’s concerns and their sentiments (renxin) as the 
starting point. It is also interesting to note that an analogy of the human race’s interference 
with nature and its disastrous consequences was used to compare the grave consequences of 
the abuse of government power, both on the individual-level and in society in general: 
 
Unstable Weng'an, just like what Shi Zongyuan repeatedly has pointed out, "Weng'an 
party committee, government, public security bureau and leading cadres from relevant 
departments are all responsible for this [the unstable Weng’an] ." What exactly are the 
local officials responsible for? Obviously, the main one is the improper use of government 
power. Any government needs authority, but this type of authority has to first be established on 
the basis of the people's good sentiments. This requires the government to venerate the people's 
sentiments and requires the government to be humble to serve the people and protect 
fundamental civil rights. Otherwise, just like human race's excessive interference with nature, 
which leads to an unbalanced environment and extreme and disastrous climate; the improper 
use of government power similarly will lead to the loss of peoples’ sentiments, [and] in the end 
it is hard to avoid to pay the high held social costs, and especially the human costs.169 














It is interesting to see how the journalist concludes, again using the specific case Weng’an and 
the lessons of it to make a case for what the government and, indeed China as nation, should 
learn from the Weng’an incident: 
 
All in all, why not just start from Weng'an? What if we turn to the present program 
(dajiefang) in Weng’an county, to a permanent upgrade, innovation of the system and to put 
democracy and rule by law into practice, put into practice the people's right to know, right to 
participate, right to expression and right of supervision, then the people [and their] knowledge 
can automatically have an effect, [and help to] practice checks and balances of government 
power, cleanse government power, in that case, this embryonic stage [start phase] of 
contemporary service-minded government, could be born from Weng'an and set a good 
example for all of China.170 
 
What is particularly interesting beyond general comment and measures the journalist list up is 
actually the way these examples are phrased. The lexical choices of “people’s right to know”, 
“right to participate”, “right to expression” and “right of supervision” (renmin de zhiqing 
quan, canyu quan, biaoda quan, jiandu quan) are all concepts which are much less sensitive 
than concepts taken from Western human rights discourse. In this paragraph it could be 
relevant to talk about media freedom and independence, or how media as the fourth estate 
could help to check and balance state power, but this is clearly off-limits. I think these 
aforementioned lexical choices illustrate that investigate journalists and editors are very 
conscious about the overarching framework they work under and its blurry line between the 
acceptable and unacceptable. The use of these concepts at the expense of concepts from the 
much more sensitive human rights discourse is an example of the thin line investigative 
journalists and editors often balance upon when conducting their work. Like Elin Sæther 
points out, they often adopt a strategy of “partial opposition and partial loyalty to the 
mouthpiece role”.171 In fact, she also writes about the party-state’s suspicion against human 
rights discourse, for instance, the freedom of expression is regarded as a “liberalist imperialist 
individualistic concept” and a part of the “peaceful evolution towards capitalism”.172 That is 
why the use of “people’s right to know” (renmin de zhiqing quan), which Sæther connects to 
the process of commercialization, market discourse and public’s demand for information, is 
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less politically sensitive and a much more accepted term.173 In this way, such conscious 
lexical choices with “people’s right to know”, as we seen in this text, is a necessity in the 
discussion of sensitive matters.  
 
In contrast to Guizhou Daily, where we in the first articles find a macro strategy of a 
victimization of the government by the few lawless people, in these two articles by Southern 
Weekend we can see that it is the people of Weng’an who are perceived to be the victims of a 
corrupt local government. It is inexplicitly pointed out that the government is the culprit 
responsible for “harming the rights and interests of the masses”.174 As such, in these two 
articles the government has moved from the being the victim of the lawless few, to being a 
social actor which has neglected concrete responsibilities and duties resulting in harming the 
common people and their rights and interests. In this commentary, Shi Zongyuan’s quote 
plays a much more central role by being placed in the beginning of the article. There is also a 
vast difference in how the two papers use and contextualise the same quotes from high 
standing officials. In Guizhou Daily, these relatively critical quotes were not only 
backgrounded by coming last in the article, but also drowned in an immense focus on the role 
of the few and how successful the government has been in restoring the normal social order. 
In the party-press, these quotes were not used as they have been in these two articles, namely 
to elaborate on the specific problems, but rather contextualized in the more abstract discussion 
about how the they will “build a party for the people” and “put people first”.  In these two 
articles these quotes are used as the stating point of the discussion, bringing up topics of 
illegitimate governance, harming the people’s rights and interests, lack of a functioning civil 
society and re-establishing stability on the foundation of people’s sentiments. By mixing and 
intertwining the dominant official voice and discourse with the journalist’s own critical voice 
helps to make the sensitive matter of discussing the deeper causes of the mass incident seem 
safer and more legitimate. I argue that this is a discursive strategy utilized by Southern 
Weekend to make a relatively politically sensitive discussion more politically safe. This 
strategy can be explained with Scott’s concept of infrapolitics, strategically using the 
discourse of the dominant, in this case high-ranking officials, to camouflage and make critical 
views seem more legitimate and thus safer to express. 
  
                                                




In the next sub-chapter one the analysis of Southern Weekend’s article “Weng’an - the 
unstable town”, we will see how the same discursive strategy of the strategic use of official 
voice and discourse, but now mixed and intertwined with a myriad of other non-official 
voices. This polyphony as the mix of non-official and official voices is, as the next analysis 
will show, a very distinct characteristic of investigative journalism in contemporary Chinese 
media. This type of polyphony is also one of the major means and discursive strategies of 
resistance for enabling investigate journalists and newspapers to critically comment upon 
political minefields in contemporary Chinese media. 
 
 
4.6 Analysis of Weng’An - The Unstable Town 
 
“Weng’an - the unstable Town”175 was the first genuine investigative report on the Weng’an 
incident, published 14th of July 2008, over two weeks after initial the riots and demonstrations 
broke out. My major findings in this analysis are how polyphony and the strategic use the of 
the officials voice and discourse constitute the most important discursive strategy of for 
investigative journalism to voice critical perspectives and comments on politically sensitive 
topics. This analysis will examine, on one hand, how sensitive parts are made politically 
acceptable with polyphony and strategic use of the official discourse. On the other hand, it 
will try to pinpoint the limits of critical investigative discourse and examine the discursive 
constraints imposed upon the critical journalism within the order of Chinese media discourse. 
 
Narrative, Analepsis and Rationality  
 
I will start by looking at how the trajectory of the narrative in this text helps to construe 
demonstrators as rational people who have a legitimate cause. The narrative starts with 
describing the start-up of a small student-demonstration and follows its way down through 
Weng’an. It is interesting is how, using a retrospective technique (analepsis), the narrative 
goes back in time and provides us with additional background information exploring the 
deeper causes (shenci yuanyin) of the mass incident. The use of retrospective technique is 
perhaps another strategy for the investigative discourse to elaborate and dig into the 
background and tell the story of about illegitimate corrupt government practices. In this text 




the initial cause for the demonstrations is a perceived anger against the government handling 
of the Li Shufen-case, specifically how the local government inexplicitly threatens to take the 
remains of Li Shufen by force: 
 
One the morning of the 28th of June, the public security bureau sent a “notice on urgent 
handling of remains” to Li Shufen’s family, which stated that Li Shufen “committed suicide by 
jumping into the river [and] died by drowning”, ”cause of death has already been proved, there 
is thus no longer any need for preserving Li Shufen’s remains”, The Li Family has to come and 
bring back to bury [cremate] Li Shufen’s remains by 14:00, “otherwise, the public security 
bureau will handle it according to the law”. This caused discontent among the bystanders, and 
at around 15:00 the same day, two middle school students walked in the front, with several 
scores of people following behind, holding up a white banner “seeking to redress of an 
injustice for the masses”, their intent was to demonstrate and present a petition for Li Shufen. 
Among these people, not one was Li Shufen’s family or relatives.176 
 
The narrative continues with the trajectory of how this small-scale demonstration and how 
this evolved into a mass riot involving thousands of people. First of all, the lexical choice and 
the consistent use of youxing, meaning demonstration or march, construes people involved in 
a more positive light compared the frequent usage of “hit-smash-pillage lawless people” in 
the party-press. On one hand, youxing connotes some form of legitimacy, making the actions 
of participants seem more legitimate. As such, it helps to construe them in a much more 
neutral way. We can also see from this passage that their initial plan was to present a petition 
(and not start a violent riot), a strategy of “rightful resistance” and this also helps to construe 
the people/masses as a much more rational entity. Indeed, as the narrative develops, it is 
almost a story of their rightful struggle against government oppression and illegitimate 
practices. The narrative of the demonstration begins by describing the route it takes and how 
people from diverse social groups joined in, such as the migrant workers and farmers who 
reside in that area. The most interesting part is how the narrative goes back in time, describing 
how and in which manner the representatives from the local government infringed upon 
interests and rights of these social groups. This representation of participants marching in the 
demonstration marks a crucial difference in the organization of meaning and knowledge of 
this mass incident. The party-press discourse is limited to construing the people involved 
either as “the few lawless people or people with an ulterior motive or “the ignorant masses” 
(yi xie bufa fenzi, you bie yongxin de ren, buming zhenxiang de qunzhong). By only using 








such categories this effectively helps to delegitimize the actions of demonstrators/rioters and 
put a subsequent focus on the acts of violence, instead of the deeper causes. In this text, the 
categorization of demonstration (and demonstrators) and the additional background of the 
deeper causes (shenci yuanyin) elaborated upon in retrospect helps to construe the masses as 
much more rational social actor with a just cause. And in this text, compared to the irrational 
generic category of “the masses” (qunzhong) mostly as “the ignorant masses” (buming 
zhenxiang de qunzhong), we will later see that this generic category is broken down, and that 
there is a much more fragmented and polyphonic representation in this through the social 
categories of “farmers”, “students”, “emigrants”, “villagers”, “citizens” and so forth. In this 
way, the representation of the masses is in this text constituted through a myriad of voices 
from people of different social backgrounds and class. In the next section, I am going to take 
a closer look at how this narrative develops under the sub-headline “the helpless village, the 
emigrants who joined in the demonstrations” (wuzhu de cunzhuang, jiaru youxing de yimin). 
 
The narrative starts out with describing how the demonstration started out and later how 
emigrants joined in: 
 
After setting off from Da Yan bridge, going around for a while, demonstrators marched onto 
the old ring road yelling slogans. In the Seven-Star village situated in the area around the old 
ring road, live over thousands of emigrants affected the hydroelectric station-project.177  
 
With an analepsis, the narrative goes back in time and we get to know that over 4000 people 
had to relocate due to the construction work and that 3000 among these were farmers. In 
2004, settlements regarding compensations and disputes arouse between villagers and 
government personnel. According to a source, the compensation they got was far lower than 
the national standard for Orchard trees. Apparently they got only 100 yuan for each tree in 
contrast with neighbouring peasants who got 1000 yuan per tree. The whole situation got out 
off hand in 2004, when representatives from the government came to discuss the matter of 
low compensation, but because of a deadlock and seemingly unwillingness from the official 
side to resolve the problem, the villagers took to drastic measures. They refused to let officials 
go by detaining cars and sealing of roads. Over 1000 people went to Jiang Hejie to demand an 
explanation from the representatives. Even though government officials, including the head of 
the county, were forced in containment for three days no agreement was reached. This 






developed into a mass incident, as the solution adopted by government officials was to use 
police force. The armed police and the police were both called in to “solve” the problem. 
According to a villager, even women and children were among many of the injured in the 
clashes with the police. The same villager also said that the local hospital got instructions 
from the top to refuse medical treatment to injured villagers, and leave the wounded to buy 
medicine and treat the injuries themselves. After a year, even though the villagers got some 
compensation for medical expenses, the problem of low compensation still remained 
unresolved. In March 2007, the official answer and solution to the problem was a notification 
stating that the people who had not accepted the terms of compensation had to move before 
the end of the month, or else bear the consequences themselves. Unwilling to accept low 
compensation and to relocate, the villagers’ houses, crops and harvests were forcefully 
destroyed. The narrative continues by elaborating on the immediate and the longstanding 
consequences of being forcefully relocated, which helps to give sympathy to the helpless 
villagers: 
 
(…) “the grieved villagers had to endure a sleepless night”. The spot where the village was is 
just a big piece of rubble and debris and overgrown with weeds today.  Even to this day, 54 
households, over two hundred emigrants are still staying behind in the village. They have not 
accepted any compensation from the government, and have set up temporary sheds on the 
water level-line, entire household live in the narrow and small shed with no water and 
electricity, only relying on the few cropland and fruit trees left to make a living. Even when 
they went to government the village government hoping to get some temporary construction 
work, they were informed that emigrants such as them are not needed. “We only want political 
transparency, standard compensation and live life and work in peace on the water level-line. 
But they can only, as before, wait in vain for the problems to be resolved.178   
 
We also get to know that most of the emigrants who accepted the terms and moved to the 
Seven Star village, also voiced their discontent towards the government complaining about 
the compensation being too low. The narrative goes then back to the day of the 
demonstrations, describing how this social group appeared among the troops and ranks of 
demonstrators. All this background helps to construe villagers and emigrants, now included in 
the category of demonstrators, in a much more rational light. In other words, they are not just 
helpless ignorant masses incited by the few. With the story told of their long withstanding 
dispute and conflict with Weng’an county government makes them, as a social group seem 
rational and having a legitimate cause.  









The narration then continues under the sub-title “active criminal gang, tapped out mining 
area”179 and starts out how and why students from the school Li Shufen once had attended, 
started the demonstrations: 
 
Passing through the old ring road, this student-led demonstration turns onto the northeast road. 
Weng’an middle school No. 3 is located here, exactly the school the departed Li Shufen used 
to attend.180  
 
According to an anonymous student, the atmosphere and environment around the local school 
had been very detrimental. Students getting involved with criminal gangs became common, 
both including the troublesome and achieving students. This claim is even further supported 
through the voice of two teachers that says “teachers being hit by students are nothing new 
here in this school”. This topic, about criminal networks penetrating schools is also discussed 
in Guizhou Daily’s later coverage, with focus in the perceived need for students to engage in 
political and ideological thought work and self-criticism of joining the violent few. In this 
article however, the students are construed as rational demonstrators and initial starters of 
this, at first, small-scale demonstration. But criminal penetration at the local school is not the 
main focus in this passage. By first bringing up this less controversial topic, which Guizhou 
Daily included in their coverage, the article can use this as a pretext to comment upon a much 
more serious problem. According to the text, criminal activity in school only constitutes the 
lowest level of the criminal network in its totality. According to one who once invested into 
the development of the mine, there is collaboration between the government and criminals 
forces: 
 
At the upper end of the “structure of the pyramid”, criminal forces are either covertly or openly 
active in mining area, even in collaboration with official power, to seek profits and benefits. 
“If one is to refuse the conditions of the gang, some mines will be very hard to continue to 
develop”. The same person goes on saying that the conditions include protection money, or 
control over mining ore sales, or owing share of stocks in the mining enterprise and so fourth, 
some gang members develop mines themselves.181   
 
This is arguably one of the most sensitive parts of the text, giving a first-hand account of 
corrupt local governance. The practical consequences of these illegitimate practices are 









further elaborated on by explaining how villagers from the mining area are caught in the mix 
between mining businesses and gangsters. Villagers’ interests are in conflict with the mining 
development and the government. An example is the subsequent pollution of the drinking 
water due to the development of the mine, resulting in the deterioration of villagers’ crops and 
harvests. However, the causal links here are only implicitly touched upon. Least explicitly is 
the link between why villager’s petitions get refused and by the government. Even though the 
article states that representatives from the local government have vested interests in the mine, 
this is not explicitly discussed, which could be one the reasons why petitions got refused. The 
text simply states that both the government and mine enterprise seem to ignore the villagers: 
“But the villagers’ petitions to the government did not get any response, the mining enterprise 
completely refused to pay attention [to this problem]”.182 More explicitly is the causal link 
between the mining enterprise and the negative consequences of soil erosion for the villagers. 
As such, it seems less sensitive to explicitly show causal linkages between business 
malpractice and how this affects the masses. The social conflict between business interests 
and the masses is then less sensitive than the representation of social conflicts between the 
government and the people. This is shown in how we get to know that many peasants did not 
receive any compensation for the loss of land from the mine company. Later, the villagers 
also found out the groundwater level was becoming lower and lower to the extent that a well 
in the village completely dried up. And again, petitions were ignored. So in desperation, 
villagers cut the electricity effectively blocking further development of the mine. After 
disputes with the new developers, negotiations lasted for three days without any result. Later, 
village representatives were invited to a “to solve the problem” meeting with leading officials. 
But “the meeting was turned into a Hongmenyan”.183 This metaphor is interesting, because it 
is a historical reference to the use of a banquet hold by Xiang Yu as pretext to kill his rival, 
Liu Bang, the coming emperor. In this abstract way and perhaps implicit way, the local 
government comes off as traitors in collaboration with the police. 11 representatives were 
arrested and when the villagers hurried down to the public security bureau to voice their 
discontent, they were only met by a security line. This later evolved into violent clashes 
between the two parties. A total of 22 people were arrested and accused of attacking 
government bodies and institutions. Seven among the representatives were deemed guilty of a 
very serious crime, namely “assembling a crowd and disrupting social order”. The practical 
legal consequences of such crime are at best a two-year prison sentence while the longest 





could be up to six years. All this background on the social injustice and suffering of the 
helpless villagers through the narrative helps to construe them as rational, as well as having a 
legitimate claim for joining the demonstrators. The narrative continues: 
 
When the demonstrators passed through [this area], the villagers in the mining area who had to 
silently forbear, over a long period of time, the integral collaboration of government personnel 
and organized gangs, suddenly also got incited, more and more people started to follow 
behind.184   
 
Not only has this section given concrete examples of corrupt governance and malpractice, it 
also touches upon the negative consequences of this, by presenting a clear picture of the 
degree of helplessness (wunai). This wunai comes from how the peasants’ “rightful 
resistance” is futile, and how they repeatedly try to work within the framework of the law 
without any results, leading to the inevitable situation of adopting illegal and unlawful forms 
of resistance. However in this context, the blame for this is not pitted upon the peasants, but 
rather on the local government, the mining enterprise and to some extent the criminal gangs. 
There is aslo no moral condemnation of the acts done by the peasants. The social injustice, 
epitomized be these examples, particularly where representatives from the villagers were 
lured into a trap at the meeting and then seized by the police, can help to explain the 
accumulation of public discontent over time towards the local government. These two 
examples are exactly what Shi Zongyuan calls deeper causes, but through conducting 
investigative journalism and extensive fieldwork, these causes are for the first time 
extensively elaborated upon. This is one distinctive characteristic of Southern Weekend’s 
alternative media representation of the Weng’an incident. 
 
Agency and lexical choices 
 
I will in this particular section analyse agency and take a look at how social actors are present 
or not as agents in a clauses/sentences. I argue that the analysis of agency will show some of 
the very subtle strategies of bypassing political minefields by only implicitly pointing out 
causal links between illegitimate practices and representatives from the local government. I 
will also look at how the masses as a social actor in this text has much higher degree of 
agency compared to their passivity manifested in their position as the affected of another 
agent’s action, which was a common discursive practice in the party-press discourse.  






With descriptions of illegitimate and corrupt practices and so fourth, the section “the helpless 
village, emigrants joining the demonstrations”185 is one of the most sensitive parts of the 
article. With regards to the analysis of agency is it interesting how government actors are 
present in the preceding passage (Weng’an xian zhengfu), but not directly linked to the 
(illegitimate) destruction of houses. For instance in: 
 
4th of April 2007, under the guidance of persons-in-charge from Weng’an county 
government, including migration, development bureau, public-security organs, procuratorial   
organs and the People’s Court, troops of over a hundred people came to Jiangjiehe Village, all 
houses and buildings in this village were forcefully demolished by the excavator, the 
demolishers even set fire on some of the wooden houses.186 
 
Even though it’s clear that agency and overall responsibility is attributed to the Weng’an 
county government and the people in charge, the causality of the actual destruction is 
attributed the excavator machine and the vague category of demolishers (chaiqianzhe). Who 
are exactly these demolishers? Other illegitimate practices done by the demolishers include 
sawing down fruit trees, pulling up crops, as well as poisoning crops with herbicide. Casual 
linkages to the actual actions of destruction are in this way implicitly linked to the Weng’an 
county government. This could be a part of a strategy to avoid explicitly pointing the finger at 
the local government, reducing explicitness in the overall representation of social conflicts 
between the government (guanfang) and people (minfang). It may seem a very peculiar detail, 
but I think it is quite illustrative of some of the discursive constrains imposed upon critical 
journalistic discourse. In this example, the representation of social conflicts (shehui maodun) 
between local government and the people of Weng’an are being pointed through implicit 
casual linkages. This is done because it is too sensitive to explicitly point out social conflicts 
between the government and the masses. One reason why this is particularly sensitive is 
because official party discourse, which still is a relatively dominant force in the order of 
Chinese media discourse, often organize meaning of social reality based on a orthodox 
Communist understanding, entailing that there should be no social contradictions between the 
party and the people. As such, the party’s representatives always represent and act according 
to the will of the people and wholeheartedly serving the people (wei renmin fuwu). 
 







Another strategy of downplaying the representation of social conflict between the local 
government and the people of Weng’an can be connected with the lexical choice and 
consistent use of “government personnel” (zhengfu gongzuo renyuan) throughout the article. 
Jingrong Tong shows in her in analysis of the coverage of social riots how the lexical 
“government staff” (zhengfu gongzuo renyuan) was preferred and chosen by editors at the 
expense of the journalist initial lexical choice of “official” (guanyuan).187 According to Tong, 
this particular lexical connotes: 
 
“hierarchy” and in describing the locality of the conflicts between the rioters and the 
police/officials, the shift of “officials” to “government staff” show the newsroom’s intention to 
mute the presentation of conflict and opposition.188  
 
These subtle lexical choices, such as in this case “excavator machine”, “demolishers” and 
“government personnel” can be understood as alternative means to mitigate and play down 
the discursive representation of social conflicts between the local party-state and the people. 
In this way, the skill of conscious lexical and syntactical choices, constituting a form of self-
censorship, could paradoxically play a very essential and important part of how to conduct 
investigative journalism with success, by making critical news reports politically tolerable and 
thus publishable.189 As Tong and Sparks point out: “Other tactics (…) to increase their 
chances of publishing politically and economically sensitive stories involve attempting 
carefully to manipulate self-censorship in order to present material that would otherwise be 
spiked”.190 Another aspect they take up is how important the institutionalization of critical 
journalism has been. This is well reflected in the words of a deputy Editor-in-Chief in a 
famous investigative newspaper: “Our policy should not be to reject reports with political 
sensitivities out of hand. Instead, we need to know how to present the report in a way in 
which the political sensitivities are minimised”.191 
 
As implied earlier, this article is perhaps the best example of the polyphony of critical 
investigative discourse, which I will discuss in detail in the next section under voices.  But the 
analysis of agency can tell us more about how the fragmented masses in this text are 
represented through agency or a lack of agency. In this text, the critical investigative 
discourse seems to attempt to go beyond party-press discourse and its practice of construing 
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the masses as very passive, voiceless and helpless entity. My examples will show that the lack 
of agency in party-press representation is replaced by a much more complex representation, 
through less generic categories and how the masses are attributed a significant higher degree 
of agency. The passage below illustrates the popular support and growing discontent towards 
the local government on one side, and how people from the whole social stratum donates 
money to Li Shufen’s family in their struggle for redressing a perceived injustice on the other 
side:  
 
This narrow and cramped place turned into a stage. An endless stream of people came to visit 
upon hearing the latest news all day long. People came with their own discontent in life to view 
the controversy around the death of this girl. They made generous money contributions, 
placing hope on Li Shufen in their wish for justice, donating money in either big or small 
amounts to Li Shufen’s familiy. Many townspeople told me [the journalist] they learned that 
the biggest amount of a donation was of up to 3000 yuan, and that the donator told the family: 
”take the money and go to court, we support you all the way, if you don’t sue just give back the 
money”. Donators also include people from the lower classes. “Some peasants, selling 
vegetables all day, barley making any profit also donated the little money they had. According 
to one eyewitness, the total sum of donations exceeded ten thousand.192  
 
This passage illustrates well a higher degree of agency attributed to the fragmented masses. In 
Guizhou Daily, the agency of non-party/government members is limited to the few and their 
bad acts of rioting, beating and smashing. In this text the masses as a social actor is construed 
as a much more active entity.  
 
Another big difference between the party-press and investigative reports is how the police as a 
social actor is represented. The next passage gives an account of what happened when the 
demonstrations started to get out of hand in front of the public security bureau. This is 
probably the best concrete example of conflicting regimes of truth between the party-press 
and investigative media representations. As we have seen in Guizhou Daily’s coverage there 
is an overall positive representation of the police, with the repeated emphasis on how the 
police did and how they were completely defenceless when the few fiercely attacked and 
besieged the local police station. In here, through the first-hand account of a citizen, 
participating in the demonstrations, we get a different version of the events:  
 









Hu Shifu, who stood near the front lines the whole time, saw the police pull up the security line 
in front of the gate, allowing two students to enter the big hall in the office building to talk. 
“They grabbed the banner from the students, and [when] the students resisted and tried to take 
back the banner, the two parties clashed and there were scuffles between the students and the 
police”. Hu Shifu said, “seeing the students take a beating, even more people broke through the 
security line, rushing in to help [the students].193 
 
We can see here that the negative acts of the police are included in the coverage. The police 
grabbed the banner and during the scuffles beat up the students. In another example in which 
the police is present as a social actor, we can observe a similar strategy of implicitness as we 
have seen before: “At this time, riot-preventing squads [People’s armed police] in full arms 
appeared in the middle, they poked their batons towards the crowds”.194 This sentence shows 
that the police violence is not explicitly mentioned, but rather only implied upon and 
insinuated by the careful wording of “poke”. I think these subtle choices of words and syntax 
epitomize some of the ways that investigative journalists and editors use to only implicitly 
represent and connect illegitimate practices with the local party-state.  
 
Illegitimate practices and blame are, as we have seen, in this text attributed through varying 
degrees of implicit casual reference to the local government. The next passage will illustrate 
how blame is attributed to the fact that the local government failed to come out and actually 
talk to the masses of Weng’an: 
 
Hu Shifu says, in the county Party Committee and government buildings, the head student of 
[of the demonstrations], looked from the first floor to the fifth floor, and did not find 
government personnel in charge. That day was a Saturday. “If persons in charge at this time 
could come out and try to communicate, even just one with a loudspeaker taking command of 
the situation, then what happened later might not had happened”, Hu Shifu thinks.195 
 
With this background, and the elaboration on the deeper causes of the growing discontent 
towards the local government, the blame for the exaltation to the mass incident is put on 
dysfunctional local governance. Solving disputes with force and hiding behind an army of 
police is seen as the main reason for how this demonstration evolved into an anger-venting 
mass incident. The article wraps it up accordingly: 











The uproarious crowds, seeing students being hit, are so furious that they to grasp mineral 
bottles and flowerpots in front of the public security bureau, [or] anything they could get hold 
of to throw at the building. “Then it is over”, Hu Shifu said. At that moment he realized that, 
the crowd already had lost their mind, the situation was out of control. At this time, the blasting 
fuse [the death of Li Shufen] was not important anymore, the important thing is, just like how a 
volcano that has been waiting to erupt suddenly will find a tiny little crack to go off, the 
“unstable” town exploded just like this.196 
 
These last examples here point the topic for the next section, namely voices. We have see how 
the non-official source of Hu Shifu has been essential in providing an alternative account of 
the events, compared to the ones found in the party-press. Such inclusion adds to the 
polyphony of this text, but as we will see, the official voice, especially that of Shi Zongyuan 
is perhaps as dominant here as it was in Guizhou Daily. For instance, in the very sensitive 
passage describing the scene in front of the public security bureau and how the police hit 
students, in which Hu Shifu is an essential non-official source, is followed up by a quote from 
Shi Zongyuan on how the local government of Weng’an has used police force at will. I think 
this is a good example of the polyphony of critical investigate discourse and infrapolitics as 
the strategic use of official discourse and voice, manifested with this mix between non-official 




There is a myriad of sources, voices and perspectives represented in this article. I have listed 
up the sources and voices that are being quoted directly in the text, contributing to overall 
polyphony in the article: 
  
Shi Zongyuan (Guizhou provincal party committee secretary) 
Wang Fuyu (deputy secretary) 
Li Xiuhua (Father of the deceased)  
Li Xiuzhong’ father, (qi fu) 
Lu Suzhen (Li Shufen’s grandmother) 













Anonymous schoolmate (of Li Shufen) 
Two teachers 
Another student 
Local earlier investor in the mining development 
Villagers 
Anonymous villager 
Villager on the scene/spot 
Wu Tingshu (Commisionary secretary of Qiannanzhou) 
Informed person 
Taxi driver (1) 
Feng Zhongming (Father) 
Jing Tiemin (shopkeeper)  
Mr Shi (Father) 
Taxi driver (2) 
Hu Shifu (Resident of Weng’an) 
 
In this text, 21 of a total of 41 sources are non-official ones. This marks a substantial 
difference in the discursive practices between Southern Weekend and Guizhou Daily. The 
latter drew upon official sources or government friendly-perspectives voiced through 
handpicked members of the masses. In this text, the often so voiceless masses is now directly 
represented and enabled to voice their concerns and perspectives regarding this incident. And 
the range is quite wide in voices included from a wide variety of social groups. From the 
directly concerned, Li Shufen’s family to schoolmates and teachers, taxi-drivers and 
entrepreneurs, villagers and investors, and other residents of Weng’an. And these, until now 
“suppressed” voices are actually voices that really confront and question the party-press 
representation. As earlier noted, some controversial aspects are only briefly touched upon in 
quotes from Shi Zongyuan, saying that there must be underlying causes (shenci yuanyin) 
triggering the incident. In this article, these causes are for the first time extensively elaborated 
upon and given an alternative representation through a multitude of sources. The use of 
sources and especially the high frequency of direct quotes as a discursive practice should in 
this context be discussed briefly. On one hand, it enables a journalist to mediate information 
to its audience in a more direct way, perhaps reflecting a commitment to media 
professionalism. For example, in the beginning of the article the voice of the father is 
represented through a direct quote: 
 
“The whole family sunk into deep grief and sorrow. [we] had not at all thought about the 
crucial questionable aspect before the drowning, that is why [we] did not request a laparotomy 
of the lower parts [autopsy].” This is how Li Xiuhua described the initial state [situation].197 
 





Not only does this help to construe a much more rational picture of the reaction from Li 
Shufen’s relatives with this direct quote. We also get details about how they later got 
suspicious because once the involved suspects had been released from police custody they 
started to come up in morbid rumours spreading around in Weng’an. The consistent use of 
direct quotes could also be a strategy of attributing critical content to the source, rather than to 
journalists themselves, and then a discursive strategy of using these quotes to develop the 
narrative. This strategy could be one component in an overall strategy of protecting the 
journalists as well as the newspaper from negative repercussions from the party-state. Tong 
writes in her chapter “Reporting on Social Riots” that the use of direct quotations by critical 
journalists could be a way to make articles more politically safe, to “shake off responsibility” 
and as a part of a “self-protection strategy”.198 There is a quite consistent pattern of using 
direct quotes in Southern Weekend compared to Guizhou Daily, which seems to rely on 
reported speech, especially when the sources are non-official ones.  
 
Another perspective, which adds to the polyphony in the text, is the emphasis on the rumours 
(chuanyan) being spread around in this small town. For example: “the main culprit is the 
niece of the county Party secretary, and another the two schoolboys [suspects] have family 
relations to the head of the local police station, the departed [Li Shufen] was raped and 
murdered”.199 Such rumours were bluntly denied by the official party-press, stressing the 
importance of propagating the truth of the matter (shishi de zhenxiang). As interesting 
comparison, the specific problem with lack of credibility of the local government was 
discussed in another article by Southern Weekend, called “Insights of an journalist: Why the 
“ignorant masses do not believe”200. Anyway, the party-press exercise of propagating the truth 
seemed even more futile because more rumours started to circulate:  
 
Some bystanders swear that they heard a horrified shrilling voice in the middle of night; ”help 
me!” Some people say that they saw a condom and bloodstains on the river bank. The grassy 
area by the river was believed to be the crime scene. Rumours regarding the death of young Li 
Shufen, officials, corrupted policemen and injustice got all mixed up together, and spread 
widely around in this small county town.201 
 
Some of the more serious accusations in the rumours include the alleged connection between 
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the perceived culprits and local officials making aforementioned rumours even more latent: 
 
More and more distorted rumours spread all over town: “’16-year-old Li Shufen was murdered 
because she refused to give school test to another girl in class for copying”; “the neck has 
scratches all over! It is obvious that she’s been strangled to death”; The son of the vice-county 
mayor, in league with another youngster, obscenely raped and ruthlessly murdered and threw a 
school girl from Weng’an into the West-Gate river…..”.202 
 
As these two examples show there are also a lot of anonymous sources in this investigative 
article. Looking at the table of sources we can see the use of both vague and anonymous 
sources, include “many townspeople, one eyewitness, villager, anonymous schoolmate, two 
teachers, another student, local investor, anonymous villager, villager on the scene, informed 
person” and so forth. By Western journalistic standards, to publish such serious accusations 
through the attribution to such vague sources would probably be condemned and detested. 
This is perhaps one the backsides of Chinese investigative journalism, which is dependent on 
the market and revenue, and press ethics becomes less important than sensationalised stories 
securing readership and profits. However, within the context of the Chinese media, Elin 
Sæther has noted that attribution to anonymous and vague sources could be ways for the 
journalist to voice their own views and perspectives in the text.203 Referring to vague or 
anonymous sources could then be a discursive strategy of voicing alternative views that are 
suppressed in the official party-press discourse.  
 
Li Shufen’s maternal grandmother Lu Suzhen is also quoted directly in the article saying for 
sure “there was no water in the stomach at the time of the autopsy and there were pills in the 
throat”.204 All of these rumours constitute another clash of between different regimes of truth. 
This clash between official accounts based upon official sources (guanfang cailiao) is further 
contrasted with first-hand accounts from non-official sources. For example, Li Xiuzhong, the 
uncle of Li Shufen, who was reported to have been involved in a clash at the police station 
with Zhang Ming, a police officer. While official sources denied that Li got severely injured, 
this article quotes directly from Li Xiuhua’s appeal, sating “that his little brother Li Xiuzhong, 
before formal talks with the police, was severely wounded by a policeman using a baton and 








kicking [him]”.205 According to this investigative report, Li Xiuzhong was also later the same 
day attacked and given a sound beating by unidentified men on his way to another round of 
formal talks. Li Xiuhua wrote on his urgent appeal that “Li Xiuzhong was severely beaten, 
and remains unconscious, blood coming out mouth, nose and ears, and his condition is 
critical”. He also wrote; “[my] beloved daughter Li Shufen was murdered and drowned, and 
the police won’t file the case for further investigation to solve the crime”.206 By not 
commenting on or evaluating these appeals, which would be too sensitive, the journalist 
leaves it up to the reader to interpret what to make out of these first-hand non-official sources. 
In this way, critical journalistic discourse gives more room for interpretation by presenting an 
alternative media representation bases upon a multitude of official and non-official voices and 
perspective. The party-press discourse is much more monophonic and authoritarian media 
representation, in which propagating the official truth is central. 
 
The other side of polyphony, as we saw in the first analysis of Southern Weekend’s coverage, 
includes giving voice to official soucres. In this article, official discourse is mostly 
represented through quotes from Shi Zongyuan (Guizhou provincial party committee 
secretary), Wang Fuyu (deputy secretary) and Wu Tingshu (Commisionary secretary of 
Qiannanzhou). Indeed, even though the majority of sources in this article are non-official 
ones, prominence is given to the official voice in many ways. The headline itself “Weng’an – 
the unstable town”207 is derived from a quote by Shi Zongyuan. The sub-headline “the ‘6.28’ 
incident may look like random, but was inevitable, and would had happened sooner or 
later”208 is also a direct quote of his. In the editorial note, which precedes the actual report, 
Shi Zongyuan and the deputy secretary are also represented through direct quotes and 
reported speech. I argue these and the following examples constitute what Scott calls 
infrapolitics, which entails the strategic use of the dominant official discourse. Not only does 
this prominence of the official voice in this text help to legitimize the most critical content by 
seemingly accepting a subordinate position in relation to the provincial party-government, but 
through this use of infrapolitics mixed with a polyphony of non-official voices helps to create 







208 ‘6.28’ 事件看似偶然，是属必然，迟早都会发生 
91 
 
a double meaning. This rich mixture of both official and non-official voices camouflages the 
most sensitive parts in this text. We can for instance observe how quotes and the pretext of 
these quotes from high standing officials are being used to elaborate on the deeper causes 
(shenchengci yuanyin). As Shi Zongyuan points out; “Weng’an is not safe, the masses don’t 
have feel safe, and the people do not dare to speak the truth”.209 This statement and statements 
about the deeper causes (shengci yuanyin) are also found in Guizhou Daily’s coverage, but 
not elaborated upon beyond the comments made by Shi Zongyuan. In this text, we can see 
that these exact comments are being used to introduce alternative perspectives on the same 
topic, but going beyond and further than the original quotes. This use of the official discourse 
to make critical content more safe is perhaps most evident in the elaboration of one of the 
deeper causes, namely the settlements of migrants (yimin anzhi). The official voice can be 
spotted right before some of the more critical perspectives under the section of  “the helpless 
village, migrants joining the demonstrations”. The next example is one that I argue epitomize 
the strategic use of official discourse as a pretext for commenting and elaborating on the most 
politically sensitive issues. In this case, the bad governance regarding the handling of 
migrants and the journalist only elaborates on this particular deeper cause, after quoting Shi 
Zongyuan’s claim about how the controversial death of Li Shufen was only the superficial 
“blasting fuse”: 
 
(…) but the backdrop of the deeper causes is in the local handling of the settlement of 
emigrants, relocation in connection with construction work, and development of mineral 
resources, there has been repeated occurrences with infringements of interests of the masses. 
What Shi Zongyuan called “settlement of emigrants”, include the thousands of emigrants in 
the Seven Star village.210 
 
Particularly the last sentence functioning as the connection between Shi Zongyuan’s quote to 
a concrete elaboration of a deeper cause is a good example of infrapolitics. The same strategy 
is utilized again, in the last part of the section “active criminal gangs,…” which is one of the 
most sensitive parts of the article. As we saw in the sample sentence in the analysis of agency, 
this part touches upon the alleged cooperation between local government and criminal gangs. 
In this example Shi Zongyuan’ voice is present through reported speech and as a part of the 
strategic use of the official dominant discourse: 
 
The 3rd of July, Guizhou party secretary, Shi Zongyuan believed that, in dealing with 
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conflicts and disputes and during the mass incident, some cadres’ style of work were 
rough/crude [brutal] and simplistic [derog.] even using police force at will (…) whenever there 
is an incident, the public security bureau is at once called out onto the frontlines, the masses’ 
has many complaints, [and this] does not only lead to strained cadre-mass relationship, but also 
spur a strained relationship between the police and the people.211 
 
Deputy secretary Wang Fuyu is also quoted straight after, saying “I believe that some cadres 
are corrupt and are in collaboration with criminal forces, serving as the “signalman” and a 
“protecting power” for the criminal forces”.212 So after exposing government officials’ 
alleged collaboration with criminals, and examples of corrupt governance and repeated 
infringements of the rights of villagers, reliance on solving problems with the brute force of 
police, this very sensitive part of the article is concluded with the official voices of Shi 
Zongyuan and Wang Fuyu. This is yet another example of infrapolitics, with the strategic use 
of the official discourse and voice. 
 
The polyphony of this investigative news article, expressing perspectives of both official and 
non-official character and mixing them all up makes the article much more open for 
interpretation. The journalist does not as much evaluate the truth of these different voices and 
perspectives, as just comparing them and contrasting them. It is much more up to the reader to 
interpret and make independent judgments. This might also be one of the crucial differences 
between the two discourses. Guizhou Daily’s monophonic and authoritarian account is much 
more about telling and propagating an official version of the truth, leaving the reader little 
room for alternative interpretations. While on the other side, one of the distinguished 
characteristics of the critical journalism and Southern Weekend’s discourse is its polyphony, 
which forces the reader to make his or hers own interpretations. But the most important 
finding in this analysis is the strategic use of the official discourse and voice in the mix of a 
multitude of non-official voices. This strategic use of the dominant official discourse 
constitutes a type of discourse which Scott calls infrapolitcs. Drawing upon this, we can argue 
that the use of this particular discursive strategy of resistance, along side analepsis, conscious 
lexical and syntactical choices, help to mask the real intentions of investigative journalism, 
which is to go beyond the party-press style of reporting and get highly sensitive information 
published.  












My analysis has on one side shown how Gouzhou Daily and the party-press discourse 
organized knowledge and meaning of the Weng’an incident around the immediate acts of 
extreme violence and destruction done by the few. I have pointed out some exclusive 
categories only used in the party-press discourse, such as the vague and derogatory generic 
terms "some people" (yixie ren), "lawless people" (bufafenzi), "people with ulterior motives" 
(bie yongxin de ren), "hit-smash-loot-burn people" (da-za-qiang-shao fenzi), "evil criminals 
(he'eshili renyuan).  I argue that these were used to describe a social group I simply have 
called the few. In one of the important themes an my analysis, blame and victimization, the 
few is not only perceived to be the culprit, with the foregrounding of their violent acts through 
consistent syntactical choices, but also as the one causing the mass incident to happen. Not 
only did the few in a animalistic and irrational sense go on a violent rampage, seemingly 
without any rational cause, but they were also blamed for "stirring up the ignorant masses". In 
this respect, we saw that the masses as a social group was in different ways construed as 
irrational, unconscious and passive, and very often placed as the affected or the object of 
another agent's action. I argue in my thesis by being placed in such a position, the masses 
come off as a social group with a very low degree of agency. This helps to enhance and 
underpin the perception and representation of them as irrational and ignorant mob-like entity 
without own ideas and thoughts. Another crucial finding in my analysis is the particular 
representation of social conflicts in the texts, which I argue the immense focus on the role of 
few as main culprit helps to underpin. In the party-press discourse this is perceived to be 
mainly a conflict between the lawless few and the lawful government. Guizhou Daily’s party-
press discourse also explains this mass incident within the powerful and well known 
discursive frameworks, such as social stability (wending) and harmony (hexie) and social and 
economic development (shehui jingji fazhan). In this respect, the few is not only also 
responsible for material destruction and physical violence, but also for wrecking more the 
more immaterial and abstract conditions of stability and harmony. Through a comparative 
view, we also saw how the two papers use and contextualize official discourse and voice in 
two completely different ways. In here, official discourse was used to propagate the official 




Southern Weekend with its critical investigative discourse provides an alternative media 
representation of the Weng’an incident. First of all, the roles of the blamed and the victim 
have been switched around It is the local government and officials who are perceived to be 
blamed for infringing upon the rights and interests of the people. Southern Weekend places 
and understands the Weng'an incident within a legal framework and connects it to the topics, 
such as the lack of a functioning legal system that ensures the people means to rightfully 
protest and voice their discontent. On this level, my analysis shows how two different 
discourses organize knowledge and meaning of the same news event in two radically different 
ways. We have also seen how Souhtern Weekend’s discourse carefully oscilliates between the 
concrete examples of government malpractice in Weng’an and the more principal and abstract 
discussions of government power, fundamental civil rights, a functioning civil society and so 
fourth. The Weng'an incident is then used as a pretext to comment and implicitly touch upon 
overarching, systemic problems. My analysis has also shown how the representation of the 
social conflict in Southern Weekend’s media representation is much more complicated than 
the distinct dichotomy between the lawful government and the lawless few found in the party-
press discourse. In this critical investigative discourse, the social conflict is perceived to have 
evolved from a long withstanding one between the government of Weng’an and its people. 
Another central theme and analytical category in my analysis is voices present and absent in 
the texts. One major finding in this analysis and a distinctive characteristic of Southern 
Weekend's critical investigative discourse is its polyphony. In the critical investigative 
discourse, many non-official voices are mixed and intertwined with official voices. This is 
how voices of the family of the deceased, peasants and migrant-workers can be genuinely 
represented in Southern Weekend’s coverage. In addition, I also found that the official voice, 
especially that of provincial party secretary Shi Zongyuan was very dominant in Southern 
Weekend as well. I argue that this strategic use of official discourse can be understood and 
explained with Scott's concept of infrapolitics. This is a discursive strategy of resistance that 
makes the most critical and sensitive passages seem more politically tolerable and thus 
publishable. My analysis of Southern Weekend has shown how this manifests itself, with a 
find a pattern in which an official quote often precedes or follows a more critical and sensitive 
passage. Polyphony in tandem with the strategic use of official discourse and voice is one 
distinct discursive strategy by which Southern Weekend can get sensitive and critical 




Some Last Thoughts about the Two Forms of Discourse: 
Party-Press Discourse versus Investigative Discourse 
 
Christian Gobel points out that there are two main strategies of government propaganda on 
rural China, providing two different frameworks for understanding rural China and its 
problems. He identifies one strategy as “rule by division”, which entails a similar mechanism, 
to what we have seen in my analysis, of blaming the local and praising the national. The other 
strategy is called “strength through unity”.213 I think these two strategies on rural propaganda 
can help to understand both the party-press and the investigative discourse of the Weng’an 
incident better.  
 
Gobel asserts that “strength through unity” “imagines rural China as an organizational whole. 
The centre, local cadres, and peasants are imagined as integral parts of a comprehensive 
modernization project led by the center”.214 In addition, the negative aspects of the ongoing 
social transformation in Post-Mao China are understood through an orthodox Marxist 
framework: “uneven development is narrated as a force of history ("primary stage of 
socialism")”.215 My analysis shows that Guizhou Daily’s party-press discourse share many 
similar ways of discursively understanding rural China. In the party-press discourse we have 
identified a consistent focus on the successful cooperation between local levels of government 
and the provincial- and the national levels. The best example is how orders from the center 
were followed completely to the letter by the provincial and local government, which was 
perceived to be instrumental in securing social stability and harmony. One of the main 
reasons why Guizhou Daily draws upon this particular discursive framework is that local 
governments and cadres are not perceived to be main culprits of rural problems and “peasant 
burden”. This because, as earlier noted, that prosperity and social harmony will come to rural 
China in due time being in the primary stage of socialism.216 “Strength by unity” provides an 
understanding that does not entail an explicit focus upon the illegitimate practices of a corrupt 
local government. 
 
The immense focus on the lawless few and fear of social disintegration we found Guizhou 
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Daily could be connected to drawing upon the old fear of imagining rural China as a “loose 
plate of sand” (yipan sansha)217. My analysis of Guizhou Daily has shown that this fear, 
manifested in the focus upon role of the lawless few was one of the discursive nodal points in 
the coverage. Indeed, one of the solutions imagined in the party-press discourse was the 
perceived need for building a stronger party organization “securing” the precarious social 
space of rural China. The overwhelming focus upon the “evil criminals” and organized crime 
reflects a common fear shared by most Chinese and Western scholars:218 a weak state and 
party presence in rural China will result in the growth of dubious organizations, such 
criminals networks and gangs. This fear is undoubtedly drawn upon and used in the party-
press discourse of Guizhou Daily. The function of this fear is to make it more plausible to 
point to a minority of lawless people, their prominent role and the perception of them as a 
very dangerous disruptive force, endangering “the excellent conditions of stability and unity” 
not only in Weng’an, but also in the entire Guizhou province. “Strength through unity” is a 
fitting discursive framework because social unrest is not perceived to be the result of corrupt 
local governments. That is why this discursive framework provides an understanding in which 
corrupt local government and cadres can be overlooked as main culprits. “Strength through 
unity” provides Guizhou Daily with powerful tools and well-known discursive references to 
interpret and ascribe meaning to this particular mass incident to be congruent with the 
provincial government’s concerns and interests. Consequently, such a framework limits what 
can be said on local malpractices and corruption. It also simplifies the complex relationship 
between the different levels of government, by propagating and imagining the party-state 
apparatus as a harmonious coherent whole, without any clashes of interests. 
 
I argue that Southern Weekend’s investigative discourse could be better understood with 
reference to a discursive framework Gobel calls “rule by division”. This strategy “entails a 
verbal alliance of the center with the peasants against “several local cadres responsible for 
rural instability” and “enables the center to shed blame for systemic problems in its local 
agents, but harms peasant-cadre relations and turns local officials against the center”.219 This 
way of understanding rural China enables critical journalists to pinpoint blame and causes to 
corrupt local officials and local governments. As such, it creats a discursive space to actually 
discuss some of the more sensitive and controversial aspects of party-state governance in 
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post-Mao China, as well as the downfalls of thirty years of reform and opening up. However, 
this critical coverage and exposure must be limited to the local and individualized instances of 
illegitimate government practices. As Gobel points out: “this strategy enables the center to 
shed blame for systemic problems on its local agents”.220 In other words, “rule by division” 
and Southern Weekend’s discourse share the same narrow scale and scope in limiting 
explanatory schemes of social problems in rural China strictly to the local, by only focusing 
on the “moral degradation of the local leadership“ and overlooking possible “systemic 
deficits”.221 For example, any critical investigation of local problems connected with a 
commentary upon systemic problems is clearly off-limits. One example could be the inherent 
urban bias in the macro economic polices designed and put in practice by the center. As 
Gobel points out: "income inequality, however, can hardly be blamed on rural officials, as it is 
a direct result of the center's very conscious macro-policy designed to let "some get rich 
first”.222 Comments upon systemic problems constitute a part of what have to be left unsaid in 
the critical investigative discourse.  
 
My thesis shows, on the contrary, to view critical investigative discourse and journalism as 
just a part of a necessary state-sanctioned supervision on local malpractices is inaccurate. 
Such a view ascribes too much agency to the state and its ability to control and dominate, as 
well as putting too much emphasis on the social structuration of discourse. Media output, and 
especially that of an investigative newspaper, cannot simply be read off and understood solely 
as products of their economic and systemic conditions and contexts. As one of my major 
findings in this thesis has shown, critical investigative discourse makes use of particular 
discursive strategies of resistance under conditions of dominance, such as the strategic use of 
the official discourse in tandem with an inclusion of non-official voices in order to express 
and critically comment upon the status quo. This is how investigative journalism can create 
alternative and new spaces of media representations. This will be further discussed in the final 
and concluding chapter. 
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Chapter V: Conclusion 
 
 
This thesis has shown how party-papers and investigative newspapers cover the sensitive 
topic of mass incidents through analysing the media coverage of the Weng’an incident by 
Guizhou Daily and Southern Weekend. With this dual focus we have seen both how different 
these two media representations are (representing the same mass incident), and how different 
their respective discourses organize knowledge and meaning of the Weng’an incident.  
 
One focal point in my thesis has been locating resistance to party-state domination and 
orthodox party-press style of journalism in the discursive dimension. But the analysis of 
Guizhou Daily’s coverage has also contributed to a better understanding of the discursive 
strategies at play in the party-press discourse. Such strategies help to construe this particular 
mass incident to be congruent with the concerns and interests of the provincial government, 
and to some degree to the local county government of Weng’an. The strategies used for this 
purpose include referential vagueness and dehumanisation of the lawless few through vague 
and derogatory lexical choices of terms, such as “some people”, “some lawless people”,  
“people with an ulterior motive”, “evil criminals” and so forth. The lawless few as a social 
actor is also responsible and blamed for the happening of the incident and its escalation from 
the initial situation into a mass incident by inciting the “ignorant masses”. We have also seen 
how syntactical choices were employed to foreground the role of “the few” in this mass 
incident, by explicitly showing the casual links as the agent of material destruction and the 
subsequent victimization of the local government. One finding that epitomizes this is how 
through a causative sentence construction, the primary agency of the few takes to the ignorant 
masses’ is its object, forming a form of secondary agency: “some people’s action”: “some 
people stirred up/incited the ignorant masses to assault the county public security 
department”.223 This is a discursive strategy used to explicitly point and blame the few for the 
actions of the many. This strategy also helps to enhance the picture of “the ignorant masses” 
as a passive mob without their own ideas and thoughts. But the lawless few as a social actor 
was perceived to also be the disrupter of the more immaterial conditions of stability and unity, 
social harmony (wending, andingtuanjie, hexie) and social and economic development 
(shehui jingji fazhan). These well-known and powerful discourses functioned as the 




overarching discursive frameworks drawn upon in order to underpin a particular party-press 
representation of the Weng’an incident. One example of this is how concerns of social 
stability and unity were prioritized at the expense of elaborating on “the deeper causes” 
(shenchengci yuanyin). The strategy of putting an immense focus on the lawless few also 
underpins the construction of a particular understanding of social conflicts and contradictions 
in these texts. In the party-press discourse, this mass incident was solely seen as grounded in a 
conflict between the lawless few, their impulsive irrational destructiveness and a lawful local 
government.  
 
My thesis and analysis of the coverage by Southern Weekend has also shown resistance to 
such party-press discourse and its particular media representation of the Weng’an incident. 
The discursive strategies of resistance employed in Southern Weekend’s coverage include 
retrospective techniques and analepsis in the narrative of “the deeper causes”. This particular 
way of construing the narrative, especially significant in the article “Unstable Weng’an” is 
one crucial way to critically comment and tell the story about illegitimate and corrupt 
government practices stretching years back in time. The analysis of Southern Weekend’s 
media coverage also brought light to other subtler strategies, such as conscious lexical and 
syntactical choices. These choices help to downplay the particular and very sensitive 
representation of social conflicts in these texts. In the critical investigative discourse social 
conflicts are perceived to be one between a corrupt local government and the masses of 
Weng’an. These aforementioned strategies are instrumental in creating a balance between the 
right amount of implicitness and explicitness in order to point to the causal links between the 
illegitimate practices, the role of the local government and its representatives. But the major 
finding in this thesis is the polyphonic expressions found in the critical investigate discourse, 
and in which the strategic use of the dominant official discourse and voice is essential in 
neutralizing critical non-official voices and views. This multitude of official and non-official 
voices mixed up together constitutes a central feature of Southern Weekend’s investigative 
discourse. I have explained Southern Weekend’s heavy reliance upon official sources and its 
strategic use of the dominant official discourse with Scott’s concept of infrapolitics. 
Polyphony and infrapolitics help to make the critical and sensitive parts of the texts seem 
subordinate, as well as to camouflage transgressive aspects. As Sæther points out, “in order to 
avoid party-state sanctions, critical journalism must appear as non-subversive”.224 That is why 
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polyphony in tandem with infrapolitics is a major discursive strategy of resistance under 
conditions of party-state domination over the order of Chinese media discourse. Furthermore, 
the successful use of infrapolitics can enable investigative journalism to get subversive and 
counter-hegemonic views out into to public transcript. In this respect, I think the critical 
investigative discourse of Southern Weekend plays an instrumental role in questioning and 
addressing the inconstancies in the party-press representation of the ‘6.28’ incident by 
creating an alternative media representation of the Weng’an incident.  
 
It is also interesting to note how my thesis brings to light how discourse (abstract noun) as 
social practice is both constituted by the social and arguably constitutive of the social. For 
instance, the discourse of mass incidents seems to be dependent on a string of factors, such as 
where the actual event took place, the newspaper’s physical location and how it is situated in 
relation to the administrative boundaries of the party-state. The discourse of mass incidents, 
and in particular, the critical investigative discourse, seems to be closely tied to and dependent 
on the practice of cross-regional reporting. This practice provides a certain space of media 
freedom due to the clashes of propaganda aims and interests between the national and local 
levels of government. As such, Southern Weekend’s media coverage of the Weng’an incdient 
owns credit to how well it can exploit this relative space of media freedom provided by cross-
regional reporting.  
 
My thesis has also shown how discourse can shape the social and possibilities of agency 
within discourse, despite being under conditions of domination. As earlier noted, this is 
connected to the practice of cross regional reporting that provides the most important space in 
which critical investigative journalism can conduct their work. It is precisely in this space 
they can challenge and contest the boundaries of the acceptable in order of Chinese media 
discourse. I think my analysis of Southern Weekend’s coverage shows how investigative 
journalism resists party-press style of journalism and the concept of being the party’s 
mouthpiece. The role and function of Guizhou Daily is closely connected to this concept. As a 
localized mouthpiece, Guizhou Daily’s primary role and function is to construe a positive 
representation of provincial party-state, and to protect the self-interests and the image the 
official provincial government. Guizhou Daily’s party-press coverage is a very authoritarian 
and monophonic media representation, of which the goal in this case is domination and 
control over the meaning of the Weng’an incident. This can explain Guizhou Daily’s very 
orthodox and conventional style of party-press journalism. Being a party-paper strictly 
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adhering to the Maoist concept of mouthpiece, this discourse tries to legitimate, reproduce 
and naturalize the existing relations of domination. As such, concerns regarding social 
stability, unity and harmony overrules any critical exposure of the local government in this 
party press discourse. 
 
Southern Weekend and its role and function is much more complicated. I think it would be 
over simplistic to understand it only as copying Western ideals of journalistic autonomy and 
media independence. It should be understood within the Chinese context, which is completely 
different from the liberal democracies in the West. As I also point out in my analysis, critical 
and investigative exposure is strictly limited to the local levels of government and separate 
individual instances – in this way, central and provincial levels of government often come off 
as responsive and responsible, correcting and addressing individual failures at the local level. 
On this level, one can say that investigative journalism partially fulfils an updated mouthpiece 
role by giving legitimacy to higher levels of party-state government. Despite this, I argue that 
even though the goal of such state-sanctioned supervision by public opinion is to play this 
blame-game, such an assessment fails to see the agency of critical journalism. Southern 
Weekend’s alternative media representation of the Weng’an incident should be historicised 
and put in the context of critical journalism in China, a force that has changed and disrupted 
the once completely asymmetrical relationship between the media and the state. By this I 
mean that although the party-state in China has been relatively successful in controlling its 
own commercial media and still is a relatively dominant force within its media system, I agree 
with Elin Sæther's assertion that not only has investigative journalism normalized critical 
discourse since the 1990s - a relatively new discourse within the Chinese media field - but it 
is also in subtle ways creating new spaces of media representations and thus constantly 
challenging and pushing the boundaries of the acceptable in the order of Chinese media 
discourse, which now is a very contested space and site of constant struggle over the control 
of meaning and knowledge. As Elin Sæther points out, this is based on a “conditional 
autonomy” in which critical journalists as producers of investigative discourse create new 
spaces of representations: 
 
Through [the use of] social and discursive strategies they frame criticism in ways subtle 
enough to be allowed publication, and direct enough to suggest existence of severe social 
problems in Chinese society. The ability to do this secures a conditional autonomy resulting in 
new spaces of representation”.225    
                                                




My thesis has shown how Southern Weekend’s role and function are connected with the use 
of diverse discursive strategies of resistance, enabling investigative newspapers to resist the 
traditional party-press style of journalism. I conclude that Southern Weekend’s alternative 
media representation of the Weng’an incident can be understood as an example of how 
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